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The Role of Storage and Information in Stabilizing Food Prices and Supplies 
Abstract 
High and volatile food prices can push people into poverty, impact production and consump-
tion, discourage investments, and lead to social unrest. Thus, due to occasional global food 
shortages as in 2007/08 and frequent regional shortages, many governments apply price 
stabilization policies. However, academic and political controversies about appropriate 
measures persist. This thesis explores the role of private and public storage, information, trade 
policies, international cooperation, and price-responsive production in stabilizing food prices. 
In spite of its relevance for resource allocation, knowledge of the quality of global supply and 
demand estimates is limited. Hence, USDA, IGC, and FAO-AMIS estimates are compared 
using cointegration analysis, granger causality tests and three other methods. Estimation 
differences are found to be driven by methodological discrepancies rather than differing 
information. Differences are large for stocks and trade and persist over time revealing a 
comovement of the estimates. Averaging over sources can improve robustness and precision.  
Despite its importance for the WTO and other trade agreements, knowledge of stabilization 
policies in an open economy is scarce. Additionally, private storage has been neglected in 
previous studies on international cooperation. Thus, emergency reserves, subsidized private 
storage, and strategic trade restrictions are compared in terms of their costs and impacts on 
price levels, volatility, and extreme events. A rational expectation partial equilibrium model is 
applied to capture dynamic interactions between agents. Private storage is found to be 
effective in reducing price volatility, whereas, complementarily, reserves are more effective in 
preventing extreme events. While free trade is usually beneficial, incentives for restricting 
exports may arise if stabilization policies are not aligned or the production variability differs 
too much. Asymmetric policies can explain large price increases as observed in 2007/08. 
With some adjustments, the above model is used to present a new empirical validation method 
for the competitive storage model, the workhorse in numerical analysis of private storage. For 
the first time, the validation uses actual stock data. By applying a surface response 
methodology, this study derives a reduced-form equation which is shown to perform well as a 
surrogate model for private storage in theory and empirical tests. This allows directly 
quantifying stock determinants and facilitates high-dimensional modelling exercises.  
As an empirical case study, India’s public stockholding program, which suffers from surging 
stocks and costs, is analyzed. Necessary reforms require understanding how policies impact 
stocks, which is quantified for the first time. Thus, expected policy impacts on public rice stocks 
are deduced from economic theory and tested empirically. Private stock determinants are quan-
tified by combining the reduced-form storage equation with an instrumental variable approach. 
Public storage is found to be inert, lacking crisis-responsive consumer protection and driven 
by the minimum support price, market supply, and export bans. The 29% increase of the real 
support price in 2008 contributed 4.9 million tons to public stocks, the export ban another 2.9. 
Each ton of public stocks crowds out half a ton of private stocks; however, speculative storage 
activities persist. Policy makers seem to be unaware of the problematic policy interactions. 
China’s demand growth and reluctance to rely on imports for its main food crops underline 
the need for a responsive supply, i.e. farmers making use of the latest price information. 
Hence, the time-dependent price responsiveness of supply is analyzed using the difference 
GMM estimator on province panel data. Production responds most to prices around planting 
time indicating the up-to-dateness of farmers’ price information. High temperatures reduce 
production thereby highlighting the importance of limiting climate change and adapting to it.  
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Die Rolle von Lagerhaltung und Informationen bei der Stabilisierung von Angebot und 
Preisen von Nahrungsmitteln 
Zusammenfassung 
Hohe und volatile Nahrungsmittelpreise können Menschen in Armut drängen, Produktion, 
Konsum sowie Investitionen beeinflussen und Unruhen auslösen. Wegen gelegentlicher globaler 
Nahrungsmittelengpässe wie in 2007/08 und häufiger regionaler Engpässe verwenden viele 
Regierungen Preisstabilisierungspolitiken. Diese führen jedoch nach wie vor zu akademischen 
und politischen Kontroversen. Diese Arbeit erforscht die Rolle staatlicher und privater 
Lagerhaltung, von Informationen, Handelspolitiken, internationaler Kooperation, sowie einer auf 
Preisänderungen reagierenden Produktion bei der Preisstabilisierung. 
Das Wissen über die Qualität globaler Angebots- und Nachfrageschätzungen ist trotz seiner 
Bedeutung für die Ressourcenallokation begrenzt. Daher werden Schätzungen des USDA, IGC, und 
FAO-AMIS mit Hilfe von Kointegrationstests, Granger-Kausalitätsstests und weiteren Methoden 
verglichen. Unterschiede zwischen Schätzungen bestehen über die Zeit fort, sind groß für Lager- 
und Handelsdaten und scheinen eher das Resultat verschiedener Methoden als abweichender 
Informationen zu sein. Eine Mittelung über die Quellen kann Präzision und Robustheit verbessern. 
Trotz der Wichtigkeit für die WTO und andere Handelsabkommen ist das Wissen über Stabilisie-
rungspolitiken in offenen Volkswirtschaften gering und frühere Studien zur Kooperation haben 
private Lager ignoriert. Daher wird die theoretische Kosteneffizienz der Stabilisierung durch 
Notfallreserven, subventionierter privater Lagerhaltung und strategischer Handelspolitiken vergli-
chen. Ein partielles Gleichgewichtsmodel mit rationalen Erwartungen erfasst die dynamischen 
Interaktionen der Akteure. Private Lager sind effektiv in der Volatilitätsverringerung während, 
komplementär dazu, eine Notreserve effektiver in der Verhinderung extremer Preise ist. Freier 
Handel ist meistens vorteilhaft, aber Anreize für Exportrestriktionen entstehen bei 
asymmetrischen Stabilisierungspolitiken oder Produktionsvariabilitäten. Asymmetrische Politiken 
können auch starke Preisanstiege erklären, wie sie beispielsweise in 2007/08 beobachtet wurden. 
Modifiziert ermöglicht das obige Model eine neue empirische Validierungsmethode für das 
kompetitive Lagerhaltungsmodel, das Standardmodel privater Lagerhaltung. Erstmals werden bei 
der Validierung Lagerbestände berücksichtigt. Mit Hilfe der Antwortflächenmethode wird eine 
reduzierte Gleichung hergeleitet, die ein genaues Ersatzmodel in der Theorie wie auch bei empiri-
schen Tests darstellt. Dies erlaubt die direkte Quantifizierung von Lagerhaltungsdeterminanten 
und ermöglicht hoch-dimensionale Modellbildung mit privater Lagerhaltung.  
Steigende Lagerbestände und Kosten von Indiens staatlichem Lagerhaltungsprogramm erfordern 
Reformen. Diese bedürfen Kenntnisse darüber, wie Regulierungen Lager beeinflussen, was erst-
mals in dieser Studie quantifiziert wird. Der Einfluss von Richtlinien auf Reisbestände wird aus 
ökonomischer Theorie hergeleitet und empirisch getestet. Determinanten privater Reisbestände 
werden mit der reduzierten Gleichung und einem Instrumentalvariablenansatz quantifiziert. Öf-
fentliche Lager erscheinen träge, beeinflusst von Angebot, Exportverboten und Minimum Support 
Price (MSP) und entbehren eines krisenabhängigen Konsumentenschutzes. Der 29%ige Anstieg 
des realen MSP in 2008 führte zu 4,9, das Exportverbot zu 2,9 Millionen Tonnen mehr in öffentli-
chen Lagern. Jede öffentlich gelagerte Tonne verdrängt eine halbe private, aber spekulative La-
gerhaltung besteht fort. Die problematischen Interaktionen von Maßnahmen scheinen unbekannt. 
Chinas Nachfrageanstieg und Abneigung gegen Importabhängigkeit für Grundnahrungsmittel 
erfordern eine schnelle Reaktion der Produktion auf Preisänderungen. Daher wird die zeitabhän-
gige Preisantwort der Produktion mithilfe des difference GMM Schätzers und Provinz-Paneldaten 
untersucht. Preise zur Anbauzeit stellen sich als am Wichtigsten heraus, was die Aktualität der 
Preisinformationen der Landwirte bezeugt. Hohe Temperaturen verringern die Produktion und 
unterstreichen so die Notwendigkeit den Klimawandel zu begrenzen und sich anzupassen.  
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1 General Introduction 
This introduction starts with a classification of the thesis within the framework of food and 
nutrition security (FNS). Then, it clarifies its motivation by posing the question of whether 
government interventions are useful and evaluating the current risk of food scarcities. 
Subsequently, the debate on information availability and usage, trade restrictions, and public 
stockholding is summarized while open issues are highlighted. Subsequently, objectives and 
research questions are formulated and put into perspective regarding the state of the debate. 
Finally, an outline of the thesis is provided. 
1.1 Motivation 
1.1.1 Classification of this thesis within the FNS framework 
The Millennium Development Goals, now followed by the Sustainable Development Goals, 
have increased global attention in achieving food security for all. Despite substantial progress, 
there are doubts whether ending hunger and poverty can be achieved by 2030 as foreseen in 
the Sustainable Development Goals (United Nations 2015a). Food security consists of food 
availability, accessibility, utilization, and the stability of these three dimensions (FAO 1996). 
The stability of food availability, the only category considered in this thesis, contains a short-
run and a long-run component. The latter, which can be seen from a Malthusian perspective 
(Malthus 1798), asks whether the production trend can keep up with the demand trend. 
Demand is driven by the rising population (United Nations 2015b), the increasingly resource-
intensive diets (e.g. Alexandratos and Bruinsma 2012; Daniel et al. 2011; Mekonnen and 
Hoekstra 2011, 2010), persistently high food losses (e.g. Gustavsson et al. 2011; Parfitt et al. 
2010), and the increasing biofuel use (e.g. Abbott et al. 2011; Coyle 2007; Haberl et al. 2011).  
Short-term supply shortages are caused by unexpected supply shocks implying that supply 
levels are below the trend. Potential causes are manifold. First, natural disasters or extreme 
weather events may lead to harvest shortfalls. Second, underlying market conditions may 
provide bad incentives for private market actors such as prices fixed by the government 
resulting in inefficient resource allocation decisions. Financial market conditions which boost 
coupling of non-food with food commodities (compare e.g. Basak and Pavlova 2013; Tang 
and Xiong 2012) or let “animal spirits” and mass psychology drive asset prices (e.g. Shiller 
2003) serve as further example. Third, unexpected policy changes may lead to sudden demand 
or supply changes. For example, export bans may lead to a domestic surplus but shortages 
abroad. Climate change may have long-term impacts, e.g. through higher temperatures. 
Besides, it may amplify short-term supply fluctuations, e.g. by increasing weather variability.  
Even if food is abandoned and accessible, it does not necessarily imply that it is sufficient to 
meet nutritional needs, i.e. to prevent “hidden hunger”. However, this thesis focusses on the 
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calorie availability to avoid food shortages which lead to undernutrition. Four main sub-pillars 
constitute the components of food availability: production, storage, transportation, and 
processing. Storage can be divided into public storage, private speculative storage, which is 
profit-maximizing, and private non-speculative storage. The latter might contain motives such 
as preventing interruptions of production processes or material flows (Carter and Giha 2007; 
Williams 1987). This thesis focusses on public and private speculative storage as parts of the 
storage category, supply response as a part of the production category, and international trade 
as part of the transport category. It investigates how storage and trade behave in different situ-
ations, both theoretically and empirically, and illustrates how price information is used for the 
supply response in China. Given the importance of high quality and up-to-date information, 
the analysis starts with assessing the quality of available supply and demand estimates. 
1.1.2 High food prices and volatility: should governments intervene? 
High and volatile food prices can have serious consequences. Poor net consumers, including 
many small farmers, may suffer under high prices which may lead to insufficient food intake 
and a reduction of investments into education, health, and other areas. In contrast, net 
producers may benefit from high prices. While there is mostly consensus that high prices have 
negative consequences in the short run (Arezki and Brückner 2011; Ivanic and Martin 2008), 
the long-term impacts are not clear and are often debated (e.g. Headey 2014 find that high 
food prices are pro-poor in the long run; compare also Minot and Dewina 2015; Swinnen 
2010). This question typically depends on the share of net producers and net consumers that 
are regarded as poor and on the responsiveness of rural non-farming wages to food prices.  
In contrast, very volatile food prices can be a challenge for both consumers and producers 
because the introduced risk affects the decision making process of risk-averse agents (e.g. 
Moschini and Hennessy 2001; Sandmo 1971). Net producers in developing countries may 
lower their input use and production under risk (Binswanger and Rosenzweig 1986; Carraro 
and Romano 2015; Haile et al. 2014) while net buyers may consume less under risk than 
under certainty (Banerjee and Duflo 2007). Therefore, potential negative welfare impacts of 
excessive food price volatility are widely acknowledged although there is less consensus 
about the actual losses (Myers 2006). Nevertheless, food price shocks can have direct 
negative nutritional impacts (compare e.g. Ecker and Qaim 2011; Kalkuhl et al. 2013). 
The inability to ensure a sufficient food intake may have severe long-term consequences 
(Chen and Zhou 2007; de Janvry et al. 2006). Many mechanisms are used to cope with the 
income and consumption risks, such as diversification of cropping patterns, usage of risk-
reducing inputs, off-farm employment, storage or acquisition of other assets (Rosenzweig and 
Stark 1989; Rosenzweig and Wolpin 1993; Townsend 1994). Despite being valuable, these 
coping mechanisms do not seem to fully compensate for the lack of formal insurance markets 
(Foster 1995; Townsend 1995). This underlines the need for governments to intervene. 
1  General Introduction 
14 
Until the food crisis in 2007/08, a widespread view was that only market-based approaches 
should be used to stabilize prices and prevent negative impacts on the poor. Meanwhile, 
governments were supposed to intervene only in an acute crisis only with targeted and short-
lived measures (e.g. World Bank 2005). However, this “dominant doctrine” (Galtier 2013) or 
“best practices” (Abbott 2010; Timmer 2010) has been criticized for underestimating 
important factors. These include the degree of price instability, the magnitude of exposure by 
producers and consumers, the influence of price instability on overall welfare (Abbott 2010; 
Galtier 2013), and potential social unrest (Arezki and Brückner 2011). Accounting for these 
factors often provides a rationale for governments to intervene. Additionally, markets in 
developing countries are typically highly incomplete and it has long been known that for 
incomplete markets, government interventions such as public stocks can increase overall 
welfare (Innes 1990; Newbery and Stiglitz 1981). Therefore, calls have increased to (re-) 
explore other types of stabilization mechanisms with a particular focus on public stocks and 
reserves (see section 1.1.6). 
Policies to either prevent food price spikes and excessive volatility, i.e. stabilization measures, 
or to find measures to minimize their impacts on the poor, i.e. compensation measures, are 
used in many developing countries. Stabilization measures comprise holding public stocks, 
restricting exports or reducing import restrictions, and subsidizing production. Compensation 
measures include maintaining social safety nets or distributing subsidized grains. It has been 
argued that only the prevention of food crises rather than support in the form of coping 
strategies is able to fully impede welfare losses for poor households (Timmer 2010). 
Corresponding stabilization policies constitute the focus of this thesis. Before discussing 
them, the extent to which the world and individual countries are still at risk will be illustrated.  
1.1.3 Food prices and excessive volatility in the 21st century: are we still at risk? 
From the 1980s onward, food prices were relatively stable until they increased mildly in 2004, 
surged in 2007, and reached a nominal all-time high in 2008. After a short period of declining 
prices, they increased again in 2010 and 2011. Afterward prices declined again but the 
confidence in international markets and the willingness to exclusively rely on market-based 
stabilization approaches, in particular free trade, has faded.  
Studies have identified the following drivers of the food crisis in 2007-2008: increased biofuel 
demand, harvest failures, high energy prices, depreciation of the U.S. Dollar, trade 
restrictions, global economic growth, low stock-to-use levels, and increased financial trading 
of food commodities, e.g. with index funds (Collins 2008; Gerber et al. 2008; Headey and Fan 
2008; Headey 2010; Tadesse et al. 2014). In recent years, food prices decreased and became 
more stable again. At the same time, stock-to-use ratios have increased and energy prices as 
well as input prices remain low. Therefore, chances of entering a new global crisis are 
currently low. However, agricultural markets have not seen any new global measures which 
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could provide more resilience against shocks. While the biofuel demand could be better 
regulated in the future, the other driving forces behind the last crisis still persist and additional 
protection measures are largely missing. An exception is the implementation of the 
Agricultural Market Information System, a G20 initiative which aims at improving data and 
offering a platform for rapid exchange between senior policy makers to align policy measures 
(AMIS 2011a). However, the influence of this initiative during a crisis still needs to be 
proved. Shocks to agricultural production may even become more frequent and severe than in 
the past. Climate change drives global temperatures up, often resulting in reduced yields, and 
increases weather variability thereby introducing higher risks (IPCC 2007; Tao et al. 2006). 
Hence, the current situation of relatively calm global food markets should be used to find 
measures which provide more resilience against future shocks, in particular harvest failures.  
Individual regions may face very different situations than those of global markets. Local 
production shortfalls may have severe impacts even if global supply is abundant. Countries 
may be particularly vulnerable if (1) supplies fall short or demand increases in a sudden and 
unexpected manner such that trade and production cannot adjust quickly enough; (2) net 
exporters become net importers due to the supply shortage which may lead to price increases 
as high as twice the trade costs to global markets; (3) a production shortfall is accompanied by 
a depreciation of the local currency against the U.S. Dollar such that imports become more 
expensive; (4) the affected region is very remote such that trade is costly and time-consuming.  
Currently, for example, some countries face severe food shortages which are mostly caused 
by the ongoing El Niño. Supply shortages in Ethiopia have made 4.5 million people 
dependent on food aid due to poor rainfall (Government of Ethiopia 2015). In Malawi, 2.5 
million people face acute food insecurity due to flooding followed by a drought which has led 
to massive production shortfalls (FEWS NET 2015a). Assistance was planned but is deferred 
indefinitely due to a lack of funds. In Zimbabwe, poor rainfall reduced production 
substantially resulting in up to 1.5 million people suffering under food insecurity (FEWS NET 
2015b). In the Americas, El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, 
and Peru have declared states of emergency in affected provinces (Oxfam 2015).  
As the risk of global supply shortages persists and regional shortages are frequent, policies 
should now focus on implementing measures to increase market resilience and prevent short-
sighted policy responses in the future. Such measures are discussed in the following sections. 
1.1.4 High-quality and up-to-date information: important for market resilience? 
If prices reflect all information that is available, markets are considered to be efficient (Fama 
1970). However, this has no implications about the quality and timeliness of the available 
information set. Yet, if information is of low quality or outdated, uncertainty and risk may 
increase. Risk implies that the probability distribution of potential outcomes is measurable 
whereas uncertainty implies that no statements about the probability distribution of outcomes 
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can be made. Risk and uncertainty about supply and demand conditions may result in price 
volatility, i.e. the dispersion of a price series from its trend, or, if information sets quickly 
change, price spikes, i.e. sudden and large short-term price changes. In contrast, expected 
price changes such as seasonal price variations for seasonal crops are not associated with risk 
or uncertainty. Decision making processes by private market actors as well as governments 
are affected by risk and uncertainty. For example, producers may lower their input use and 
production (Binswanger and Rosenzweig 1986; Carraro and Romano 2015; Haile et al. 2014), 
net buyers may consume less (Banerjee and Duflo 2007), governments may focus more on 
self-sufficiency irrespective of their comparative advantages (compare e.g. von Braun and 
Tadesse 2012), and firms as well as farms may reduce investments (Dawe and Timmer 2012; 
Timmer 1989). Furthermore, poor people may fall into poverty-traps (Dawe and Timmer 
2012). Beyond the agricultural sector, the whole economy may be affected (Ramey and 
Ramey 1995). Thus, governments should invest in reducing risk and uncertainty. The most 
market-oriented way to achieve this is by collecting and disseminating high quality and up-to-
date information (for other options see e.g. Kornher and Kalkuhl 2013). This incentivizes 
investments and allows market actors to make better resource allocation decisions. Producers 
and traders can then react quickly to anticipated scarcities and thereby prevent a potential 
domestic crisis, given enough time to respond and sufficient global supplies. Private stocks 
also increase if risk is reduced (Gouel 2013b; Koester 1986; compare also chapter 3). Overall, 
availability of high-quality information therefore improves the resilience of markets.  
Realizing the need to improve information on agricultural supply and demand conditions, the 
Agricultural Market Information System (AMIS) was set up by the G20 countries in 2011 to 
improve data and align policy responses in times of crises (FAO et al. 2011; G20 2011a). 
Progress has been made in collecting and harmonizing data (AMIS 2012a). However, the 
degree of uncertainty in the data provided by AMIS remains unclear. 
This thesis addresses two issues in this area. Chapter 2 presents a comparison of grain supply 
and demand estimates from the USDA, FAO-AMIS, and IGC. Results illustrate which 
estimates suffer from higher levels of uncertainty, how similar the information available to the 
sources is, and how estimates evolve over time. Chapter 6 analyzes how up-to-date price 
information of Chinese farmers is on the macro-level. This indicates how resilient the Chinese 
agricultural markets are, in particular, up to which point the supply can respond to changed 
market conditions and thereby help to prevent a crisis. 
1.1.5 Trade restrictions: effective intervention or collective action problem? 
Policies to stabilize food prices and supplies aim at influencing trade, storage, production, or 
demand. Typically, trade and storage are considered as the most important means of price 
stabilization. Especially during times of crisis, governments tend to intervene into markets by 
controlling trade or storage. During the world food crisis in 2007/08, at least 35 countries sold 
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grains from public stocks, at least 25 banned or restricted exports and at least 43 countries 
reduced tariffs and custom fees (Demeke et al. 2009). Many important surplus countries, 
particularly for rice, were among those which restricted exports in order to prevent domestic 
price increases. These included Argentina, Cambodia, Egypt, India, Kazakhstan, Russia, 
Ukraine, and Vietnam (Headey 2010). Domestically, these measures have often been very 
effective (Anderson et al. 2013) as they prevent the otherwise often substantial transmission 
of global prices to domestic markets (e.g. Kalkuhl 2014). In India, for example, the rice price 
increased by only 7.9%, whereas the world rice price increased by 160% between June 2007 
and June 2008 (World Bank 2010). In a theoretical study, it has even been shown that similar 
restrictive trade policies are part of an optimal strategy to stabilize prices for a small open 
economy (Gouel and Jean 2015). However, these beggar-thy-neighbor policies come at the 
cost of the other countries on the world market because export restrictions, imposed by a 
surplus country, will lead to a further increase in global prices (Anderson et al. 2013). In 
2007/08, these restrictions played an important role in setting the world price for corn, wheat, 
rice and soybeans (Anderson et al. 2013; Headey 2010). Similarly, price volatility of domestic 
prices is not reduced but only redistributed between countries while global volatility is 
increased (Martin and Anderson 2011). If importers lower import restrictions while exports 
increase export restrictions, this can create the illusion of successful policies when domestic 
prices are compared to world prices (Gouel 2014a; Martin and Anderson 2011). 
Furthermore, while consumers in surplus countries typically benefit from export restrictions, 
producers and traders do not. Such restrictive trade policies have been reported to distort 
markets, especially producer’s incentives inside and outside of the countries which use these 
policies (Anderson et al. 2010). Countries which impose export taxes or bans reduce the 
expected profits for producers thereby decreasing production. This prevents an appropriate 
supply response to the globally experienced scarcity. Countries withstanding the use of such 
measures experience an increase in volatility (Martin and Anderson 2011) which may again 
result in lower levels of production (Haile et al. 2013). Overall, this causes suboptimal levels 
of production, i.e. the supply does not respond to the actual scarcity, resulting in even higher 
prices on the world market. Therefore, the need to improve international grain markets, in 
particular by reducing trade restrictions, has often been emphasized (e.g. Bouët and Laborde 
Debucquet 2012; von Braun 2008). However, different countries face very different 
incentives. Even though it might be desirable to limit export and import restrictions from a 
world-wide perspective, exporting countries focusing on local price stability may continue to 
use them as long as they are not bound by an international agreement. To such an agreement 
they are unlikely to commit unless facing clear incentives. As a result, this situation represents 
a classical collective action problem: If countries act individualistically rational
1
 and in an 
                                                 
1
 i.e. maximize their own expected return 
1  General Introduction 
18 
uncoordinated manner, the outcome for everyone involved will be worse than if all countries 
cooperate and choose a common strategy (Bouët and Laborde Debucquet 2012). 
The WTO membership imposes limits on the extent to which imports can be restricted. 
However, bindings are higher than historically applied rates and therefore effectively have a 
very limited impact (Martin and Anderson 2011). The other half of the beggar-thy-neighbor 
problem is fully unregulated as the WTO does not impose any limits on export restrictions. 
Addressing these issues is crucial but complicated. No mechanism is known to incentivize 
free trade for all in times of crisis. While the agricultural sector only accounts for 6% of world 
trade, it also represents 70% of potential real income gains from reformed trade (Laborde and 
Martin 2012). Hence, neglecting agriculture would substantially curb potential benefits. Be-
tween countries with similar interests and preferences, a commitment to regional cooperation 
by providing appropriate incentives is much easier to achieve, and accordingly many regional 
trade agreements have been formed. However, these detract from global integration and 
provide only an economically less efficient second-best solution (Koester 1986).  
This thesis contributes to the ongoing discussions about trade policies in several ways. The 
uncertainty of trade estimates are emphasized in chapter 2. Chapter 3 addresses the lack of 
knowledge about storage policies in an open economy (Gouel 2014a). It is investigated how 
trade restrictions can prevent the leakage of benefits of domestic price stabilization policies 
into global markets. Furthermore, the collective action problem is analyzed by revealing 
under which circumstances countries face incentives to cooperate and leave trade unrestricted 
and under which circumstances they face incentives to impose restrictions. Alternative 
options to solve the collective action problem are discussed in section 3.6. Chapter 4 focusses 
on private storage but also illustrates how trade affects private storage. Chapter 5 presents the 
impacts of India’s trade restrictions on domestic public and private stocks. Yet, the main 
focus of this thesis lies on storage policies as discussed in the subsequent paragraph. 
1.1.6 Public storage: inefficient and market-distorting or a complement to 
private stockholding? 
Traditionally, market interventions by holding public stocks were performed in the way of so 
called buffer stock programs which protect producers by buying grains when prices are low 
and protect consumers by selling their stocks when prices are high. Meanwhile, buffer stock 
policies have been heavily criticized for various reasons. First, they are consistently reported 
to be less efficient than other measures to stabilize prices, be they trade oriented (Bigman and 
Reutlinger 1979; Gouel 2014a; Srinivasan and Jha 2001, 1999) or private storage oriented 
(Glauber et al. 1989; World Bank 2005). Second, buffer stocks have been reported to only 
benefit producers at the cost of consumers (Helmberger and Weaver 1977). Third, buffer 
stocks may distort markets and significantly impact the behavior of private market actors such 
as stockholders, traders, and producers (Glauber et al. 1989; World Bank 2005; Zant 1997). 
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Fourth, updating the stabilization range may be a source of controversy (Gilbert 2011a). 
Finally, buffer stock programs are usually prone to speculative attack (Salant 1983). The 
removal of the US public stock scheme in 1996 was found to have left the level of price 
stability unchanged because private stockholding increased (Lence and Hayes 2002).  
Overall, these reasons have led to a widespread aversion against buffer stocks among 
academics and policy analysts. Other types of market interventions have received similar 
critique. So called “best practice” strategies (labbeling e.g. by Abbott 2010; Timmer 2010) 
relying on market based approaches without government interventions combined with social 
safety nets have instead been advocated by the World Bank (2005) and others. However, 
during and after the world food crisis in 2007-08, this view has been reassessed. Different 
important factors have been underestimated in the analyses which yielded the above results 
and therefore a reevaluation is necessary. The most important underestimated factors include 
the degree of market incompleteness in many developing countries, the degree of global and 
domestic price instability, the magnitude of exposure by producers and consumers, and the 
influence of price instability on the overall welfare (Abbott 2010; Galtier 2013). Besides, 
market conditions have changed, storage technology has improved, and the inherent 
transparency of public storage compared to private stocks has been acknowledged (HLPE 
2011). This underlined that previous results may not hold any more. As a result, calls have 
increased to (re-)explore various types of stabilization mechanisms with a particular focus on 
public stocks and reserves (Abbott 2010; Galtier 2013; von Braun and Torero 2009). Different 
operational structures of public stocks have been proposed including buffer stocks (HLPE 
2011; Oxfam 2011), emergency reserves (Abbott 2010; von Braun et al. 2014), virtual 
reserves (von Braun and Torero 2009), and regional (international) reserves (ECOWAS 
Commission 2012; HLPE 2011; von Braun and Torero 2009) with some of them overlapping.  
Reserves, in contrast to buffer stocks, focus on protecting consumers from extreme prices but 
they do not impose lower limits on prices. As a result, much of the criticism of buffer stocks 
does not apply. In particular, their costs are well defined and adjustable by the setup such that 
no cost surges arise. Second, they can be better combined with free trade thereby providing 
two simultaneous stabilization measures. This is possible because reserves are rarely used and 
therefore incentives to restrict trade are rare; however, they do occur (compare chapter 3). 
Third, depending on the design, reserves can be much less market-distorting as will be 
demonstrated in chapter 3. Hence, private storage can be kept as another stabilization 
mechanism apart from the reserve. Fourth, the controversy about setting the intervention 
triggers is reduced; yet, it still persists even if there is only one trigger to adjust. Compared to 
a buffer stock, a reserve is also less prone to mismanagement as operational rules are simpler 
and easier to observe. This gives hope that in contrast to buffer stocks which often increased 
during the food crisis in 2007/08 (compare chapter 5 and Anderson et al. 2013), partly due to 
increased lower price bounds, reserves would actually be depleted in order to stabilize prices.  
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If shared between countries, such a reserve may work as an insurance mechanism: All 
countries contribute in times of ample supplies while individual countries may take grains 
from the reserve in times of need, e.g. if domestic supplies fall short (compare e.g. Kornher 
and Kalkuhl 2015; Romero-Aguilar and Miranda 2015). This risk sharing mechanism works 
best if supply shortages are unlikely to coincide in the participating countries. But even if they 
do, such a reserve will still help to dampen the effects and allow more time to arrange for 
other measures such as trade to compensate the shortage.  
Profit-maximizing private storage is a stabilization mechanism which is efficient in reducing 
price volatility without producing any fiscal costs for the government (compare chapter 3 and 
Gouel 2013c). Thus, public storage schemes as well as trade policies should be set up in a 
way that does not crowd out private storage.  
This thesis provides important contributions to several of the issues discussed above. Chapter 
2 reveals the bad quality of data on stocks. Chapter 3 compares the fiscal costs and price 
stabilization efficiency of a public reserve with subsidized private storage. Market distortions, 
i.e. impacts on other market actors, are quantified and some guidance is given for the 
conditions under which reserve-trade cooperation between countries can be achieved. Chapter 
4 provides empirical evidence for the validity of the competitive storage model, the 
workhorse for modelling speculative private storage. A surrogate model is presented which 
can be used for high dimensional modelling exercises and for the direct empirical 
quantification of stock determinants. This is used in chapter 5 to quantify drivers and 
interactions of public and private rice stocks in India.  
1.2 Objectives and research questions 
This thesis addresses several of the open issues discussed in the previous sections. Here, the 
objectives and research questions are subsequently summarized. 
The importance of information of high quality has been underlined in the previous sections. 
However, knowledge about the quality of global supply and demand estimates is limited. 
Different sources provide different estimates giving rise to the research question in chapter 2: 
1. How and why do the supply and demand estimates from different sources differ? 
Five different methods are used to analyze differences in the estimations. The hypothesis that 
information about supply and demand conditions improves over time is tested. As the low 
quality of stock data has previously been criticized (e.g. Abbott 2013; FAO et al. 2011), it is 
also analyzed which categories (stocks, trade, production, utilization) show the highest 
differences. If the differences are not mainly driven by well-documented methodological 
discrepancies, they can be seen as an approximation of the underlying uncertainty. 
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Previous studies on storage-trade cooperation have ignored private storage and a responsive 
supply, two key features in the analysis of price stabilization. Hence, the main research 
question for chapter 3 is: 
2. How do the fiscal costs and impacts on price levels, volatility and extreme events of the 
following three policies compare: maintaining emergency reserves, subsidizing private 
storage, or strategically using trade restrictions? 
The analysis accounts for private storage and a responsive supply. Because the success of 
insurance mechanisms depends on the similarity of interests involved, it is further analyzed 
how cooperation between countries can be achieved. The impacts of policies on market agents 
are depicted as government interventions have continuously been reported to distort markets. 
These theoretical analyses are conducted with a dynamic programming partial equilibrium 
model with private stockholders and producers featuring rational expectations. 
Private storage is an important cost-free stabilization mechanism which is typically analyzed 
with the competitive storage model (CSM). But this model is numerically complex and cannot 
be used directly to quantify private stock determinants. This leads to the main research 
question in chapter 4: 
3. How can competitive private storage be approximated by a reduced-form equation and can 
this equation be used to empirically validate the CSM? 
The surface response fitting of numerical results from the competitive storage model yields a 
surrogate reduced-form model. This can be used for direct quantification of stock 
determinants as well as for high-dimensional modeling exercises where it can substantially 
reduce the numerical complexity. Because empirical validity test of the CSM have focused on 
price distributions and ignored stock levels, the presented empirical validation tests are the 
first of its kind which account for actual stock levels. 
India has one of the most ambitious public stockholding programs but suffers from surging 
stocks and costs. Therefore, and to evaluate options for reforms, it is crucial to understand 
how different policies and other factors quantitatively impact stock levels. So far, this remains 
a black box. Thus, the main research question in chapter 5 reads as: 
4. How do policies and market conditions quantitatively impact India’s public and private rice 
stocks?  
First, the economic theory of how policies are expected to influence public stocks is 
developed which is then tested with empirical data applying a simple ordinary least square 
estimation on levels and first-differences. For the first time, empirical interactions of public 
and private stocks are analyzed quantitatively. Chapter 4 provides the theoretical foundation 
for this analysis which is extended by an instrumental variable approach.  
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A responsive supply helps to stabilize markets and prevent crises. Yet, there is little evidence 
on how up-to-date farmer’s price information is, even for a country like China which is still 
partly focusing on self-sufficiency thereby underlining the need for a responsive supply. Thus, 
the main research question in chapter 6 is: 
5. How up-to-date are the price information of China’s rice, wheat, and corn farmers and 
what are the dynamics of the production response to prices? 
A panel data set is created to assess the response over different provinces using the difference 
GMM estimator. Naturally, numerous control variables need to be included. As climate 
change is increasingly influencing agricultural yields around the world, the influence of 
temperatures, rainfall, and droughts on production is also analyzed. 
1.3 Outline  
The previous sections illustrated the importance of price stabilization policies, related 
problems, controversies and research gaps. The remainder of this thesis is structured in five 
self-contained but related core chapters which address the above-mentioned research 
questions and contribute to the ongoing debates and closure of research gaps. These five core 
chapters are followed by the general conclusion and outlook, references, and appendix. 
Chapters 3, 4, and 5 focus on storage and trade, chapters 2 and 6 on information. 
Chapter 2 compares global corn, wheat, rice, and soy supply and demand estimates from 
different sources using cointegration, correlation, and granger causality tests, as well as the 
coefficient of variation and an extension of differences-in-differences. The quality of these 
estimates is assessed and underlying reasons for differences in estimations are revealed. 
Chapter 3 presents a theoretical storage-trade model to compare the theoretical effectiveness 
and fiscal costs of international price stabilization policies. These policies aim at maintaining 
public reserves, subsidizing private storage or strategically using trade restrictions.  
In chapter 4, a reduced-form approximation of competitive private grain storage is derived. 
Empirical testing of the influence of individual parameters using data from 32 countries 
provides support for the validity of the competitive private storage model. 
Chapter 5 provides an empirical case study on rice stocks in India. Economic theory is used to 
derive how policies are expected to influence public stocks which is then empirically verified. 
Impacts of different policies reveal the need for reforms. Results from chapter 4 are used to 
quantify private stock determinants and crowding out effects of public storage. 
Chapter 6 presents a case study for China illustrating how the supply of rice, wheat, and corn 
responds to prices over time. This indicates how up-to-date farmers’ price information is. 
Additionally, weather-related determinants such as rainfall and temperatures are evaluated.  
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2 Different Sources, Different Information? How and Why 
Global Grain Supply and Demand Estimates Differ2 
2.1 Abstract 
High quality and up-to-date information is a fundamental prerequisite for an optimal 
allocation of resources. Yet, little is known about the quality of international supply and 
demand estimates. Earlier studies used within-source comparisons to test for bias and 
smoothing, but between-source comparisons, which allow additional analyses such as testing 
for differences in the processing and availability of information, are missing. This study fills 
this gap by comparing global grain estimates from the USDA, IGC, and FAO, all provided via 
AMIS, using different methods to account for methodological differences. Methods include 
comparing the coefficient of variation, the standard deviation of relative changes, pairwise 
correlation tests, cointegration analysis, and granger causality tests. Findings indicate that 
different sources adjust their estimates very similarly over time resulting in a co-movement. 
Hence, differences in data availability and processing of new information seem to be minimal. 
Weak evidence suggests that the FAO might be slightly slower in adjusting their data. The 
highest differences between sources are observed for stocks and trade and these cannot fully 
be explained by historical differences. It is then argued that for most analyses averaging over 
the three sources improves precisions and robustness of the estimation compared to taking 
estimates from any specific source. Finally, to really profit from the potential benefits of 
heaving estimates from different sources, more consistency in data collecting methods is 
necessary and above all better documentation of data collection and aggregation 
methodologies is required. 
2.2 Introduction 
Markets are considered to be efficient if all available information is reflected in the prices 
(Fama 1970). Thus, only efficient markets can exhibit an optimal allocation of resources. 
Another prerequisite of a sustainable and sound use of resources is the availability of up-to-
date and high quality information on which different agents can base their decisions. Short-
run food supply shortages can only be prevented if traders, stockholders, producers, and the 
government can anticipate a forthcoming crisis and react with countermeasures. If markets 
were fully efficient, current prices would contain all possible risks. But given that markets in 
                                                 
2
 An earlier version of this work was presented and internally distributed at the eight session of 
the global food market information group of AMIS, Milan, 19 Oct 2015, under the name “What 
can We Learn from the World Supply-Demand Outlook Data Published in the AMIS Market 
Monitor Reports?” An earlier version of the results for the coefficient of variation method was 
also published in the conference proceedings of the 2014 AAEA Annual Meeting, Minneapolis, as 
Brockhaus, J., Kalkuhl, M., “Can the Agricultural Market Information System (AMIS) Help to 
Reduce Food Price Volatility?” 
2  Different Sources, Different Information? How and Why Global Grain Supply and Demand 
Estimates Differ 
24 
developing countries are often incomplete and agents are rarely fully rational, it is 
questionable whether prices always reflect all information available (compare e.g. Antoniou et 
al. 1997; Zalewska-Mitura and Hall 1999). Furthermore, if little information is available, 
prices in efficient markets would still be a very vague (though unbiased) indicator of the 
supply and demand situation. Thus, the collection and dissemination of timely data of high 
quality about supply and demand conditions is of crucial importance to prevent food crises in 
vulnerable countries. Besides its importance for markets, data on fundamentals is essential for 
academics as countless studies heavily rely on this data.  
Before the G20 conference in Cannes in 2011, many major problems in agricultural markets 
were identified. These included poor stock and domestic price data, poor understanding of the 
linkages between international and domestic prices as well as inappropriate and uncoordinated 
policies responses (FAO et al. 2011). The latter were often resulting from a lack of 
information or understanding (ibid.). Furthermore, a lack of timeliness of data provision was 
identified and it was noted that most data is limited to production related items but does not 
include information on the number of farms, agricultural households and welfare related 
issues (AMIS 2012b). Therefore, in the Ministerial Declaration “Action Plan food price 
volatility and agriculture” the Ministers expressed their concerns about the negative impacts 
of excessive volatility on access to food for the poorest, on producers and their production 
decisions, on agricultural investments, on effective market responses to long-term increases in 
demand for food, and on the confidence in international markets (G20 2011a). An agreement 
consisting of five steps was achieved: (i) improving agricultural production and productivity, 
(ii) increasing market information and transparency, (iii) strengthening international policy 
coordination, (iv) improving and developing risk management tools, and (v) improving the 
functioning of agricultural commodities' derivatives markets. In order to address (ii), the 
market information and transparency, there was consensus that an “Agricultural Market 
Information System” (AMIS) should be launched. AMIS was planned to “encourage major 
players on the agri-food markets to share data, to enhance existing information systems, to 
promote greater shared understanding of food price developments, and to further policy 
dialogue and cooperation” (G20 2011a). Thus, AMIS is not an organization, but rather a 
platform for exchange and cooperation. In addition to the G20 countries plus Spain, other 
major grain or oilseeds exporting or importing countries as well as the private sector were 
invited to participate. By October 2011, Egypt, Kazakhstan, Nigeria, the Philippines, 
Thailand, Ukraine and Vietnam were also participating (G20 2011b). AMIS is supposed to 
focus on the main market players and is housed at the FAO in Rome with the Secretariat 
including other international organizations. An analysis of the functioning of AMIS is 
provided by Brockhaus and Kalkuhl (2014). One of the main tasks of AMIS lies in the 
improvement, harmonization, and dissemination of data. Therefore, by now, access to partly 
but not fully harmonized datasets including estimates from different sources is available. 
2.2  Introduction 
25 
This study concentrates on comparing the global supply and demand forecasts from the 
USDA, FAO-AMIS, and International Grains Council (IGC). These are provided in the 
monthly market monitors published via AMIS. Both cross-source comparisons as well as 
within-source comparisons are conducted to analyze (i) to which extent the sources deviate 
from one another, (ii) how deviations evolve over time, and (iii) which categories (production/ 
demand/ stocks/ …) show the highest deviations. This helps to draw conclusions about the 
uncertainty of the data, differences in information availability and in the processing of new 
information between the sources, and which categories require the highest attention to 
improve the knowledge about the overall supply and demand situation. Earlier studies have 
intensively analyzed the USDA forecasts to test for bias and accuracy (Bailey and Brorsen 
1998; Baur and Orazem 1994; Good and Irwin 2006; Isengildina 2004; McKenzie 2008; 
Sanders and Manfredo 2003), usually finding that USDA forecast are of high quality. It was 
further shown that the USDA forecasts are news for the markets (Good and Irwin 2006; 
Sumner and Mueller 1989) despite being smoothed (Isengildina et al. 2006) and that this 
smoothing is partly anticipated by the market (Isengildina et al. 2004). Yet, all such studies 
use within-source comparisons. Within the U.S., between-source comparison focusing on 
comparing forecasts through price reactions and in one case by directly comparing production 
forecasts have been conducted (Egelkraut et al. 2002; Garcia et al. 1997; Sumner and Mueller 
1989). With one historical exception (Paulino and Tseng 1980), between-source comparisons 
of estimates on fundamentals outside of the U.S. have not been conducted. Nowadays, the 
study by Pauline and Tseng (1980) cannot be regarded as representative anymore as data 
coverage has increased, data collection and aggregation methods have changed, and 
harmonization efforts have been undertaken (AMIS 2012a). In addition, this study differs to 
Paulino and Tseng (1980) in that it compares the evolution of forecasts over time (rather than 
only final estimates), focuses more on differences between categories, and is more careful by 
only comparing data which is based on the same marketing year definition. For these reasons, 
only global estimates can be compared and only specific crops and categories can be included 
in the comparison. Visualizing how estimates from the different sources evolve over time 
directly leads to the main hypothesis stating that there is a co-movement between the sources 
(Figure 2.1). 
Comparisons are conducted with different methods, the coefficient of variation (CV), the 
standard deviation of relative first differences which can be regarded as an extension of a 
difference-in-difference procedure, pairwise correlation tests, cointegration analysis, and 
granger causality tests. Major findings include that forecasts evolve very similarly over time 
indicating an akin availability and processing of information. Furthermore, results show that 
differences are large for stocks and trade but small for production and utilization. This 
highlights the need to particularly improve data collection and methods for stocks and trade. 
Differences between USDA and IGC data are smaller for some crop-category combinations 
than differences between USDA and FAO or IGC and FAO. Granger-causality tests provide 
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weak evidence suggesting that the USDA and IGC might be providing slightly more up-to-
date estimates than the FAO.  
 
Figure 2.1: Wheat stock estimations for the marketing year 2013/2014 
Note: Own illustration. Raw data from AIMS. 
 
For various reasons, having estimations by different source is very valuable. First, they may 
provide different or complementary information if, for example, they use different data 
collection methods or different definitions of products or categories. Second, different sources 
may cooperate to exchange knowledge and experiences to improve the data collection process 
which is one of the purposes AMIS was designed for. Third, a healthy competition between 
the sources may drive improvements and innovation. However, the benefits of multiple 
estimates can only be achieved if a clear documentation of data is available. While the USDA 
provides a precise documentation for most of their data (e.g. USDA 2012), documentation of 
FAO and IGC data is scarce and incomplete. Furthermore, each source needs to apply 
inherently consistent methods to build their estimates. This is currently not always the case. 
The marketing years, for example, are sometimes defined differently
 
(Abbassian 2015; 
Paulino and Tseng 1980; USDA 2012) while they should always start with the beginning of 
the main harvesting season. Otherwise, the so called “ending stocks” are not actually ending 
stocks but quantities remaining in the market at some more or less arbitrary moment during 
the marketing season. In that case, they cannot be compared and contain much less 
information about the supply and demand situation. Furthermore, other methodological 
differences exist. Data collection methods differ, for example, stocks can be calculated as a 
residual or from surveys (Abbott 2013), or product definitions may include only raw products 
or also processed goods. For wheat, the FAO only reports raw wheat whereas the USDA also 
includes processed products (Abbassian 2015). The FAO-AMIS data, which is used in this 
study, largely relies on statistics provided by the individual countries, although corrections 
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may be made based on additional insights (ibid)
3
. In contrast, the USDA is known for making 
more substantial adjustments to official country statistics when these are regarded implausible 
(e.g. Paulino and Tseng 1980).  
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 2.3 delineates the data. Section 
2.4 describes the applied methods and how these can capture methodological discrepancies 
between the sources. The results of the various approaches are presented in section 2.5. In 
section 2.6 it is argued that the average value of the estimates from the three sources is 
expected to be a better approximation of the real value than any individual estimate. Thus, the 
use of the mean value may be preferable in most analyses. Eventually, section 2.7 concludes. 
2.3 Data 
Only global estimates, not country-specific estimates, from the FAO-AMIS, IGC, and USDA 
are compared. The reason is that only the global estimates receive nearly monthly and largely 
harmonized updates for all sources and therefore allow a comparison of the evolution of 
estimates, i.e. how estimations change over time. In contrast, country-specific estimates are 
typically only available ex-post and only in their latest version. Only for very few countries 
there are monthly estimates and even these are not provided by all sources. As a result, the 
comparison is limited to global demand and supply data. 
Global estimates were collected for wheat, corn, soy, and rice from the regularly forthcoming 
AMIS Market Monitor (AMIS 2015) Nr. 2 to 29. The provided and collected categories 
include production, supply, utilization, trade, and ending stocks. The data goes from 2012, the 
time when the database was set up, to 2015. The definitions of marketing years are drawn 
from Market Monitor Nr. 29 (AMIS 2015). Hence, each crop-category-year combination 
constitutes one time series such that overall a panel dataset with up to 100 time series is 
obtained, containing between 1 and 21 observations. There are 1184 observations in total, 
resulting in an average of about 12 observations per time series. However, dependent on the 
method, a substantial share of the time series needs to be dropped. Time series with few 
observations need to be dropped for most methods. Various consistency tests are performed. 
In particular, three criteria are used to identify mistakes: Outliers within one source are 
regarded as mistakes if (i) earlier and later values are very different and themselves very 
coherent, i.e. only one value deviates substantially from the otherwise inert time series; (ii) if 
no corresponding correction in other sources is observed, i.e. one source suddenly shows a 
large shift while other sources provide nearly unchanged estimates; (iii) changes within a 
source are inconsistent, i.e. the balancing equation supply = production + last year’s ending 
stocks = utilization + this year’s ending stock is not fulfilled. Based on these criteria, 14 
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 Official FAO data which is provided by the FAO directly and not via FAO-AMIS is copied 
from country statistics without making any adjustments. 
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mistakes are identified in the data and these are corrected as described in the appendix, 
section 8.1. In addition, a graphical visualization is provided which might allow a more 
intuitive understanding. These mistakes have partly been confirmed by AMIS and later on 
corrected in the corresponding database.  
As explained in the introduction, various methodological differences exist between the three 
sources. Data which refers to different marketing year definitions is not compared as no 
method allows accounting for this difference and hence it would remain unclear what drives 
deviations between the sources. Other differences can be accounted for by different methods. 
If the only differences lie in the method of data collection (e.g. surveys versus residual 
estimation) these do not cause any problems. If instead different product definitions are 
applied, e.g. raw products versus raw plus processed products, these will result in relatively 
constant offsets between the sources. The same would apply if the definition of categories 
differs. Deviations in stock data are partly attributable to historical differences, i.e. differences 
for the very first stock estimations when the databases were set up which are now carried 
forward from year to year (Abbassian 2015). However, with the exception of differing 
marketing years, all these differences can be accounted for by applying appropriate methods 
to compare the data as explained in the following section. 
2.4 Methodology 
Forecasts or estimates can be seen as a function of the information available at a specific point 
in time. The function is then the mathematical description of how the data is processed. From 
that perspective, it can be tested whether sources employ different methods and/or if they 
have different information at their disposal. If the available information sets are different, it is 
to be expected that the information which is used for the final estimate
4
 from different sources 
is more similar than information used for early forecasts, e.g. forecasts from before the 
respective marketing year has even started. This implies that sources update their information 
and are able to decrease the level of uncertainty, thereby reducing differences in the available 
information sets. Therefore, it would be expected that the estimations approach each other 
over time. While this does not imply that different sources converge, it implies that deviations 
are expected to decrease. If the available information is the same or comparable but different 
methods of data processing or aggregation are applied, this is expected to result in a co-
movement of the estimations. To illustrate this, two examples are provided. First, if stock 
deviations are caused by historical differences which are then carried forward year to year as 
explained above, this results in an absolute difference which is persistent over time. However, 
it does not lead to differences from one estimation to the next, i.e. estimates for the same 
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 The final estimate is the last estimate for a specific marketing year, i.e. afterwards no more 
adjustements are made to this data. 
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marketing year which are provided in subsequent Market Monitors. As the second example, 
deviating product definitions are considered which differ in the way that one source only 
includes raw products whereas another source also includes some processed products. In this 
case, these methodological differences result in certain differences between estimations. But 
as time passes, these deviations are expected to remain relatively constant because the 
processed products are usually expected to scale with the raw products on such short time 
horizons where long-term trends only have a very limited influence. Hence, this approach 
helps deduce whether deviations between the sources are primarily a result of different 
methods or of differences in the information available.  
Different methods are applied to compare data from the three sources. First, the coefficient of 
variation (CV) is calculated between the sources. This measure compares the absolute values 
of the estimations. Second, the standard deviation of relative changes from one market 
monitor to the next is calculated. This measure can be regarded as a modification of the 
difference-in-difference procedure. While the difference-in-difference measure can only 
compare two sources, the standard deviation of the first differences can compare all three (or 
even more) sources at once. Furthermore, instead of using the absolute first differences, the 
relative first changes (increases or decreases in percent) are taken because methodological 
differences are expected to scale relatively but not absolutely. In the example considered 
above where one source only considers raw products whereas another also includes some 
processed goods, the second one will naturally provide higher estimates. If both sources then 
receive similar new updates, i.e. information sets, about production increases, then this should 
also lead to a bigger absolute increase for the second source while, as a rough approximation, 
the relative increase is expected to be similar. Therefore, this measure is labeled as “standard 
deviation of relative changes”. However, as deviations are typically not very large, this 
procedure only yields minor differences compared to taking the absolute first-differences.  
Third, the pairwise correlation between the individual time series is calculated. For this, each 
crop, category, and marketing year combination is regarded as its own time series. Fourth, a 
cointegration analysis is conducted in two ways. On the one hand, the Engle Granger 
cointegration tests are applied to each pair of time series (Engle and Granger 1987; critical 
values from MacKinnon 2010). On the other hand, a panel cointegration method is used 
(Westerlund 2007). Calculations are performed in Stata with the xtwest command (Persyn and 
Westerlund 2008) including the bootstrapping option to account for dependencies across 
categories. The correlation coefficients indicate how similar individual adjustments (updates) 
are, whereas the cointegration statistics shed some light on how the time series are bound 
together, i.e. experience similar long-term time trends. Short-run deviations are allowed but in 
the long run it is expected that a dependency between the variables persists (compare to error 
correction models, e.g. in Engle and Granger 1987; Westerlund 2007).  
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Granger causality test are conducted to analyze if there is a source which moves earlier or 
later than the others. This would indicate that this source uses more or less recent information. 
However, the release dates of the estimates from the different sources differ (AMIS 2015) 
which naturally leads to differences in the available information sets. Therefore, findings of 
this test have to be treated with great caution and could also merely be a reflection of different 
release dates.  
Besides comparing differences between the sources, adjustments within each source are 
measured and compared by simply calculating the coefficient of variation between the 
respective estimate under consideration, i.e. the current projection, and the final estimate for 
that marketing year. This illustrates the extent to which adjustments are made and how 
adjustments differ between the sources.  
For the first two measures, the CV and the standard deviation of first differences, a set of time 
series rather than just two or three individual ones are compared. Then, the measures are 
applied as explained above, followed by taking the averages over different groups. For 
example, this implies that to compare deviations between different crops and categories, these 
are calculated individually for each marketing year and then the averages over different 
marketing years are built. Similarly, to compare the evolution of estimates for specific 
categories, the averages of the results from the different crops and sources are taken. This 
procedure allows the inclusion of more observations and improves the robustness of results. 
2.5 Results  
First, the differences in absolute values of the estimations for different crops and categories 
are compared (Figure 2.2). The average CV on the y-axis (Figure 2.2) is the average of the 
CVs calculated for the different marketing years. It can be interpreted as a measure of how 
different the sources are (in absolute terms). For many items, the marketing year definitions 
are different and as a result, only those that do not differ are compared. It turns out that some 
differences between the crops exist, but most importantly, the ending stocks and trade data 
seem to differ more from one another. Comparing only two sources instead of all three allows 
the comparison of more crop-category combinations because of fewer differences in the 
marketing year definitions (Figure 2.3)
5
. The observed pattern remains as before, i.e. 
differences between the ending stocks and the trade data are huge whereas deviations in 
production data are low. The differences in supply data are mostly driven by last year’s 
ending stocks. Differences for utilization are very crop-dependent but are mostly below those 
of the ending stocks or trade data. The differences between the crops seem to be comparable.  
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 The FAO and USDA use the most different marketing year definitions while the IGC 
sometimes overlaps with the FAO and sometimes with the USDA marketing year definitions. 
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Very similar results are obtained by comparing the data with the second measure, the standard 
deviation of relative changes. For both, the comparison of all sources (Figure 2.4) as well as 
the comparison of only two sources (Figure 2.5), it is found that the deviations are very high 
for ending stocks and trade whereas only minor differences are observed for production, 
supply, and utilization. Hence, not only do the absolute values in these categories differ 
greatly, but their changes when updates are made also differ substantially. This underlines the 
need to improve data collection methods for these categories. Earlier studies have found 
similar results and criticized the poor quality of data on trade (Paulino and Tseng 1980) and 
stocks (Abbott 2013). Besides comparing how changes differ from one Market Monitor to the 
next, the deviations of changes from one marketing year to the next are analyzed with the 
same measure and yield the same results (Figure 2.6). The differences for ending stocks and 
trade data are found to be very high, whereas differences in other categories are comparably 
low.  
 
Figure 2.2: Comparison of absolute values between all sources (Own illustration) 
 
Figure 2.3: Comparison of absolute values between two sources only (Own illustration) 
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Figure 2.4: Average SD of relative changes between all sources (Own illustration) 
 
Figure 2.5: Average SD of relative changes between two sources only (Own illustration) 
 
Figure 2.6: Average SD of relative year-to-year changes (wheat only) (Own illustration) 
By comparing the adjustments over time within each source, one can infer whether there are 
differences in the adjustments between sources. The estimations for each marketing year are 
tracked over time and the CV of the current estimate with the final estimate for each crop-
category combination is calculated before building the average CV over all crops and 
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categories (Figure 2.7). In contrast to the between-source comparisons, data on all crops and 
categories can be used for these within-source comparisons. Several conclusions can be 
drawn. First, unsurprisingly, early forecasts exhibit a substantial deviation from final 
estimates but these differences become smaller over time. Second, for the individual 
marketing years, corrections in the first Market Monitor releases are larger than corrections 
made in the last editions which report values for that year
6
. Hence, early forecasts suffer from 
a very high uncertainty but this reduces rapidly at the beginning. Third, the individual sources 
seem to follow a similar trajectory over time. Thus, no source is faster than the others in 
reducing the differences to their final values. In individual years, this may not be true
7
 but 
overall there is no clear indication that any source performs better by this measure. 
To illustrate how the adjustments differ by category, the individual categories are illustrated 
in a separate graph (Figure 2.8). Again, a decline of the differences over time can be 
observed. While the initial average CV for data on production, supply, and utilization is about 
1%, it reaches up to 3% for data on trade and even up to 7% for stock data. As a result, it 
seems that the sources make major relative corrections to the stocks and trade estimates 
whereas the other estimates remain almost untouched in relative terms. As the amounts 
produced, supplied, and utilized are much higher than those traded and kept in stock, the 
absolute adjustments might behave differently. 
For wheat and soy, there are enough comparable categories to track the differences between 
the three sources over time (Figure 2.9). Results show that the differences between the 
sources are relatively stable over time, in particular, no convergence and more or less no 
approximation can be observed. In comparison to the graphs showing how the sources adjust 
their own estimations over time (Figure 2.7 and Figure 2.8), the differences between the 
sources are smaller than the differences within the sources when early and late estimates are 
compared. For data on stocks and trade, the adjustments made over time are larger than the 
differences between the sources. Yet, despite these relatively large adjustments, estimates 
from different sources do not approach each other. These results imply that there is a co-
movement between the sources. In other words, the different sources update their estimations 
in a similar manner. If one source increases or decreases their estimates, the other sources 
follow. However, at this stage it remains unclear how fast the sources follow each other. 
Following the explanations in section 2.4, it can be concluded that methodological differences 
between the sources exist but the information available to the different sources and the way of 
incorporating new information seems to be very similar. Relatively constant differences 
                                                 
6
 Note that the series for 2011/12 and 2014/15 are incomplete. Early estimates are missing for 
the former while late estimates have not yet been available at the time of writing for the latter. 
Thus, this result is drawn from the observations for the marketing years 2012/13 and 2013/14 
only. 
7
 The FAO more quickly reduced the deviations from their final estimates in 2012/13, for 
example. However, in 2014/15 the FAO performed relatively poor by this measure. 
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between the sources, possibly a result of different aggregation methods or product definitions, 
are carried forward over time but remain mostly unchanged.  
 
Figure 2.7: Adjustments of estimations from all sources over time (Own illustration) 
 
Figure 2.8: How adjustments differ by category 
Notes: Own illustration. Only marketing year 2013/14 is displayed because taking the averages 
over different marketing years might wipe out the effect as early and late estimates would be 
mixed. Averages are taken over the different sources and crops but similar graphs are obtained if 
only individual sources or crops are depicted. 
 
For wheat, it is even possible to track the difference between all categories over time (Figure 
2.10). This confirms earlier observations. No trend indicating that estimates approach each 
other over time can be identified. Even though this may happen for specific years and 
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categories, counter-examples are numerous. Trade data became much more similar in recent 
years, i.e. for the marketing years 2014/15 and 2015/16. This means that from one marketing 
year to the next the trade data improved but not within the individual marketing years. This 
behavior could potentially indicate that harmonization efforts were undertaken at that point in 
time. Global stock data, however, did not improve over time for the considered time period 
from 2012 to 2015. However, it may have improved on a longer time horizon. 
Correlation, cointegration, and granger causality test are performed to underline previous 
results and obtain further insights from the data (Table 2.1). All three methods can be applied 
to each pair of time series; however, different minimal lengths of the time series are required. 
For all pairs of sources, a large share of the time series is found to be correlated. The mean 
level of correlation amounts to roughly 0.6, which highlights how similar the sources process 
new information. The correlation between the USDA and IGC is slightly higher than between 
the other pairs indicating that these sources change their estimates in an even more similar 
manner.  
 
Figure 2.9: Differences between the sources over time for wheat and soy 
Notes: Own illustration. The averages over different categories are taken. For wheat, all categories 
are used whereas only the production, trade, and utilization are used for soy because only these 
categories are comparable between all sources. Hence, no conclusions can be drawn from this 
graph about whether differences for wheat are larger than for soy. Years in the legend, which are 
the same for both graphs, refer to the first year of the marketing season. 
 
Pairwise cointegration analysis shows that more than 25% of the pairs of time series between 
the sources are found to be cointegrated using the 5% threshold and around 15% using the 1% 
threshold (Table 2.1). Cointegration between FAO and USDA is slightly higher than between 
the other pairs which might indicate a more similar trend between these sources. As a further 
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sources at the same time are also performed. The two different group-mean tests Gt and Ga 
test the null hypothesis that all coefficients of explanatory variables are zero against the 
hypothesis that at least one coefficient is different from zero (Persyn and Westerlund 2008). 
Thus, rejection of the null hypothesis is evidence for cointegration of at least one cross-
sectional unit (ibid.). The two different panel tests Pt and Pa test again the same null 
hypothesis of all coefficients being zero against the (fundamentally different) alternative that 
all coefficients are different from zero. In this case, rejection of the null hypothesis is 
evidence that the panel is integrated as a whole. Accounting for heteroscedasticity, all three 
pairs of panels are found to be cointegrated at the 1% level by all four test criteria. This 
provides strong evidence that the sources follow very similar trajectories. Therefore, the 
earlier finding that different sources apply different methods but have access to similar 
information sets and process new information in a similar manner is further supported by 
these results.  
 
Figure 2.10: Evolution of category-specific differences between sources for wheat 
Notes: Own illustration. For each category, the time evolution over the Market Monitors is shown 
on the x-axis. Years in the legend refer to the first year of the marketing season. 
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Table 2.1: Correlation, cointegration, and granger causality tests 
 IGC–USDA IGC–FAO FAO–USDA 
Pairwise correlation 
25
th
 percentile 0.53 0.39 0.42 
50
th
 percentile 0.82 0.69 0.7 
75
th
 percentile 0.9 0.84 0.87 
Mean 0.67 0.54 0.57 
Standard deviation 0.35 0.46 0.41 
N (# of time series) 44 44 44 
Min/Mean/Max observation per time series 7/13/19 7/13/19 7/13/19 
Pairwise cointegration 
Share of series cointegrated at 1% threshold 14% 14% 18% 
Share of series cointegrated at 5% threshold 25% 27% 32% 
N (# of time series) 44 44 44 
Min/Mean/Max observation per time series 5/11/17 5/11/17 5/11/17 
Panel cointegration 
Robust p-value for Gt 0.000 0.005 0.005 
Robust p-value for Ga 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Robust p-value for Pt 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Robust p-value for Pa 0.000 0.000 0.000 
N (# of time series) 19 22 19 
Min/Mean/Max observation per time series 17/19/21 17/19/21 17/19/21 
Pairwise granger causality 
Share of series showing forward granger 
causality at 1% threshold 
32% 43% 40% 
Share with forward granger causality at 5% 39% 54% 61% 
Share with backward granger causality at 1% 32% 25% 50% 
Share with backward granger causality at 5% 43% 36% 64% 
N (# of time series) 28 28 28 
Min/Mean/Max observation per time series 9/14/17 9/14/17 9/14/17 
Notes: Own illustration. Except for the panel cointegration, all statistics are calculated 
pairwise, i.e. for each pair of time series. Methods impose different restrictions on the number 
of time series and observations which can be used. Granger causality is tested forward, i.e. if 
the source mentioned first in the table header granger-causes the second, and backward, i.e. if 
the source mentioned last in the table header granger-causes the first; in both cases for the 1% 
and 5% threshold and with the first and second lag. Panel cointegration uses 200 bootstrap 
repetitions, a kernel window of three, and one or two lags and leads based on the Akaike 
information criterion. 
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Pairwise granger causality tests show that the sources partly granger-cause each other (Table 
2.1), i.e. some series of each source granger cause some series from another source. Both 
directions of granger causality are tested. For the USDA and IGC data, they yield a 
comparable share of time series pairs which are found to granger-cause each other at both the 
1% and 5% threshold. For other pairs of sources, shares are comparable but not as similar. 
First of all, this finding of granger causality in both directions is further support for the 
discovered co-movement between the sources. When comparing the IGC-FAO results and the 
FAO-USDA results for forward and backward tests, it becomes clear, that many more FAO 
series are granger-caused by IGC data and slightly more by USDA data than the other way 
round. This is not a mere reflection of different release dates as the FAO estimates are 
calculated after the USDA and IGC estimates from the same Market Monitor (AMIS 2015). 
Indeed, the USDA estimates from the same market Monitor are roughly calculated three 
weeks earlier than the FAO estimates. This indicates that it might be equally justifiable to 
shift the USDA data forward by one period (Market Monitor) for the granger causality tests. 
With this shift, even more USDA series are found to granger-cause FAO series than the other 
way round (64% versus 50% at the 5% threshold and 46% versus 36% at the 1% threshold). 
As a result, there is mild evidence that the IGC and USDA adjust their estimates earlier than 
the FAO-AMIS which might indicate that they use more up-to-date information or are faster 
in processing information. However, as the differences in the shares of series showing 
forward and backward granger causality are not very big, this result has to be interpreted with 
great caution and further analyses should be conducted to shed more light on this issue. 
2.6 Creating own estimates based on USDA, FAO, and IGC data 
The results of the previous section show that there is no source which provides significantly 
better estimates than the other sources. Thus, no a priori recommendation to use data from a 
specific source can be made based on this analysis. However, if it is of crucial importance to 
apply the most recent data, then the USDA and IGC data might be slightly superior as the 
analysis provided some weak evidence that these sources are slightly more up to date. 
However, it is possible to construct own estimates from the USDA, FAO-AMIS, and IGC 
data which in many cases may be superior to the data from each individual source. As no 
source is superior, it is the best to simply take the mean value from all three sources. This is a 
very simple operation and the effort of acquiring the data is therefore very limited. The 
average values for the data included in this analysis are presented in Table 8.1 in the appendix 
(except for the year 2015, where there was hardly any data at the time when the analysis was 
conducted). Taking the mean values of the three sources has a number of advantages 
compared to taking the values from one specific source.  
First of all, the mean is less prone to mistakes in the data. Mistakes can happen for all sources 
and as shown in appendix 8.1, presumptive mistakes are found in all data sources. In any 
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econometric analysis, such mistakes can have huge impacts. For regressions, an outlier which 
differs substantially from the other data points can have tremendous impacts on the estimated 
coefficients. Taking the mean values does not fully solve this problem but it reduced size of 
the outlier as the two correct sources help to keep the mean value in line with the rest of the 
data. Therefore, the effects of mistakes in the data on estimated coefficients are substantially 
reduced. 
Second, for the same reasons, the mean value is less prone to individual estimation errors. If 
any source does not account for all available information, they may be higher or lower than 
they should be. This problem is reduced if the mean of the sources is taken. 
Third, the specific methodological differences between the sources are mostly undocumented. 
Therefore, a researcher or any other interested person cannot judge which methodology suits 
best to the intended way of using the data. If the precise methodological discrepancies were 
known, one could choose which data fits one’s needs best. But as they are unknown, it may be 
better to build the mean value, i.e. the average over the different methodologies. While a 
specific (but unknown) source may be better, this procedure reduces the influence of the 
specific data collection and aggregation methodology on the results. If a specific source were 
chosen randomly, taking the mean would not reduce the expected influence of the specific 
methodology of this source, but it reduces the likelihood to pick the most inappropriate 
source. Hence, the results are expected to be more robust. Therefore, this procedure can be 
seen as a risk-averse approach to select input data, i.e. the expected bias is not reduced, but 
the maximal possible bias is. 
Fourth, if the sources are trying to measure exactly the same things (due to different 
methodologies this is not fully clear), then the cumulated information is usually better than the 
information from each individual source (Acemoglu and Ozdaglar 2011; Galton 1907; 
Surowiecki 2004). Thus, the mean is expected to be a more precise estimate than any 
individual estimate from one of the sources. However, this “wisdom of crowds” effect can be 
undermined if the errors from the sources are not statistically independent, external influence 
is exercised, or other “distortions” exist (Lorenz et al. 2011; Vul and Pashler 2008). Yet, the 
expected maximum deviation from the real value would still be reduced by taking the average 
from all sources. 
Overall, these factors suggest that the mean is a better approximation of the real value than the 
individual estimates. Furthermore, it can help to improve the robustness of results which are 
based on such data by reducing the impact of mistakes, inappropriate methodologies and 
estimation errors. Table 8.1 in the appendix presents the mean values for the data in this 
study. This procedure works well on the global level, but it may be inadequate for individual 
countries because the different sources apply different and sometimes inappropriate marketing 
year definitions for some countries. 
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2.7 Conclusion 
Testing whether markets are efficient is among the research questions which have attracted 
the highest academic interest due to the importance of market efficiency for the allocation of 
resources. However, efficient markets are not sufficient; high quality and up-to-date 
information also needs to be available for sustainable investments, crises prevention, and 
resource allocation in general. Yet, knowledge about the quality of grain supply and demand 
estimates is limited. While different studies have used within-source comparisons to analyze 
bias, smoothing, and accuracy, there is a lack of studies comparing data from different sources 
(the notable but historic and methodologically more limited exception is Paulino and Tseng 
1980). This study fills remaining gaps by providing between-source comparisons using four 
different measures: the coefficient of variation, the standard deviation of relative first-
differences (a diff-in-diff extension), correlation coefficients, and cointegration analysis. 
These different methods are useful because they allow accounting for different 
methodological discrepancies between sources as well as addressing different research 
questions. However, data is not compared if marketing years are different because accounting 
for such a distinction is not possible. Furthermore, granger causality tests are performed to 
test for lead and lag sources. For the first time, the evolution of different estimates over time 
is tracked and compared. 
Results show that over time the FAO-AMIS, USDA, and IGC adjust their global grain supply 
and demand estimations in a very similar manner. This leads to a co-movement of estimations 
over time. Differences in the estimations seem to be driven by methodological discrepancies 
rather than differing information. For data on stocks and trade, the differences are particularly 
large, independently of whether they are compared in absolute terms or as relative changes. 
Production estimates are comparatively similar. Weak evidence suggests that the USDA and 
IGC estimates are slightly more up-to-date than the estimates by FAO-AMIS.  
Furthermore, it has been shown that using the mean value of the estimations from the 
different sources may provide several advantages over taking the estimates from any specific 
source. This procedure can make the results more robust as it reduces the impact of mistakes, 
estimation errors, and potentially not fully appropriate methods of data collection and 
aggregation. In addition, the mean value has been argued to typically be a more precise 
approximation of the “real” value than any individual estimate. 
If monthly updated estimates for the individual countries were available, the same analysis 
could be conducted for all countries and it could be identified which countries drive the 
differences between the sources. However, while monthly updated forecasts are not available, 
the final historical estimates are available from all three sources. These haven been analyzed 
by Brockhaus and Kalkuhl (2014) and it was shown that the largest differences occur for 
2.7  Conclusion 
41 
Nigeria, Turkey, India, Viet Nam, Indonesia, and the Philippines whereas the US data was the 
most similar. 
Seven policy conclusions can be drawn from this analysis:  
(1) Documentation of data, in particular on data collection and aggregation, urgently needs to 
be improved. For most of the data provided, it remains unclear how exactly data was collected 
and aggregated and what input information was used (prices, weather data …). Even 
acquiring knowledge about basic specifications such as the definition of marketing years 
sometimes requires extensive research efforts. Furthermore, better documentation could 
provide insights about the extent to which differences between sources are driven by the 
balancing out of total supply and demand.  
(2) Being the only initiative of its kind, AMIS is of crucial importance for discussing and 
harmonizing methods between sources, providing a platform for exchange, and increasing the 
data collection capabilities. Substantial progress has been made in this area, including the 
recent launch of a policy database on the AMIS website. However, the low level of funding 
that AMIS receives needs to be addressed (Fiott 2011)
8
 and AMIS still has to augment 
pressure on national governments, in particular on those of large emerging countries, to 
increase the amount of information collected and to expand the extent to which this 
information is shared (argument in line of Gilbert 2011b). To date, several countries do not 
even manage to report their data to AMIS according to the defined time schedules (AMIS 
2013; Paquotte 2015). Kazakhstan, Nigeria, and Saudi Arabia have been reported to not 
having delivered any data in the past while data from many countries including India, China, 
Thailand, and Vietnam has been criticized for being incomplete (AMIS 2013). Apart from 
that, based on the findings, no overall improvement of data quality over time can be observed. 
(3) Results show that the information available to the sources seems to be mostly comparable 
but that differences are likely to be an outcome of different methods. Further harmonization 
would allow better comparisons and thus less uncertainty about the agricultural supply and 
demand situation.  
(4) Findings highlight that more attention is needed to improve the data on stocks and trade, 
whereas production estimates seem to be experiencing less uncertainty.  
(5) In some cases, more consistency is required. This is the case if the marketing year does not 
start with the harvest of the main crop leading to large “ending stocks” which are a reflection 
of stocks somewhere in the midst of the season. Another example is the FAO trade data where 
the total exports do not always match the total imports for each year but they are only 
balanced out over several years.  
                                                 
8
 Funding from FAO for the AMIS website is also ending in 2015 and needs to be replaced by 
the countries (Abbassian 2015). 
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(6) A very unsatisfying historic artifact that requires attention are differences in stock 
estimates for the time when the databases were set up. These are now carried forward from 
year to year for those sources which estimate stocks as a residual. In this case, an actual 
estimation of current stock levels followed by an adjustment of historical stocks (e.g. by 
updating stocks with the help of supply-demand balances) may provide a more satisfying 
solution as data on stocks has probably improved during the last decades.  
(7) All sources should provide more details on underlying reasons for updates of data 
(argument in accordance with Paquotte 2015). To date, in many cases some qualitative 
information is provided, but how individual factors quantitatively lead to updated estimates 
remains a black box. This would also allow a better understanding of differences between 
sources.  
(8) By providing more disaggregated data, the sources could draw a clearer picture about the 
supply and demand situation and would allow researchers to use datasets which are more 
adjusted to their needs. For example, a distinction between raw products and processed goods 
should be made by all databases. Recently, efforts have been undertaken to include an 
increasing amount of not officially documented trade in the databases (Abbassian 2015), but 
unfortunately no such distinctions are made in the data provided on the AMIS website.  
The main limitation of this study results from the methodological discrepancies between the 
sources. Five different methods were used to account for these differences. However, there 
may be unknown methodological differences which are therefore not fully accounted for by 
the chosen methods. In addition, evidence on some of the results (e.g. the granger-causality 
test) is weak, partly because there are no applicable statistical significance tests available.  
Further research should provide evidence on whether (and if so, why) the FAO-AMIS is 
slower in updating their estimates and, more generally, how sources influence each other. 
Furthermore, historical estimates can be compared in the same vein indicating how countries 
differ in their data quality. A first analysis in this direction is provided by Brockhaus and 
Kalkuhl (2014). However, as methods for some crops differ substantially, results are only a 
combined measure of data uncertainty and differences in methods. Future research should also 
explore how uncertainty about fundamentals is linked to prices, price volatility, and therefore 
potentially the behavior of traders, stockholders, and producers. Given the importance of 
information on supply and demand for both research and the functioning of agricultural 
markets, more research about the general accuracy of estimations would also be highly 
valuable. Considering the responsive supply found in chapter 6, the expected gains in price 
stability from timely information of higher quality can be substantial.  
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3 Emergency Reserves, Private Storage, or Trade? A Theoretical 
Analysis on Price Stabilization across Countries9  
3.1 Abstract 
Different governments around the world use trade and storage related policies to prevent high 
and volatile grain prices. Yet, investigations of these policies have either ignored private 
storage or not considered gains from international cooperation. This chapter compares the 
potential efficiency gains and fiscal costs of policies which aim to stabilize prices by 
controlling trade, subsidizing private storage, or setting up public emergency reserves in a two 
country setting. A partial equilibrium model with private stockholders and producers featuring 
rational expectations is used to capture dynamic interactions between agents. Contrary to 
existing works on private and public stockholding policies, this study compares gains from 
international cooperation and focuses on extreme events in addition to price volatility, both of 
which represent relevant political concerns. Findings illustrate the benefits from trade and that 
private storage, even if subsidized, hardly manages to avoid extreme price spikes despite 
being efficient in reducing price volatility. A (common) public emergency reserve behaves 
complementary. It is inefficient in reducing volatility but allows compensating large supply 
shortages at low fiscal costs while also showing fewer market distortions. Meanwhile, free 
trade is beneficial as long as countries are not too asymmetric in their characteristics and their 
trade policies are aligned. However, if only one country has a reserve, it needs to prevent 
leakages into foreign markets by imposing export restrictions when the reserve is used. 
Otherwise, this country alone will pay the costs to stabilize all countries thereby creating an 
international free-rider problem. If there are countries which use public stocks in combination 
with trade restrictions while others do not intervene into markets, prices in the latter group of 
countries can rise well above levels observed in the absence of any type of intervention. This 
can explain large price increases as observed in 2007/08. The high relevance of these findings 
for the ongoing WTO negotiations is discussed. 
3.2 Introduction 
Governments in developing countries around the world use different measures to protect their 
population from high and volatile food prices. The controversies around commonly used 
policies such as the maintenance of public buffer stocks, public emergency reserves, and trade 
                                                 
9
 Earlier versions of this work have been published in the conference proceedings of the 29th 
ICAE Conference 2015, Milan, as Brockhaus, J., Kalkuhl, M., “Grain emergency reserve 
cooperation – a theoretical analysis of benefits from a common emergency reserve” and in the 
proceedings of the ECOMOD conference 2015, Boston, as well as the GEWISOLA 2015, Gießen, 
(forthcoming as “Schriften der Gesellschaft für Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften des 
Landbaues e.V., Band 51, 2016) under the name “Emergency reserves, private storage, or trade? 
How to prevent extreme grain prices in a two country setting”. 
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restrictions, have been discussed in the general introduction, chapter 1. In short, buffer stocks 
have been heavily criticized for their high costs, low effectiveness, and market distortions 
impacting producers, speculators, and traders (Bigman and Reutlinger 1979; Gilbert 2011a; 
Glauber et al. 1989; World Bank 2005). However, the food price increases since the early 
2000s have caused serious doubts on the underlying assumptions of these analyses. For 
example, it has been criticized that different important factors were underestimated such as the 
impact of high prices on poor people and magnitude to which markets are incomplete in many 
developing countries (Abbott 2010; Galtier 2013; Timmer 2010). This led to a new discussion 
about public food stocks, be they national or international, buffer stocks or emergency 
reserves, physical or virtual (Galtier 2014; HLPE 2011; von Braun and Torero 2009; von 
Braun et al. 2014). Export restrictions have been shown to allow stabilizing prices in one 
country (Anderson et al. 2013; World Bank 2010) while at the same time increasing world 
prices (Anderson et al. 2013; Headey 2010). India, for example, managed to limit the increase 
of domestic prices to 7.9% with the help of restricted exports while global prices increased by 
160% from June 2007 to June 2008 (World Bank 2010). Researchers have thus repeatedly 
emphasized the need to limit trade restrictions (e.g. Bouët and Laborde Debucquet 2012; von 
Braun 2008). But as long as individual countries face incentives to impose restrictions and are 
not bound by international agreements, little progress can be expected in this area. As the 
WTO membership does not impose limits on export restrictions (Martin and Anderson 2011), 
it is thus not very surprising that more than 25 countries restricted exports in the years 2007 
and 2008 (Demeke et al. 2009). Apart from increasing global prices, export restrictions are 
typically bad for domestic producers and traders whose profit margins are reduced. They may 
thus distort producer’s incentives (Anderson et al. 2010) and thereby amplify a potential crisis.  
This study contributes to the discussion of how storage and trade policies may help to stabilize 
prices in different ways by addressing important questions in a theoretical framework 
incorporating public reserves, private storage, and trade in a two country setting. First, this 
study analyzes how restrictive trade policies impact the distribution of market prices. As there is 
only one homogeneous product, trade restrictions are imposed directly and no indirect 
restrictions such as quality standards exist (compare e.g. Heckelei and Swinnen 2012). Second, 
it illustrates how trade restrictions allow a single country to use a reserve for price stabilization 
while at the same time not having to fear leakages into foreign markets. Third, it shows how 
gains from cooperation can be achieved, i.e. how beneficial it can be for two countries to have a 
common reserve and keep trade unrestricted as long as the countries are not too asymmetric in 
terms of their domestic supply variability. Fourth, it illustrates how a public emergency reserve 
is very efficient in reducing the likelihood of extreme events while hardly impacting private 
market agents which is in huge contrast to a much more distorting private storage subsidy – a 
policy which used to be advocated within the “dominant doctrine”. However, such a subsidy 
allows reducing food price volatility while it remains an inefficient measure to tackle extreme 
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events and thereby prevent price spikes. In brief, the private storage subsidy and the emergency 
reserve can therefore be seen as complementary policies. Finally, this study illustrates how 
these policies impact other market actors such as producers and arbitrage traders.  
Based on the competitive storage model (Gustafson 1958; Newbery and Stiglitz 1982) which 
describes profit maximizing agents with rational expectations (Muth 1961), the model in this 
study incorporates private and public stockholding, spatial arbitrage, and consumers which are 
unable to self-insure themselves. This approach thereby follows the tradition of storage-trade 
models (Gouel 2011; Miranda and Glauber 1995; Williams and Wright 1991). While rational 
expectations have been criticized for inadequately modelling individual agents, they typically 
perform well in modelling the aggregated behavior of larger groups of agents and are 
supported by recent evidence on the competitive storage model (Cafiero et al. 2011; Peterson 
and Tomek 2005; compare also with chapter 3). The lack of opportunities for consumer self-
insurance provides a rationale for government interventions (Innes 1990; Newbery and Stiglitz 
1981). As buffer stocks have received numerous criticisms (compare section 1.1.6), this work 
instead focuses on a public emergency reserve. A buffer stock tries to keep prices within a 
predefined price band by selling or buying when prices are reaching the lower or upper 
threshold. This policy is often very costly, has historically failed in different circumstances 
(HLPE 2011), and is hard or impossible to defend against speculative attack (Salant 1983). 
Numerical analyses of buffer stocks are manifold (Gouel 2013b; Miranda and Glauber 1993; 
Miranda and Helmberger 1988; Wright and Williams 1988, 1982). In contrast, public 
emergency reserves do not try to protect consumers and producers at the same time but instead 
only focus on preventing very high prices (thereby automatically curbing price fluctuations). 
Most of the critique on buffer stocks does not apply to emergency reserves (compare section 
1.1.6). For example, reserves focus on protecting consumers from extreme prices and thereby 
do not impose lower limits on prices. Therefore, fiscal costs of reserves are much smaller and 
more foreseeable than for buffer stock schemes. Second, as they remain untouched in normal 
times, they can better be combined with free trade. In this case, both stabilization mechanisms 
together can provide a much higher degree of price stability. Third, reserves are much less 
market distorting (compare results). Fourth, management rules for reserves are typically much 
simpler and therefore easier to anticipate by market actors thereby reducing market distortions. 
This also makes reserves less prone to be influenced by specific interest groups. Finally, 
emergency reserves can be shared between countries, even if the expected price distributions 
differ. This may reduce costs while at the same time increasing the level of price stability. 
In normal times, a reserve remains untouched and full while releases only occur in times of 
substantial supply shortages. In this work, the emergency reserve is driven by a price peg 
policy, i.e. the minimum and maximum prices for buying and selling operations are the same. 
As long as market prices are below the pre-defined trigger price, the reserve remains full or is 
filled up to its (relatively low) capacity limit. Stocks are then released to prevent any price 
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increase above the trigger price. This works until the reserve is fully replenished and only 
then, market price can increase above the trigger price. The reserve’s capacity and trigger 
price should then be chosen such that the probability that the reserve is fully replenished is 
sufficiently low. 
The advantages of following such a simple storage rule are manifold: It is easy to implement 
in practice by the managing authorities. Because its behavior can easily be anticipated by 
other market actors this results in minimal market distortions. Furthermore, violations of the 
stockholding rule can be easily observed which offers protection from misusage of the 
reserve. Otherwise, that is if storage rules are discrete or hard to observe, interest groups may 
lobby for specific interests or self-interested politicians may use stock releases to lower food 
prices before elections (Alesina and Gatti 1995; Sahley et al. 2005). Besides offering 
protection from misuse, such a reserve allows addressing most of other criticism buffer stocks 
have received. Stock levels and therefore fiscal costs can be easily controlled and kept at low 
levels. Furthermore, poor consumers are at the very heart of the intervention and no other 
groups may benefit at their cost. Additionally, market distortions through impacts on other 
market actors are very limited (compare with the results section and conclusions). 
After price surges in recent years, many authors have investigated optimal food price 
stabilization policies in different settings: in a closed economy (Gouel 2013c), in a small open 
economy (Gouel and Jean 2015), in a poor grain importing country (Romero-Aguilar and 
Miranda 2014), or for a large country calibrated for wheat in India (Gouel et al. 2014). In a 
work which probably comes closest to this, reserves and private storage subsidies are 
compared for wheat in the Middle East (Larson et al. 2014). Storage cooperation scenarios 
have been explored to show costs and benefits (ECOWAS Commission 2012; Kornher and 
Kalkuhl 2015) and to illustrate the sustainability of a regional reserve with the possibility of 
default (Romero-Aguilar and Miranda 2015). However, these studies ignored the impacts on 
and interactions with private speculative storage and the supply response leading to results 
which may change if these restricting assumptions were relaxed. Without including private 
storage, different papers have analyzed the costs (and benefits) of (non-) cooperative trade 
policies (Bouët and Laborde Debucquet 2012; Gouel 2014b). In the context of the WTO trade 
negotiations, these policies have been discussed extensively (Bouët and Laborde 2010; Jean et 
al. 2010; Laborde and Martin 2012).  
This study connects these three strings of literature: Optimal stabilization approaches which 
have previously been focused on one country, storage cooperation analyses which have 
suffered from very restrictive assumptions, and trade policy studies which have usually 
ignored the role of private speculative storage and a price-responsive supply. Thereby this 
study brings an important contribution to the question of how to implement storage policies in 
an open economy, a topic about which current knowledge is very limited (Gouel 2014a). 
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Furthermore, with very few exceptions (Gouel 2011; Larson et al. 2014), the role of extreme 
events has been largely ignored in the rational expectations storage literature. Nevertheless, 
extreme events are a very relevant political concern as they may cause a significant crisis, 
including riots, social unrest, and starvation. To tackle these issues, this work combines 
emergency reserves with private storage and supply response in a two country setting where 
both countries may have different trade or storage policies. Results shed light on the full price 
distribution, i.e. price volatility as well as the likelihood and severity of extreme events. Both 
of these matter for policy makers as volatile prices may reduce production and consumption 
(Banerjee and Duflo 2007; Binswanger and Rosenzweig 1986; Haile et al. 2014) whereas 
social unrest has been reported to be only caused by extreme prices (Bellemare 2015; 
Maystadt and Ecker 2014) or price increases (Arezki and Brückner 2011). 
No attempt is made in this analysis to measure the welfare impacts of the different policies 
but instead only impacts on the distribution of prices, private stocks, public stocks, supply 
response, trade, and other response variables as well as fiscal costs for the government are 
compared. This is based on the shortcomings of welfare measures circulating in the literature. 
These assume linear or quadratic influences of prices and therefore do not account for the 
high welfare losses associated with extreme prices. Insufficient food intake, even if occurring 
only for a very limited amount of time, may have severe long-term impacts on the human 
body, in particular if food insecurity occurs during childhood (Chen and Zhou 2007; de 
Janvry et al. 2006). Thus, extreme prices which result in insufficient food intake and 
potentially lost lives cannot be captured within the framework of currently available welfare 
measures. Additionally, any such measure would inherently require subjective judgements for 
quantifying the value of a human live and the value of a healthy development of the brain and 
body. Furthermore, judgments about the distribution of welfare between consumers and 
producers would need to be made. As a result, this work refrains from making any such 
attempts but rather illustrates what can be objectively measured and then be used for making 
subjective judgements: the fiscal costs and the impacts of different policies on the prices and 
the behavior of agents considered in the model. 
This chapter is structured as follows: Section 3.3 presents the theoretical model including the 
behavioral determinants of the different private market agents and the governments. Section 
3.4 presents and justifies the calibration of the model. The results are depicted in section 3.5, 
grouped into subsections. First, the effects of trade policies are illustrated thereby highlighting 
how trade as a no-cost policy can help to stabilize prices. Yet, incentives to keep trade 
unrestricted vanish if one government alone decides to introduce price stabilization measures. 
Second, a private storage subsidy is shown to be efficient in reducing price volatility but not 
in tackling extreme events. Third, the influence of the reserve’s capacity and trigger price on 
the price distribution and private stockholders are shown pointing out the limited impact of a 
well-designed reserve on private storage. Finally, it is revealed how high asymmetry, 
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exemplarily illustrated by highly asymmetric production shocks, can hinder or even prevent 
international cooperation. Section 3.6 concludes. 
3.3 Theoretical model 
The model is an extension of the first trade-storage models which were developed (Miranda 
and Glauber 1995; Williams and Wright 1991). Its specification closely follows the approach 
developed by Christophe Gouel (Gouel and Jean 2015; Gouel 2011). However, it differs in 
several ways: (1) It explicitly includes two countries instead of one, (2) both of them have a 
public reserve following simplified rules as well as competitive private storage, (3) it includes 
flexible trade policies (e.g. by protecting the reserve), and (4) it has an explicit focus on 
extreme price events. These are the result of large supply shortfalls which arise if production, 
carry-over stocks, and imports combined are well below their expected level. 
In the applied model, there are two countries, A and B, indexed by 𝑖 ∈ {𝐴, 𝐵}. If one country 𝑖 
is chosen, the other country is indexed as −𝑖 =  {𝐴, 𝐵} \ {𝑖}. A homogeneous food product is 
produced, consumed, and stored in both countries and can be traded between them. This 
partial equilibrium dynamic programming model has annual time steps and combines trade, 
private stockholders, and public storage. 
3.3.1 Private stockholders 
One representative risk-neutral, profit maximizing stockholder exists in each country and acts 
competitively according to the competitive storage model (Gustafson 1958; Williams and 
Wright 1991). At time 𝑡 the quantity 𝑆𝑖,𝑡  is bought for price 𝑃𝑖,𝑡  in country 𝑖 and in time period 
𝑡 + 1 this quantity is sold for price 𝑃𝑖,𝑡+1. Storage losses 𝛿𝑖  and constant marginal storing 
costs 𝑘𝑖, which are considered to be equal in both countries, apply but may be (partly) 
compensated by the constant marginal storage subsidy 𝑚𝑖.
10
  As a result, the stockholder’s 
profit maximization problem can be expressed with the help of the rational expectations 
operator 𝐸𝑡[. ] as 
𝑉𝑖
𝑆(𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1, 𝑃𝑖,𝑡) = max
{𝑆𝑖,𝑡+𝑗≥0}𝑗=0
∞
𝐸𝑡 (∑ 𝛽𝑖
𝑗[𝛿𝑖𝑃𝑖,𝑡+𝑗𝑆𝑖,𝑡+𝑗−1 − (𝑃𝑖,𝑡+𝑗 + 𝑘𝑖 − 𝑚𝑖)𝑆𝑖,𝑡+𝑗]
∞
𝑗=0
), 
 
(3.1) 
where 𝑉𝑖
𝑆
 is the stockholder’s value function which includes the sum over all buying and 
selling operations and therefore depends on the stock levels, the market prices, the storage 
                                                 
10
 To be precise, one would need to consider different costs for placing into the stock, releasing 
from the stock, storing itself, and rotating the crop as well as for keeping the storage capacity. 
Furthermore, all these parameters would depend on the actual stock levels. However, this would 
massively increase the complexity while providing very limited additional insights. Therefore, 
only constant marginal storage costs, which are assumed to cover all these processes, were 
considered. 
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costs and the storage subsidy. The index for the time periods is 𝑗, so the maximization 
problem is solved for all time periods simultaneously. There are two discount factors in this 
equation, 𝛽𝑖  =  1/(1 +  𝑟𝑖) (with 𝑟𝑖 representing the interest rate) is the monetary discount 
factor whereas 𝛿𝑖  represents the discount factor originating from the storage losses. 
Representing this equation in a recursive form allows rewriting the problem as the following 
Bellman equation: 
𝑉𝑖
𝑆(𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1, 𝑃𝑖,𝑡) = max
𝑆𝑖,𝑡≥0
(𝛿𝑖𝑃𝑖,𝑡𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1 − (𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑘𝑖 − 𝑚𝑖)𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖𝐸𝑡[𝑉𝑖
𝑆(𝑆𝑖,𝑡, 𝑃𝑖,𝑡+1)]) (3.2) 
This equation can be rewritten as a complementarity problem using the first-order condition 
on the stocks, the envelope theorem, and the non-negativity constraint on the stocks (Gouel 
2011). The resulting complementarity problem reads as 
𝑆𝑖,𝑡 ≥ 0 ⊥ 𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑘𝑖 − 𝑚𝑖 − 𝛿𝑖𝛽𝑖𝐸𝑡(𝑃𝑖,𝑡+1) ≥ 0  . (3.3) 
Here, the ⊥ symbol represents the orthogonality of the mixed complementarity problem. In 
general, a mixed complementarity problem 𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛 ≤ 𝑥 ≤ 𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥 ⊥ 𝐹(𝑥) consists of a 
continuously differentiable function 𝐹: ℝ𝑛 → ℝ𝑛 and 𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛 ∈ (ℝ ∪ −∞)𝑛, 𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥 ∈
(ℝ ∪ +∞)𝑛 as lower and upper bounds, respectively, such that for each 𝑖 ∈  {1, . . . , 𝑛} one 
out of the following conditions holds: 
𝐹𝑖(𝑥) = 0  and  𝑥𝑖
𝑚𝑖𝑛  ≤  𝑥𝑖  ≤  𝑥𝑖
𝑚𝑎𝑥        or (3.4) 
𝐹𝑖(𝑥) > 0  and  𝑥𝑖
𝑚𝑖𝑛  =  𝑥𝑖                                 or (3.5) 
𝐹𝑖(𝑥) < 0  and  𝑥𝑖 =  𝑥𝑖
𝑚𝑎𝑥                           .  (3.6) 
If 𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥 = ∞ (or 𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛 = −∞), then 𝐹(𝑥) ≥ 0  (≤ 0)  ∀𝑥, as it is the case for the private 
storage problem above. If 𝑥𝑚𝑎𝑥 = ∞ and 𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑛 = −∞, then F(x) = 0 is a “traditional” 
equation. 
3.3.2 Public emergency reserve 
Both countries have a public emergency reserve. These follow simple rules which make the 
results more understandable and transferable to real-world situations. Only two parameters are 
used to operate the reserve, its capacity, 𝑐𝑖, and its trigger price, 𝑇𝑖. As long as the observed 
price is below the trigger price, the reserve is filled up to its capacity whereas stocks are 
released to prevent any price increase above the trigger price until the reserve is depleted. 
Only then, market price can increase above the trigger price. This behavior can be expressed 
as the following complementarity problem: 
𝑃𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑇𝑖 ⊥ 0 ≤ 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 ≤ 𝑐𝑖 (3.7) 
where 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 represents the level to which the reserve in 𝑖 is filled at time 𝑡. If both countries 
have a reserve and trade is free, it is called reserve cooperation because they share the costs 
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but also the benefits from their public reserves. In contrast, if only one country has a reserve, 
depending on the trade policy the benefits may be shared while the costs never are. 
3.3.3 Production 
Planting decisions in 𝑖 depend on the price expectations about the future prices at 𝑡 + 1 in 
time period 𝑡 with the knowledge available then. Therefore, the representative and risk-
neutral producer in each country makes his planting decision 𝐻𝑖,𝑡 at time period 𝑡 while the 
crop is only harvested one period later. Additionally, there are random, normally distributed 
yield shocks 𝑒𝑖,𝑡  with mean 1 and variance 𝜎𝑖  so that the final production can be written as 
𝐻𝑖,𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑡+1. This assumption is justified by the weak evidence against normally distributed 
harvest shocks (Just and Wenninger 1999). In theory, production could become negative 
under the assumption of normally distributed production shocks. But the values chosen for the 
calibration ensure that production levels stay in the expected ranges and will under no 
reasonable level of simulated time periods ever become negative. The resulting profit-
maximizing production decision of the producers then reads as 
max
{𝐻𝑖,𝑡+𝑗≥0}𝑗=0
∞
𝐸𝑡 (∑ 𝛽𝑖
𝑗
∞
𝑗=0
[𝛿𝑖𝑃𝑖,𝑡+𝑗𝐻𝑖,𝑡+𝑗−1𝑒𝑖,𝑡+𝑗 − Ψ𝑖(𝐻𝑖,𝑡+𝑗)])  . 
 
(3.8) 
Here, Ψ𝑖(𝐻𝑖,𝑡+𝑗) represents the production costs for producing 𝐻𝑖,𝑡. As before, this problem 
can be rewritten in recursive form providing 
𝛽𝑖𝐸𝑡(𝑃𝑖,𝑡+1𝑒𝑖,𝑡+1) = Ψ𝑖
′(𝐻𝑖,𝑡) (3.9) 
This equation can be interpreted as follows: The marginal cost of production is equal to the 
expected, discounted marginal profit from one unit of planned production. Following 
economic theory, the first derivative of the production cost function needs to be strictly 
increasing which can be fulfilled by choosing a convex, isoelastic function of the form 
Ψ𝑖(𝐻𝑖,𝑡) = ℎ𝑖
𝐻𝑖,𝑡
1+𝜇𝑖
1 + 𝜇𝑖
 
 
(3.10) 
with scale parameter hi and 𝜇𝑖 ≥ 0 as the inverse supply elasticity. Hence, this specification 
was chosen for the model. 
3.3.4 Trade 
All possibilities for spatial arbitrage are used by the representative trader who is trading 
competitively between the two countries. Trade is instantaneous with per unit trading costs of 
Θ𝑖 for exports from 𝑖 to −𝑖, i.e. the other country. In addition, a country may impose an export 
tariff 𝜙𝑖,𝑡. As trade happens instantaneously, instant profits rather than expected profits are 
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maximized. Expressed as a complementarity problem, the trader’s behavior can be described 
as 
𝑃𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑃−𝑖,𝑡 + Θ𝑖 + 𝜙𝑖,𝑡 ⊥ 0 ≤ 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 ≤ 𝑋𝑖
𝑚𝑎𝑥 (3.11) 
Here, 𝑃−𝑖,𝑡 is the price at 𝑡 in the country which is not 𝑖, and 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 are the exports from country 
𝑖 to the other country. A direct result from this equation is that there are never simultaneously 
exports to and imports from the same country, i.e. 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 ≥ 0 ⊥ 𝑋−𝑖,𝑡 ≥ 0. Governments may set 
a quota, i.e. a limit to the maximum allowed amount traded which is represented by 𝑋𝑖
𝑚𝑎𝑥. 
Furthermore, governments may decide that exports are allowed only as long as their reserve 
remains untouched. For the numerical implementation, this case can be represented by 
adjusting the export tariff whenever the reserve is used. The following complementarity 
condition describes this behavior 
𝑇𝑖 − 𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑐𝑖 ⊥ 0 ≤ 𝜙𝑖,𝑡 ≤ 𝜙𝑖
𝑚𝑎𝑥 (3.12) 
where 𝜙𝑖
𝑚𝑎𝑥 describes the maximum export tariff which could be infinity. This equation sets 
𝜙𝑖,𝑡 = 0 as long as the price is below the trigger (𝑇𝑖 > 𝑃𝑖,𝑡 ; which implies that the reserve is 
filled completely, so 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑐𝑖); it sets 𝜙𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜙𝑖
𝑚𝑎𝑥 if the reserve is not filled up to its capacity 
(𝑅𝑖,𝑡 < 𝑐𝑖 , implying 𝑇𝑖 < 𝑃𝑖,𝑡), and in the remaining cases this equation adjusts 𝜙𝑖,𝑡 such that 
exports do occur but only precisely up to the point where the reserve would be touched. 
3.3.5 Consumption 
The consumers in both countries have an isoelastic consumption function 
𝐷𝑖(𝑃𝑖,𝑡) = 𝛾𝑖𝑃𝑖,𝑡
𝛼𝑖 (3.13) 
where 𝛾𝑖 is a normalization parameter and −1 ≠ 𝛼𝑖 < 0 is the price elasticity. This implies 
that consumers have a constant income and do not save and, as a result, do not insure 
themselves. If they did, there would be another maximization problem for the consumer 
which needed to be solved and this would go beyond the scope of this analysis. 
3.3.6 Fiscal costs 
Fiscal costs only arise if a government intervenes into a market which can be done by paying 
a subsidy to private stockholders, by maintaining a public emergency reserve, or by limiting 
trade. For a constant marginal private storage subsidy 𝑚𝑖, the storage costs 𝑘𝑖 are shared 
between the government who pays 𝑚𝑖  and the private stockholder who pays 𝑘𝑖 − 𝑚𝑖. The 
subsidy 𝑚𝑖 has an upper bound, 𝑚𝑖 ≤ 𝑘𝑖 + ?̅?𝑖(1 − 𝛿𝑖𝛽𝑖), because otherwise storage would 
always become profitable and therefore stock levels would diverge. However, there may also 
be a tax (𝑚𝑖 < 0) on storage resulting in 𝑘𝑖 − 𝑚𝑖 > 𝑘𝑖 and therefore very low private stock 
levels. For any level of private subsidy, the fiscal costs within one period can be calculated as 
𝑆𝑖,𝑡𝑚𝑖 resulting in fiscal costs for all periods 𝑡 = 1 … 𝑛 of 
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∑ 𝑆𝑖,𝑡𝑚𝑖𝛽𝑖
𝑛
𝑛
𝑡=1
  . 
 
(3.14) 
The total fiscal costs for all periods depend on the number of periods. It is therefore preferable 
to use the expected per-period costs for comparing different scenarios. These can also be 
calculated from the simulation results as  
1
𝑛
∑ 𝑆𝑖,𝑡𝑚𝑖
𝑛
𝑡=1
  . 
 
(3.15) 
These expected per-period costs do not depend on the discount factor. When comparing 
different scenarios, it turns out that the relative value of both cost measures is the same if the 
number of simulated periods (shock realizations) is high enough. This is due to the random 
shock realizations because the discount factor would affect all production levels in the same 
way and as a result not change the relative importance of individual realizations. Owing to the 
superior comparability, only the expected per-period costs are calculated for the subsequent 
factors which contribute to the total fiscal costs.  
For a public emergency reserve, the government has to pay the full storage costs which are 
assumed to be equal to the gross marginal storage costs 𝑘𝑖 for private stockholders. Therefore, 
the fiscal costs for storing the amount in the reserve is 𝑅𝑖,𝑡𝑘𝑖 for any specific period. In 
addition, fiscal costs arise as the reserve is filled up when prices are below the trigger price. In 
contrast, stock releases take place when market prices reach or surpass the trigger price until 
the reserve is replenished completely. This produces revenues of (𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1)𝑃𝑖,𝑡. As a 
result, the expected per-period fiscal costs for the reserve are 
1
𝑛
∑[𝑅𝑖,𝑡𝑘𝑖 − (𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1)𝑃𝑖,𝑡]
𝑛
𝑡=1
  . 
 
(3.16) 
If trade is limited by a variable export tariff 𝜙𝑖,𝑡, the government can collect fiscal revenues 
from exports. Even if trade is not limited by a variable export tariff but by a fixed quota which 
dictates the maximum level of exports, the government can still collect the profits from the 
traders, e.g. by selling the quota in auctions. In both cases, the expected per-period revenues 
can be calculated as 
1
𝑛
∑(𝑃−𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑃𝑖,𝑡 − Θ𝑖)𝑋𝑖,𝑡  .
𝑛
𝑡=1
 
 
(3.17) 
All the fiscal costs and revenues are summed up. For achieving a more intuitive interpretation, 
they can be expressed as share of the agricultural GDP. However, as the agricultural GDP 
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may change between different scenarios, this could make the relative costs incomparable. But 
it turns out that the expected agricultural (production) GDP 
1
𝑛
∑(𝑃𝑖,𝑡𝐻𝑖,𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑡)
𝑛
𝑡=1
≈ 1   
 
(3.18) 
is sufficiently close to 1 in all scenarios
11
. Hence, the fiscal costs can still be interpreted as a 
share of the agricultural GDP without being divided by the latter. But even if they are divided, 
this does not change any results.  
3.3.7 Market equilibrium 
To limit the number of state variables, the private carry-over stocks, the emergency reserve, 
and the harvest can be combined to one state variable per country, availability 𝐴𝑖,𝑡, which 
results in the following transition equation 
𝐴𝑖,𝑡 = (1 − 𝛿𝑖)(𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝐻𝑖,𝑡−1𝑒𝑖,𝑡 (3.19) 
As the shocks are considered at the beginning of each period, the knowledge of the 
availability in both countries fully determines the state of the model. Then, the market 
equilibrium condition reads as 
𝐴𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑋−𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐷𝑖,𝑡(𝑃𝑖,𝑡) + 𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 (3.20) 
When the model is solved, a recursive equilibrium is calculated by evaluating how the 
response variables change dependent on the state variables. This means the following 
functions are calculated by using the aforementioned behavioral equations for the different 
agents: 𝑆𝑖,𝑡(𝐴𝑖,𝑡, 𝐴−𝑖,𝑡), 𝑅𝑖,𝑡(𝐴𝑖,𝑡, 𝐴−𝑖,𝑡), 𝐻𝑖,𝑡(𝐴𝑖,𝑡, 𝐴−𝑖,𝑡), 𝑋𝑖,𝑡(𝐴𝑖,𝑡, 𝐴−𝑖,𝑡), 𝜙𝑖,𝑡(𝐴𝑖,𝑡, 𝐴−𝑖,𝑡), and 
𝑃𝑖,𝑡(𝐴𝑖,𝑡, 𝐴−𝑖,𝑡).  
For simplicity, it is assumed that storage costs are the same in both countries and storage 
losses are zero. Changing this assumption does slightly affect the specific result but it does 
not influence the general behavior of the model and therefore the conclusions remain valid 
even if these assumptions were relaxed. 
3.4 Calibration 
The default values for solving the rational expectations mixed complementarity problem and 
simulating the scenarios are illustrated in Table 3.1. For each configuration, i.e. each set of 
parameters, the model is solved on a 50x50 grid of the state variables. This selection is 
justified and explained in the appendix (chapter 8.1). Typical values, which were found in the 
literature and in other models, were used for all parameters and explanations are provided in 
                                                 
11
 𝐻𝑖,𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑡 is the production level (planned production multiplied by shock) multiplied by prices. 
Thus, this yields the agricultural GDP. 
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the table. However, these values are theoretical values which only have a relative 
interpretation as the model is not calibrated for two specific countries. In most scenarios, trade 
was not restricted. For the reserve, the characteristics of the response variables have been 
calculated for a reserve size between 0.5% and 10% of the mean harvest and trigger prices 
from 1.1 to 1.6 (with the expected price being more or less equal to one). For private storage, 
different subsidies have been considered ranging from zero effective storage costs to a per-
period storage tax of 0.04. The other simulated scenarios are summarized in Table 3.1. The 
models are solved and simulated in MATLAB using the RECS solver (Gouel 2013a) and the 
CompEcon toolbox (Miranda and Fackler 2011). 
3.5 Results 
The presented model has been solved and simulated for different settings. At first, some 
distinct scenarios are modelled to illustrate the effects of trade policies and asymmetric trade 
policies. Second, the influence of the reserve characteristics is modelled. Third, reserve 
policies are compared with private storage policies and finally illustrations about countries 
with asymmetric characteristics follow. 
3.5.1 Trade policies and asymmetric reserve policies 
To illustrate the general effects of having a reserve, allowing trade, using different trade 
policies and having asymmetric reserve policies, eight different scenarios are modelled (Table 
3.2). Scenario 1, no trade and no reserve, is unrealistic but an important illustrative scenario to 
provide a baseline to compare policies with. Scenario 2, free trade without a reserve, is the 
liberal free market case without any government intervention. Scenario 3, no trade but a 
reserve, is the autarky case which is still targeted by some countries. The case where one 
country uses government interventions to stabilize prices in an open world with free trade is 
depicted in scenario 4. This case is useful to highlight the problems associated with price 
stabilization in an open economy. Scenario 5 uses trade restrictions to prevent the leakage of 
benefits into foreign markets. Scenario 6 shows the same situation with the difference that 
only some countries have public reserves. This situation is similar to the behavior of many 
governments during the world food crisis in 2007/08 and can be used to explain 
corresponding price spikes. Scenario 7 is used to illustrate the effects of price quotas. 
Eventually, scenario 8 shows the case of storage-trade cooperation. 
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Table 3.1: The default values for the simulations.  
Parameter Symbol Default value Comments / Explanation of choice 
Reserve price trigger in A 𝑇𝐴 1.3 Based on results about price stability 
Reserve price trigger in B 𝑇𝐵 1.3 Based on results about price stability 
Reserve capacity in A 𝑐𝐴 0.02 Calibrated for reasonable fiscal costs
1 
Reserve capacity in B 𝑐𝐵 0.02 Calibrated for reasonable fiscal costs
1 
Mean supply in A ?̃?𝐴 1 (Only relative value matters) 
Mean supply in B ?̃?𝐵 1 (Only relative value matters) 
SD of supply shock in A 𝜎𝐴 0.06 See section 4.4 
See section 4.4 SD of supply shock in B 𝜎𝐵 0.06 
SD of sup. shock correl. A to B 𝜎𝐴𝐵 0 For illustrating max. coop. gains 
SD of sup. shock correl. B to A 𝜎𝐵𝐴 0 For illustrating max. coop. gains 
Marginal storage costs in A 𝑘𝐴 0.06 Common value for such models 
Marginal storage costs in B 𝑘𝐵 0.06 Common value for such models 
Supply elasticity in A 𝜇𝐴 0.2 Gouel, Gautam & Martin (2014) 
Supply elasticity in B 𝜇𝐵 0.2 Gouel, Gautam & Martin (2014) 
(Demand) Price elasticity in A 𝛼𝐴 -0.2 Typical for FAPRI and USDA data 
(Demand) Price elasticity in B 𝛼𝐵 -0.2 Typical for FAPRI and USDA data 
Real interest rate in A 𝑟𝐴 0.03 Common value for such models 
Real interest rate in B 𝑟𝐵 0.03 Common value for such models 
Trade costs from A to B Θ𝐴 0.05 Based on comparison to storage costs 
Trade costs from B to A Θ𝐵 0.05 Based on comparison to storage costs 
Relative country size of A 𝛾𝐴 1 (Only relative value matters) 
Relative country size of B 𝛾𝐵 1 (Only relative value matters) 
Maximum exports from A to B 𝑋𝐴
𝑚𝑎𝑥 100,000 For unrestricted trade 
Maximum exports from B to A 𝑋𝐵
𝑚𝑎𝑥 100,000 For unrestricted trade 
Maximum export tariff A to B 𝜙𝐴
𝑚𝑎𝑥 0 For unrestricted trade 
Maximum export tariff B to A 𝜙𝐵
𝑚𝑎𝑥 0 For unrestricted trade 
Parameters for  solving and simulating 
Grid points - 50x50 High precision 
Min. grid point - 0.6x0.6 Solid lower bound 
Max. grid point - 1.7x1.7 Solid upper bound 
Grid density - 0.022 High precision 
MCP Solver - Path High precision 
Shock nodes - 7 High precision 
Solving method for RE 
equilibrium 
- 
Successive 
approximation 
Computational speed 
Function approximation method - 
Response 
variables 
Computational speed 
Simulations: Shock realizations - 600x200 High precision 
Simulation method between grid   points Solve High precision 
Notes: Own illustration. Unless specified differently, the above specifications were used for 
simulating the model.  
1 Calibration of the capacity and trigger based on results from section 3.5.3. 
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Table 3.2: Overview of scenarios which were simulated (Own illustration) 
Scenario Description Variables differing from default 
1 No trade, no reserve  Θ𝐴 = Θ𝐵 = ∞; 𝑐𝐴 = 𝑐𝐵 = 0  
2 No reserve  𝑐𝐴 = 𝑐𝐵 = 0  
3 No trade  Θ𝐴 = Θ𝐵 = ∞  
4 Reserve only in country A  𝑐𝐵 = 0  
5 Trade only if reserves are untouched  𝜙𝐴 = 𝜙𝐵 = ∞  
6 Scenario 4 and 5 combined 𝑐𝐵 = 0, 𝜙𝐴 = ∞   
7 Trade only up to capacity of reserve 𝑋𝐴
𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 𝑋𝐵
𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 𝑐𝐴 = 𝑐𝐵  
8 Common reserve  
 
The statistical properties of the price distributions (Figure 3.1, Table 3.3), the reserve
12
 and 
availability distributions (Table 3.4) and distributions of private storage, production, and 
exports (Table 3.5) build the foundation of the subsequent discussion. Unless the country is 
shown in brackets behind the scenario, statistical properties are symmetric between both 
countries. Percentiles or quantiles can also be interpreted as events which are expected to 
happen every corresponding couple of years. As an example, the price at the 90
th
 percentile 
can be interpreted as a price which is expected to roughly occur every 10 years; or one could 
say that only once in ten years the price is expected to be at around such a high level. As the 
expected prices are around 1, a price of say 1.2 can be interpreted as around 20% above the 
expected price. Other variables can be interpreted accordingly. 
In scenario 1, no trade and no reserve, a huge price range, in particular on the upper end, is 
observed and comes with relatively high mean prices and a high standard deviation, skewness, 
and kurtosis (Figure 3.1, Table 3.3). In extreme events, prices may double or more. The mean 
private stock levels are relatively large and supply response is the strongest along with no-
trade-scenario 3 which is indicated by the high standard deviation (Table 3.5).  
Scenario 2, in which there is no reserve, illustrates that trade is a no-cost policy which is very 
effective in preventing high prices for symmetric countries. Trade manages to reduce all 
moments of the prices and massively decreases the highest percentiles of the prices (Figure 
3.1, Table 3.3). However, trade also strongly reduces private stocks and the supply response 
in all parts of the distribution (Table 3.5). The mean private stocks are almost halved (the 
difference in the mean private stocks can be regarded as a crowding out factor). Once trade is 
allowed, it is hardly affected by the different scenarios except if trade is only allowed when 
the reserve remains untouched, if it is limited by the capacity of the reserve, or if there is a 
large private storage subsidy (not shown but available upon request). 
                                                 
12
 To avoid rounding problems, a maximum relative deviation of 0.1% was allowed for 
frequencies above zero, and a maximum absolute deviation of 0.0001 for frequencies of zero (e.g. 
no trade). 
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The effects of having an emergency reserve but no trade are depicted in scenario 3. All 
moments of the price distribution and the prices of the higher percentiles are decreased 
substantially. The reserve does not affect the minimum prices and hardly affects the prices 
below the mean because it is usually filled up to its capacity. When compared to introducing 
trade, the reserve seems less attractive though: Trade reduces the prices of the highest 
percentiles even more and does not produce any fiscal costs which clearly underlines the 
benefits from trade. However, the extent to which the highest percentiles of prices are reduced 
depends on the reserve’s capacity and trigger price. In contrast to allowing trade, private 
storage is hardly influenced by the introduction of a reserve. Hence, such a reserve presents 
itself as a stabilization tool which shows hardly any market distortions. In this scenario, the 
frequency of the reserve being empty or non-full is the highest. While the reserve only affects 
the highest percentiles of the supply response, trade mostly affects the lowest percentiles (not 
shown in the tables). 
Table 3.3: Price characteristics for the simulation of the different scenarios  
Scenario 
 
Prices 
 
Costs 
 
Mean SD Skew Kurt 1% 50% 90% 95% 99% 99.9% (in %) 
1  1.016 0.222 2.56 13.1 0.78 0.94 1.3 1.47 1.86 2.48 0 
2  1.009 0.162 1.82 7.6 0.81 0.96 1.23 1.34 1.57 1.9  0 
3  1.016 0.201 2.12 10.9 0.78 0.94 1.3 1.37 1.72 2.3  0.041 
4 (A)  1.009 0.153 1.51 6.1 0.81 0.96 1.24 1.3 1.5 1.81  0.074 
4 (B)  1.009 0.154 1.55 6.2 0.81 0.96 1.24 1.33 1.51 1.82  0 
5  1.01 0.156 1.96 11.7 0.81 0.96 1.25 1.3 1.5 2.03  0.08 
6 (A)  1.006 0.147 1.35 5.3 0.81 0.96 1.24 1.3 1.44 1.75  0.079 
6 (B)  1.013 0.174 2.56 15.3 0.81 0.95 1.24 1.32 1.67 2.25  0 
7  1.01 0.174 1.89 9.5 0.8 0.94 1.28 1.3 1.59 2.08  -0.019 
8  1.009 0.148 1.28 4.9 0.81 0.96 1.25 1.3 1.43 1.73  0.082 
Notes: Own illustration. Different countries are indicated in brackets for asymmetric scenarios. 
The columns show the mean, standard deviation, skewness, kurtosis, and different percentiles of 
prices for the respective scenario. Fiscal costs are depicted in the last column. The scenarios refer 
to: (1) no trade, no reserve, (2) no reserve, (3) no trade, (4) reserve only in A, (5) trade only if 
reserve full, (6) combination of 4 and 5, (7) trade quota, (8) common reserve. 
 
Only one country (A) has a reserve in scenario 4, but both countries benefit from it to almost 
the same extent (compare rows 4(A) and 4(B) in Table 3.3). The mean, SD, skewness, and 
kurtosis are all reduced and there is a huge decline of the prices in the higher percentiles. The 
benefits are almost completely shared, i.e. the benefits largely “leak” into the other country, 
so that one country is paying the cost to stabilize both of them while almost having no 
benefits over the other country as prices in the highest percentiles only differ by costs of trade. 
Yet, the effects of one reserve alone are already very significant as the standard deviation and 
the prices of the highest percentiles (when the reserve is touched) are much lower than in the 
scenarios without trade or without reserve. Private storage in either country remains basically 
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unaffected from the reserve when compared to scenario 2. Due to trade as second stabilization 
mechanism, the reserve remains more filled than in scenario 3 without trade. The supply 
response is comparable to the scenario without trade and exports hardly change compared to 
the scenario 2 without reserve. Since the benefits from the reserve are largely shared, this 
scenario also shows that it is possible to share a reserve which is – for logistical or other 
reasons – located in one country only while the costs are shared. 
 
Figure 3.1: Price characteristics and fiscal costs of different scenarios 
Notes: Own illustration. For the simulated scenarios the box-plots show the 1st, 10th, 50 th, 90 th, 
and 99 th percentile of the price distribution (left axis). The crosses illustrate the fiscal costs 
expressed in % of agricultural GDP which are shown on the right axis. Price interpretation: As the 
expected price is close to 1 in all scenarios, a price of 1.2 can be interpreted as 20% above the 
expected price. 
 
In scenario 5, trade only occurs whenever the reserves remain untouched which leads to the 
lowest frequency of an empty or non-full reserve. While the frequency of exports is slightly 
reduced compared to the aforementioned scenarios with trade, private storage remains 
unchanged. Compared to scenario 4 with only one reserve in both countries (or to the 
common reserve), the 99
th
 percentile slightly decreases while the 99.9
th
 percentile increases. 
This illustrates the mechanism of such a restrictive trade policy: Prices in “normal times” are 
slightly more stable due to the anticipated prevention of letting the other country induce a 
crisis. However, while prices are protected from external shocks, they are more prone to rise 
from internal shocks as the external stabilization mechanism is missing. Furthermore, prices 
during extreme events in both countries are higher in the country which is more affected 
because of the lack of cooperation – i.e. sharing of the burden of high prices – in this case. In 
addition, now both countries have a reserve and therefore both need to pay the fiscal costs. 
For the same fiscal costs but with unlimited trade, the highest percentiles (99.9
th
 and above) of 
the prices can be reduced significantly as can be seen in scenario 8, the common reserve. 
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If one country wants to set up a reserve while at the same time preventing this reserve from 
leaking into the other country, it can use the trade policy of scenario 5. This configuration is 
the basis of scenario 6, where only country A has a reserve. While in this case, country A has 
to pay all the costs for the reserve, it also manages to reduce the highest percentiles much 
more than if trade were allowed in times of supply shortages (scenario 4). Hence, if one 
country alone were to set up a reserve, this kind of policy could be used to prevent leakages to 
foreign countries (assuming that trading partners do not use retaliation measures). Scenario 6 
therefore comes close to the behavior of many governments during the world food crisis in 
2007/08, which introduced export bans when prices spiked. Indeed, the probability of price 
spikes or extreme events is higher than in all other scenarios that do not totally forbid trade. 
Prices in country B can be enormous and this can explain the dramatic increase of global 
prices in 2007/08. In order to prevent extreme events, it would be better for country B if 
country A would abandon its reserve but therefore keep its borders open (scenario 2) or at 
least only impose trade quotas (scenario 7).  
Table 3.4: Availability, reserve characteristics and fiscal costs 
  Availability  Reserve  Costs 
 
Mean SD  Mean SD Freq(empty) Freq(nun-full)  (in %) 
1 1.03 0.064  0 0 1 1  0 
2 1.016 0.063  0 0 1 1  0 
3 1.045 0.064  0.018 0.005 0.069 0.118  0.041 
4 (A) 1.034 0.063  0.019 0.004 0.044 0.069  0.074 
4 (B) 1.015 0.063  0 0 1 1  0 
5 1.034 0.063  0.019 0.004 0.03 0.053  0.08 
6 (A) 1.033 0.063  0.019 0.004 0.029 0.051  0.079 
6 (B) 1.017 0.063  0 0 1 1  0 
7 1.039 0.063  0.019 0.005 0.052 0.091  -0.019 
8 1.034 0.063  0.019 0.004 0.038 0.063  0.082 
Notes: Own illustration. Different countries are indicated in brackets for asymmetric 
scenarios. For the reserve, the frequencies of it being empty and non-full are shown as well as 
the costs in percent of the agricultural GDP. 
 
Scenario 7 illustrates the effect of a trade quota as trade is limited by the capacity of the 
reserve. The frequency of trade is the highest in this scenario while the amounts traded are 
among the lowest. This implies that trade is only partly instantaneous and partly delayed by 
one or more years, depending on the trading limit and supply shock. However, the trade quota 
generates revenues which significantly reduce the fiscal costs of this policy. The frequency of 
having an empty or non-full reserve is the highest among all scenarios with trade. Compared 
to scenario 8 where trade is unlimited, there is only a slight increase in private stocks such 
that private storage cannot compensate for the damaging effect of such a trade quota. 
Interestingly, the mean price, the standard deviation and the highest percentiles are all higher 
than in scenario 5 or 8. Therefore, limiting the per-period amount of trade seems to have a 
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more devastating impact on the price stability than limiting trade to periods where the reserve 
remains untouched. As a result, if only one country builds up a reserve and wants to protect 
itself from paying the costs to stabilize prices in the other country, a trade policy based on 
whether the reserve is touched is a better option than introducing time-independent quotas. 
However, governments usually do not impose time-independent quotas. Instead, they are 
introduced in times of crisis such as in 2007/08 when Ukraine and other countries (AMIS 
2011b) introduced export quotas. In that case, the quotas could be applied to prevent leakages 
from public stocks into foreign markets which would make them comparable to an export 
tariff. 
Table 3.5: Private storage, production, and export characteristics 
 
Private storage  Production 
 
Exports 
 
Mean SD 50% 90%  Mean SD Mean SD 90% Freq(trade) 
1 0.029 0.033 0.018 0.078  1.001 0.011 0 0 0 0 
2 0.015 0.026 0 0.055  1.001 0.007  0.011 0.021 0.042 0.336 
3 0.026 0.032 0.012 0.073  1 0.01  0 0 0 0 
4 (A) 0.014 0.026 0 0.053  1 0.007  0.011 0.021 0.042 0.34 
4 (B) 0.015 0.026 0 0.053  1 0.007  0.011 0.021 0.042 0.341 
5 0.014 0.026 0 0.052  1 0.007  0.011 0.021 0.041 0.333 
6 (A) 0.014 0.026 0 0.052  1 0.007  0.01 0.02 0.04 0.321 
6 (B) 0.015 0.026 0 0.055  1.001 0.008  0.011 0.021 0.043 0.346 
7 0.019 0.026 0.005 0.058  1.001 0.009  0.006 0.009 0.02 0.37 
8 0.014 0.025 0 0.052  1 0.007  0.011 0.021 0.042 0.341 
Notes: Own illustration. Different countries are indicated in brackets for asymmetric scenarios. 
The frequency of exports being larger than zero is shown in the last column. 
 
Scenario 8, the common reserve (or two identical reserves and unlimited free trade) allows 
the biggest reduction of the highest percentiles of prices; the price in the 99.9
th
 percentile is by 
far the lowest. Therefore, such a common reserve is the best mechanism to compensate 
extreme supply shortfalls. Interestingly, for smaller supply shortfalls prices can be reduced 
slightly more if trade is limited to times when the reserve is untouched. This might be a result 
of the decrease in private stocks (in particular in the highest percentiles) if trade is not 
limited
13
, it might be due to the slight reduction in trade which produces fewer trade costs, or 
it could be due to the protection from external shocks. The reserve is used less frequently than 
if trade is restricted whenever the reserve is touched (scenarios 5 and 6), but it is slightly more 
often replenished as these trade restrictions limit the influence of external shocks. However, 
the trade quota leads to a higher frequency of an exhausted reserve. Compared to the other 
scenarios where trade is allowed, private storage remains almost unaffected. Overall, the 
reserve is only touched in around 20% of the cases and is replenished with a probability of 
                                                 
13
 This leads to lower prices as the trade costs are included in the prices. 
3.5  Results 
61 
around 3.5%. These results illustrate that such a common reserve provides a good protection 
against extreme production shortfalls at very little costs (around 0.08% of the agricultural 
GDP). 
3.5.2 Private storage subsidy 
After having illustrated the effects of trade policies and asymmetric reserve policies, the 
impact of a common private storage subsidy in two symmetric countries with free trade is 
presented in this section. Both countries have the same subsidy 𝑚𝑖 which reduces the 
effective per-unit storage costs to 𝑘𝑖  −  𝑚𝑖. Figure 3.2 shows how these costs influence 
different percentiles of the prices (left axis) and which fiscal costs they produce for the 
government (right axis). High subsidies significantly reduce the highest percentiles of the 
prices. However, this exponential decrease is accompanied by an exponential increase in 
fiscal costs reaching as high as 0.26% of the agricultural GDP when private storage is 
effectively free. In addition, the prices of the lower percentiles (the 25th percentile is 
indicated in cyan) increase, so the standard deviation is reduced because prices from both 
ends of the distribution are shifted toward the mean. In general, only when the supply is 
relatively high, private storage occurs at all. This prevents private storage from compensating 
supply shortages, particularly if several of these occur in a row. Trade is heavily reduced by 
the storage subsidy. More precisely, the frequency, the mean exports, and the higher 
percentiles are reduced (not shown). Policymakers therefore need to be aware of these large 
impacts of a storage subsidy on trade. Section 3.5.4 compares the cost-effectiveness of a 
private storage subsidy to a public emergency reserve.  
3.5.3 Influence of the reserve parameters on a common reserve 
For the public emergency reserve, there are two parameters which can be varied by 
policymakers, the capacity and the trigger price. This section looks at the effect of these 
parameters on prices and costs while assuming that both countries cooperate by following the 
same reserve policies and keeping trade free. Figure 3.3 shows the 99.9
th
 percentile, the 99
th
 
percentile, the 90
th
 percentile, the fiscal costs, and the frequency of an empty or non-full 
reserve as colors in separate plots with the reserve capacity on the x-axis and the trigger price 
on the y-axis. This shows how these variables change if the reserve capacity and/or the trigger 
price are changed. The percentiles can again be interpreted as a shock of a certain frequency, 
i.e. the 99
th
 percentile is a 100-year shock, the 90
th
 percentile a shock which is expected to 
occur roughly every 10 years. In the graphs with the different price percentiles it can be seen 
that if the trigger price is very low, the reserve might not be able to keep the price of the 
respective percentile below it. If the reserve is supposed to affect prices at the 90
th
 percentile 
already, it is necessary to set the trigger price below 1.3. But these low trigger prices are 
likely to fail in compensating large supply shortages unless they come with a big reserve and 
therefore high fiscal costs. As a numerical example, a reserve capacity of 0.025, i.e. 2.5% of 
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the average harvest, combined with a trigger price of 1.2, i.e. 20% above the average price, 
would allow keeping the 90
th
 percentile below the trigger price while the 99
th
 percentile 
equals 1.4 and the costs of this policy would be around 0.077% of the agricultural GDP.  
A common concern with public stockholding is the crowding out of private storage (see 
chapter 5). This crowding out effect is calculated for the different reserve configurations 
(Figure 3.4). The private stocks at the 99.9
th
 percentile, the 99
th
 and the 90
th
 percentile, and, 
most importantly, the mean private stocks are shown. Obviously, any reserve which is 
supposed to impact the price distribution will also impact private storage. However, it can be 
seen that if the reserve’s capacity is not too high and the trigger price is not too low, the 
impact of the reserve on private storage can be minimal. In the numerical example above with 
a reserve capacity of 0.025 and a trigger price of 1.2, the mean private stocks would be 
reduced from roughly 1.5% to 1.24% of the production. A price trigger of 1.275 would 
already prevent the mean private stocks from going below 1.3% of the production, 
independent of the capacity. Overall, the impact on private storage seems to be small 
compared to the other scenarios before. Prohibiting or limiting trade for example has a much 
bigger impact on private storage.  
 
Figure 3.2: Price distribution for the storage subsidy 
Notes: Own illustration. Percentiles (lines) are indicated on the left y-axis whereas fiscal costs 
expressed as % of agricultural GDP (dashed black) are depicted on the right y-axis. As the default 
per-unit private storage costs are calibrated to 0.06, higher values on the x-axis represent a storage 
tax which brings revenues, i.e. negative fiscal costs. 
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Figure 3.3: Characteristics of a common reserve dependent on its capacity and trigger price 
Notes: Own illustration. The colors of the six plots show the price at the 99.9th percentile, at the 
99th percentile, at the 90th percentile, the costs (in % of agricultural GDP), and the frequency of an 
empty as well as of a nun-full reserve, respectively. On the x-axis is always the capacity of the 
reserve (which can be interpreted as a share of the expected harvest), on the y-axis the trigger 
price (which can be interpreted as a share of the expected price, e.g. a price of 1.2 is 20% above 
the expected price). 
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Figure 3.4: Private stocks for different reserve scenarios 
Notes: Own illustration. The colors of the six plots show the private stocks at the 99.9th percentile, 
at the 99th percentile, at the 90th percentile, and the mean. On the x-axis is always the capacity of 
the reserve, on the y-axis the trigger price as in Figure 3.3. All graphs show the scenario for the 
common reserve with unlimited trade. 
 
One noteworthy finding is that a reserve is not very useful to defend low trigger prices. If both 
the trigger price and the storage capacity are set very low, the reserve will be used frequently 
(bottom right of Figure 3.3). However, if now the reserve capacity is increased, the fiscal 
costs increase rapidly and at the same time it is getting much more likely that it is used, i.e. 
non-full. This is caused by the huge crowding out of private storage if the trigger price is very 
low and the capacity high (Figure 3.4). In this case, the government is crowding out private 
sector activities which would otherwise help to also stabilize market prices. 
All these graphs in Figure 3.3 and Figure 3.4 allow policy makers to decide for a reserve 
which is optimal for their preferences on the price distribution and risks. This means that 
policy makers would need to decide about their price distribution and cost preferences first 
and then they can use these graphs to find the combination of trigger price and capacity which 
ensures this expectation. As an example, policy makers could define the maximum acceptable 
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frequency of the reserve being empty (and hence the price being above the trigger price) and 
then find the configuration which minimizes the costs while fulfilling this criteria. An 
alternative example is to predefine the available budget and use this to minimize the 
frequency of a price at a certain percentile (e.g. a 100 year event). In general, two parameters 
have to be specified to obtain a unique solution.  
3.5.4 Comparing efficiency and costs of a reserve and a subsidy 
From a policy maker’s perspective, it is important to know how the impacts and costs of a 
private storage subsidy compare to those of a public emergency reserve policy. Figure 3.5 
shows different percentiles in different colors for the specific scenarios. As explained before, 
the reserve’s parameters are only uniquely defined when two parameters are chosen to be 
optimized. Therefore, choosing a level of fiscal costs is not yet enough. Instead, two different 
scenarios are chosen: The dotted curves show the case where the reserve is chosen to 
minimize the price at the 99
th
 percentile given the level of fiscal costs at the x-axis while for 
the dashed curves, the price at the 90
th
 percentile has been minimized. The solid lines 
represent the storage subsidy as comparison.  
As before, it can be seen that the reserves reduced the prices at the highest percentiles much 
more for any level of fiscal costs. However, the prices at the 75
th
 percentile are increased 
while they are decreased if a subsidy is paid to private stockholders. This subsidy nevertheless 
increases the prices of the lowest percentiles (here the 10
th
 percentile in magenta) which are 
unaffected by the reserve. Therefore, the differences of these policies are rather distinct. The 
dashed lines show that if the reserve is optimized to minimize the price at the 90
th
 percentile, 
it still manages to reduce the prices at this percentile to levels below what can be reached 
through a subsidy. But even if the reserve is optimized for the 90
th
 percentile, it is able to 
reduce the price in the higher percentiles significantly more than a private storage subsidy 
could for the same costs.  
Overall, it therefore turns out that a private storage subsidy is very efficient in reducing price 
volatility (i.e. the standard deviation of prices) while it is very inefficient in reducing the 
likelihood of extreme prices which reserves can achieve at a relatively low level of fiscal 
costs. In particular, private storage is not able to compensate for two production shortfalls in a 
row, as carry-over stocks are zero when the production level is below the expected level. 
Thus, an emergency reserve targets consumers only while a private storage subsidy also 
targets risk-averse producers (besides stockholders). 
It should be kept in mind that the grid size for the reserve calculations is limited – on the x-
axis the capacity was varied from 0.005 to 0.1 in steps of 0.005, on the y-axis the trigger price 
was changed from 1.1 to 1.6 in steps of 0.025. Therefore, some fluctuations are visible in 
Figure 3.5 and the lines for the reserve configurations could even be slightly lower if the 
reserve grid density were increased. This would come at high computational costs though. 
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Figure 3.5: Comparison of costs and impacts of a reserve and a subsidy policy 
Notes: Own illustration. The different lines show different percentiles (colors) of the price 
distribution depending on the fiscal costs (x-axis), expressed in % of the agricultural GDP. Solid 
lines represent the storage subsidy; dotted and dashed lines a reserve optimized for a minimal 
price at the 99th or 90th percentile, respectively. As before, a price level of 1.2 can be interpreted as 
20% above the expected price because for all cases the expected prices are sufficiently close to 1. 
3.5.5 The influence of asymmetric production shocks 
If countries are asymmetric, this may affect the impacts and costs of the different policies. 
There are many ways in which the countries could deviate from one another and a full 
overview of these effects would go far beyond the scope of this study. However, some 
insights on how different parameters influence the results shall be presented. If the trade costs 
are increased or the previously uncorrelated harvest shocks become correlated, the benefits 
from cooperation decrease (not shown) but both countries will still profit from cooperating. 
However, this does not hold for all parameters. As an example, the influence of asymmetric 
production shocks is illustrated for the common reserve and free trade (Figure 3.6). The 
standard deviation of the production shock in country A is fixed at 6% of the average harvest 
whereas the standard deviation of the production shock in country B is varied from roughly 
1% to 15% of the average harvest. In the absence of trade, price quantiles in A are a straight 
line because they do not depend on production shocks in B whereas the 99
th
 percentile in B 
grows exponentially if shocks increase.  
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Figure 3.6: How asymmetric production shocks influence gains from cooperation 
Notes: Own illustration. Different percentiles (colors) of the price distribution are shown 
dependent on the standard deviation of shocks in country B. The dotted line represents how prices 
in country A, the dashed line how prices and country B would behave in the absence of trade. The 
solid line represents the price in both countries when trade is unlimited. 
 
Overall, three different regimes can be identified. Whenever the solid curve is the lower than 
both the dashed and dotted line, both countries would directly benefit from cooperating, i.e. 
they could reduce the prices at this percentile if they keep trade open. Nevertheless, if either 
the dashed or the dotted line is the lowest, one country benefits from cooperation while the 
other one loses by having to accept higher prices than in the absence of trade. In many cases, 
gains for the country which profits are larger than the losses faced by the other country such 
that compensation could be paid to achieve cooperation. Then, one country would be better 
off and the other one at least as well off as without trade. However, if countries are very 
asymmetric, the total losses may be higher than the total gains. This would be the case if the 
distance between the lower two prices curves is bigger than the distance between the upper 
two price curves for the considered percentile in Figure 3.6. Additionally, country-specific 
non-linear subjective welfare measures could yield the same result even if the common price 
would only be slightly above the insulation price for one country. In these cases, paying a 
compensation to incentivize cooperating is not possible. Hence, cooperation cannot be 
achieved if all countries are seeking to be better off. But if production can be stabilized in the 
shock-prone country, or if further countries can be integrated such that the collectively 
(country B) 
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experienced production shocks become smaller, cooperation can become beneficial for all 
countries again. 
For x=0.06, both countries have the same supply variability and hence the prices are the same 
in both countries for all percentiles if trade is blocked. As the reserve only affects the highest 
and lowest percentiles of the price distribution, the middle percentiles remain mostly the same 
in both countries if the reserve is not too big (and thus affecting the middle percentiles also). 
This is the reason why the 90
th
 percentile in country B shows a kink: If the reserve is too big 
compared to the supply variability, the price of the 90
th
 percentile changes but once it is 
sufficiently small, which is the case for a SD of shocks above 0.05 in country B, it does not 
change any more. 
3.6 Conclusion 
This study calculates for the first time gains from international trade and storage cooperation 
while accounting for private storage and a responsive supply. The non-linear dynamic 
programming, two country partial equilibrium model with private stockholders and producers 
with rational expectations provides a number of insights about how governments can protect 
their population from extreme and volatile prices. Unsurprisingly, free trade turns out to be a 
highly efficient and free of costs way to compensate harvest failures (scenario 2). A private 
storage subsidy may be an additional tool to stabilize prices. However, while it is very 
efficient in reducing the standard deviation of prices and thereby price volatility, it is likely to 
fail at compensating extreme events, i.e. massive supply shortages which may result in price 
spikes. Such shortages are a result of production, private stocks, and imports combined being 
significantly below the sum of their expected values. In contrast, a public reserve turns out to 
be a much more efficient way to reduce the highest percentiles of prices and therefore help in 
extreme events. The reserve analyzed follows very simple rules: Storing up to some capacity 
limit if prices are below a trigger price while releasing to prevent price increases above the 
trigger. This allows private market actors to easily anticipate stock acquisitions and releases. 
Therefore, the reserve can be set up in a way that it hardly affects private storage and only 
produces minimal fiscal costs. Already for 0.08% of the agricultural GDP
14
, a decent level of 
insurance against extreme events can be reached. As comparison, Indonesia’s public stock 
managed to stabilize prices and its costs were estimated to be 0.11% of the total GDP in 1991, 
a year of intensive interventions (Timmer 2013). A combination of a minor private storage 
subsidy and a public reserve could be an option to efficiently fight high prices and price 
volatility at the same time. 
                                                 
14
 The agricultural GDP here serves only as a comparison, i.e. to better illustrate the level of the 
costs. However, the costs can be expressed in absolute terms without referring to the agricultural 
GDP. 
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Another consideration for a policy maker is that a private storage subsidy may heavily impact 
trade whereas an emergency reserve hardly does. While it could be useful to limit the need for 
trade if infrastructure is bad, it also implies that in case of large supply shortfalls there may be 
fewer companies ready to start importing. Thus, it may increase impacts of extreme 
production shortfalls. Furthermore, private storage has also been argued to provoke stock 
hoarding and create speculative bubbles (a discussion of this issue is found in Dorosh and 
Rashid 2012; Galtier 2014; for empirical cases compare Ravallion 1987; Sen 1980). This is 
another argument for keeping a public emergency reserve. 
The results further show that if the policies of the countries are not aligned, no such measures, 
be they public or private storage oriented, can exploit their full potential. If trade is not limited 
and only one country has a reserve, the results show that benefits of this reserve will leak into 
the other country while the costs do not. Both countries would then benefit from the insurance 
mechanism which is maintained and paid for by one country only thereby creating a free rider 
problem. But countries looking for protection from extreme events can set up their own 
reserve while restricting exports when the reserve is used, thereby preventing leakages from 
the reserve into foreign markets. If countries want to cooperate but for logistical or other 
reasons the maintenance of a reserve is easier in one country, the other could pay 
compensation as the protection from supply shortages is almost equally shared (scenario 4). 
This works as long as the asymmetries between the countries are not too big. If they are, the 
losses for one country may become bigger than the gains for the other resulting in a situation 
where compensation payments cannot incentivize free trade for all. 
These results are of high relevance for the ongoing WTO negotiations. As shown, countries 
face no or few incentives to commit to free trade if they have domestic price stabilization 
policies in place because benefits would leak into world markets while costs do not. The 
results also showed that very high prices may be realized if some countries have stabilization 
policies in place and use trade restrictions while other countries rely on free trade without 
public interventions. In this scenario, prices in the latter group of countries can rise well above 
levels which would be achieved if all countries would refrain from intervening into markets in 
any way. Therefore, this behavior, public stocks combined with trade restrictions, can explain 
the high prices observed during the world food crisis in 2007/08. However, the costs and 
negative welfare impacts of a failing Doha round or of excluding agriculture from it are huge 
(Bouet and Laborde 2010; Laborde and Martin 2012). One potential solution could be to 
allow some flexibility for key products, an argument usually proposed based on political 
pressure for politically sensitive products. But even this is likely to show severe adverse 
impacts (Jean et al. 2010). This flexibility would correspond to export tariffs or quotas which 
can be introduced, but are limited according to pre-defined criteria. Hence, it is related to the 
scenarios 5, 6, and 7 of this model. As it was shown, applying flexible rules helps to keep the 
borders open most of the time and thus limits the occurrence of extreme events. However, it 
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was also shown that if there are countries with public stocks which limit exports, prices in 
countries without public stocks can increase dramatically (scenario 7). It that situation, it can 
be better to not maintain any public stocks but always keep trade unlimited. This corresponds 
to scenario 2 of this model which shows indeed a higher level of price stability as scenario 7. 
In the real world, the price stability may depend on how the production and its variability 
differ between the countries that would impose such restrictions and those which do not. 
Another challenge arising from flexible rules is that they may be hard to monitor. However, if 
reserves would be following simple rules, as in this study and generally suggested, then it 
would be possible to pre-define strict criteria for the flexible trade rules, e.g. market prices 
reaching certain levels (accounting for their trend). This way, rules according to scenarios 5, 
6, and 7, i.e. pre-defined export quotas or tariffs, could be monitored by the WTO and 
violations could be identified and sanctioned by the WTO dispute settlement mechanism. 
Nevertheless, if there are many countries without public interventions, prices in these 
countries can become less stable (scenario 7) and therefore this may not be the preferred 
option. 
Two potential solutions remain which allow combining price stabilizing market interventions 
while at the same time incentivizing free trade and thereby profiting from the comprised 
welfare gains and overcoming the collecting action problem of insulating policies: First, an 
international emergency reserve financed by the international community that provides a 
sufficient level of protection for all countries (an extension of the proposal from von Braun 
and Torero 2009). This would correspond to scenario 8 of this model and it was shown that 
extreme prices are particularly rare in this scenario. Yet, achieving a mutual agreement on 
stocking policies and on sharing the fiscal burden seems very difficult if not impossible. The 
second option is to introduce a scheme for compensation payments to countries with price 
stabilization policies which would ensure compensation for not imposing trade restrictions in 
time of crises. Hence, the international community would need to agree on sharing the fiscal 
costs of those price stabilization measures from which all countries also benefit when global 
production falls short. Unfortunately, this kind of mutual agreement does not seem any easier 
to achieve. A non-global alternative could be the formation of country groups which build 
common reserves (or use other measures), ensure free trade within the group, and use 
restrictive trade policies only to prevent leakages into foreign markets. Such country groups 
might be easier to form, as countries with a more common understanding of impacts of 
volatile and high prices and views on stabilization policies are more likely to commit to 
mutual agreements. Partly, such groups exist or are in the process of being implemented for 
the ECOWAS countries (ECOWAS Commission 2012) and ASEAN plus three (Briones 
2011). Nevertheless, a substantial share of potential global welfare gains from free trade is 
lost if only interest groups cooperate.  
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The WFP buys a large share of their acquired 2 million tons of food per year as close as 
possible to where it is needed (WFP 2016). This allows saving time and money for 
transportation and helps the local economies (ibid.). However, when there is a supply shortage 
evolving, buying grains from other surplus countries and shipping them to the crisis region 
may be preferable in order to prevent price surges (this could correspond to a targeted trade 
subsidy in the model). Such as strategy is partly applied and the WFP has even been awarded 
an international supply chain award for their comprehensive strategy (WFP 2014). The WFP 
keeps around a million tons of food in their 650 warehouses and an additional 120.000 tons in 
warehouses which are managed by humanitarian partners (ibid.). It procures food  through 
competitive bidding processes to achieve the best possible prices (WFP 2013). Nevertheless, 
the WFP operations are small compared to the total global grain markets. As food for 
humanitarian emergencies is often exempted from export restrictions, it may therefore be an 
option to upscale the WFP operations. Thus, more grains could be provided for import-
dependent countries when they lose access to imports due to export restrictions imposed by 
major producer countries. While this would not solve the general beggar-thy-neighbor 
problem, it could allow more protection for the most vulnerable countries and regions in times 
of need. 
Limitations of this study arise from the model specification. In particular, the conclusions 
about how asymmetry between countries affects the gains from cooperation are very limited. 
Hence, results are not intended to provide a concrete quantitative guidance on how to set up a 
reserve for a specific country but rather to illustrate the behavioral characteristics of and 
interactions between different policies. Most importantly, conclusions about the emergency 
reserve are restricted to reserve policies which can be described by the chosen scheme or 
which behave sufficiently similar. However, other policies for a reserve could be chosen and 
would need an own investigation. Finally, limitations arise from the design of the model and 
the partial equilibrium framework. For example, interactions with other sectors of the 
economy were not considered, private stockholding may happen for other reasons than profit-
maximization, and markets may be incomplete and their dynamics non-stationary. 
Past research on international storage-trade cooperation has typically ignored the effects of 
public reserves on private storage and trade. This study illustrates what effects can be 
expected from economic theory for different stabilization measures and how these depend on 
different parameters. Given the occurrence of rare but extreme price spikes (compare e.g. 
Deaton and Laroque 1992), this study supports the calls for considering public stockholding 
programs which can support private storage. Future research should therefore provide specific 
regional case studies which identify such effects for specific sets of countries. In addition, 
more knowledge is required on how asymmetry influences potential gains from cooperation, 
e.g. how the benefits depend on the correlation of the production, the relative size of the 
countries, and the demand elasticity of the consumers. Furthermore, more research is needed 
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on how agreements can help to overcome incentives to default, i.e. to impose trade 
restrictions. For example, if countries cooperate by having a common reserve, incentives to 
impose trade restrictions may be reduced. A substantial risk of retaliation may have a similar 
effect. Apart from that, studies on nutritional and welfare impacts of high and volatile prices 
should receive more attention on the research agenda. The full social costs, including 
nutritional impacts, of high and volatile prices still remain under-investigated. More 
knowledge in this field might also pave the way for game theoretic analyses about how 
countries can find agreements if objective functions and perceptions of how prices impact 
welfare vary.   
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4 Linking Theory and Empirics: Derivation and Empirical 
Testing of a Surrogate Model for Private Storage15 
4.1 Abstract 
The competitive storage model (CSM) has evolved as the workhorse in numerical analyses of 
price stabilization through private storage and recent evidence has supported its empirical 
validity. However, several shortcomings prevail. The numerical implementation of the model 
remains very complex and is limited to settings with very few state variables. Therefore, only 
one or two countries can typically be considered and policy measures need to be implemented 
in very simplified manners. Furthermore, approaches to empirically validate the CSM have 
focused on the distribution of prices but ignored actual stock levels. Finally, the CSM only 
indirectly allows empirically quantifying stock determinants. This study addresses these 
issues by developing a surrogate model for drivers of competitive storage. The reduced-form 
model is obtained from a so-called response surface methodology which econometrically 
relates the stock data generated by the CSM to various input parameters and the state 
variables, i.e. global and domestic supply and income. This approximation allows the 
characterization of grain stockholding by a piece-wise linear function for a broad set of 
parameters and model assumptions and can therefore be implemented in high-dimensional 
modelling exercises. When tested with generated data, the model turns out to be highly 
precise and flexible. It is then applied to empirical stock data for 32 countries using a non-
linear least-square panel regression. This provides an alternative way for the empirical 
validation of the CSM which, as a novel feature, accounts for actual stock levels. Results of 
empirical estimations provide for the first time a direct comparison of the empirical and 
theoretical influence of different parameters.   
4.2 Introduction 
Measures to stabilize grain prices need to be based on insights into how markets function. For 
ensuring sufficient grain supplies the main actors of interest are producers, traders and 
stockholders, be they smallholders or big commercial agents. Therefore, knowledge about the 
behavioral determinants of private stockholders is an important prerequisite for evaluating any 
type of public intervention. The competitive storage model (CSM) has become the workhorse 
in theoretical models involving private profit maximizing stockholders. There are also more 
simplified models circulating (e.g. stocks as a fixed share of supply), but these usually have 
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 Earlier versions of this work have been published in the conference proceedings of the 
ECOMOD conference 2015, Boston, as Brockhaus J., Kalkuhl, M. “Drivers of private grain 
storage. A computational-economics and empirical approach” and of the GEWISOLA 2014, 
Göttingen, (published as “Schriften der Gesellschaft für Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften 
des Landbaues e.V., Band 50, 2015) under the name “Empirical Investigation of Private Grain 
Stock Determinants”. 
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very simplistic assumptions about the price expectation formation process. The CSM has 
enabled the acquisition of numerous insights about possible market interventions, though 
these are typically based on theoretical models. Due to its theoretical importance, interest in 
testing the empirical validity of the CSM has been and still remains high.  
After the establishment of storage-trade models (Miranda and Glauber 1995; Williams and 
Wright 1991), many authors have used the CSM to simulate market prices and then compare 
the obtained price characteristics to empirical price data in order to tests the model’s empirical 
validity
16
. Deaton and Laroque (1992) have been able to predict the price behavior for thirteen 
commodities including rare but violent price explosions. However, they argue that their model 
cannot explain the high degree of autocorrelation observed in the data. Even after changing 
from a GMM estimation to fitting the competitive storage model directly, the high level of 
autocorrelation could not be modelled (Deaton and Laroque 1996, 1995). Miranda and Rui 
(1999) found this issue can be solved by employing a supply of storage function which allows 
negative intertemporal price spreads if stocks are positive and by using a nested maximum 
likelihood estimation technique. In a similar vein, the incorporation of a convenience yield, 
i.e. the attribution of an intrinsic value to the possession of stocks (Brennen 1958; Working 
1949), has allowed replicating U.S. corn prices (Peterson and Tomek 2005). However the 
concept of convenience yields has always been controversial (compare e.g. Deaton and 
Laroque 1996). In a further step, the model was shown to produce consistent results which 
support the model’s validity if output and demand trends, yield shocks, as well as time 
dependent interest rates are considered (Miao et al. 2011). Finally, Cafiero et. al (2011) 
showed that the model from Deaton and Laroque (1995, 1992) may even replicate the high 
degree of autocorrelation by only applying a much finer grid of state variables on which the 
model is solved. This improved the precision of the results and yielded a much higher degree 
auf autocorrelation. Cafiero et. al (2011) also illustrate how more realistic assumptions on 
parameters, e.g. a less price-sensitive demand curve and lower storage costs, can also solve 
this issue. Overall, today there seems to be substantial evidence for the empirical relevance of 
the CSM. However, in all these analyses, only the prices and price stability over time have 
been considered but to the best of the author’s knowledge no approaches have been made to 
estimate the drivers of private grain stocks considering actual stock levels. Yet, without 
providing any further details, Deaton and Laroque (1996) have mentioned that a different 
approach would be taken if actual stock data is used. This work presents such an approach. 
This study develops a new method to empirically test the CSM and directly identify drivers of 
private grain storage. Therefore, this study compares the dependency of stocks on different 
parameters in the theoretical simulations and for the empirical data. The idea is to first solve 
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 Prices are usually easier to observe than stocks which may have driven earlier empirical 
validity tests. 
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the model numerically for a specific set of parameters. Then, policy functions are derived, i.e. 
the stock levels are expressed by the state variables, i.e. availabilities and income levels. As it 
is not a priori clear what functional form should be assumed for the dependence of stocks on 
the state variables, at first qualitative arguments for a specific form are presented. These are 
then econometrically verified using a so-called response surface fitting procedure (Box and 
Wilson 1951; Gorissen et al. 2010; Hendry 1984). This methodology allows analyzing the 
relationship between several explanatory variables (here the state variables) and a response 
variable (stocks). This procedure is necessary because no analytical solution exists and 
therefore grid points of the numerical solution need to be fitted with a well-defined and 
theoretically founded reduced-form equation. As a result of the approximation of the policy 
function, a surrogate reduced-form model for competitive storage is obtained. In contrast to 
earlier studies, it does not model prices but rather stock levels directly. On the one hand, this 
requires data on actual stock levels while on the other hand it also allows finding a much 
simpler reduced-form equation. Prices are highly non-linear and even on small intervals they 
can hardly be approximated by piece-wise linear functions (compare Figure 4.1). The closing 
stocks in contrast, can very well be approximated by a piece-wise linear function. This non-
linearity of prices but piece-wise linearity of stocks is, however, also a result of the model 
assumptions, in particular of the iso-elastic demand function. Nevertheless, this behavior is 
observed for several of the typical ways to specify similar models.  
Monte-Carlo methods are used to specify the impact of different model parameters on the 
results, i.e. the stocks. This means that the model is solved for a wide range of parameters and 
the influence on the response variables is econometrically quantified. The derived reduced-
form surrogate model which is obtained this way is then applied to empirical data in order to 
identify which variables are drivers of private grain stocks in the real world. This final 
reduced-form storage equation can be also used in high-dimensional modelling exercises. In 
this case it eliminates the need to solve the non-linear rational expectations market 
equilibrium which otherwise typically comes with the “curse of dimensionality” (Bellman 
1957). This “curse” is a permanent source of trouble in dynamic programming problems, 
particularly if non-linear equations are included as it is the case for the CSM. 
Of course, this procedure comes with its own shortcomings. Most importantly, data which 
distinguish between private and public stocks is mostly missing. Therefore, the empirical 
analysis can only be based on the total stock data. However, different measures are 
undertaken to ensure that the results are not distorted by public stocks (compare section 4.7.2 
for details). Most importantly, only developed countries which have very low public stocks 
and rarely use them are included in the analysis. Section 4.7.2 also argues that very small 
public stocks typically have a minimal impact on private stockholding activities. Only 
considering countries without any public stockholding program could fully resolve the issue 
but this is empirically infeasible due to a lack of such countries. This approach would come at 
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the costs of a substantial reduction in the number of observations which is expected to have a 
more distortive effect on the results. Another limitation is the negligence of trade distortions 
which are typically impossible to quantify for a broad set of countries. Furthermore, for a full 
validity test of the whole model rather than testing only the influence of specific parameters, 
the model would need to be calibrated to each specific country-crop combination to reproduce 
specifically the moments of the stock distributions.  
The remainder of this chapter is structured along four crucial steps. First, in section 4.3 the 
theoretical model is presented including its calibration parameters. This is the theoretical 
benchmark model which is used to generate stock data for a wide set of parameters and 
supply situations, i.e. a Monte-Carlo simulation method is applied. The model includes one 
country with supply and income shocks which can store and trade with the rest of the world. 
Supply shocks can also occur in the rest of the world and indirectly affect the country. 
Second, in section 4.5 the dependency of the results (the stock data) on input parameters is 
illustrated by first explaining the qualitative behavior of grain stocks according to 
visualizations of stocks and then developing a tractable reduced-form storage equation that 
quantitatively captures these dynamics. Third, in subsection 4.6 the quality of the 
approximation using the R² from non-linear least-square fits on the generated data from the 
first step is evaluated. Forth, section 4.7 applies a non-linear least square regression to 
estimate the reduced-form storage equation using actual storage and supply data from 32 
countries. Major findings and their policy implications are summarized in section 4.8. 
4.3 Theoretical model 
The model specification follows Gouel (2011) or Gouel and Jean (2015) but differs in 
explicitly including the rest of the world as a second country and in incorporating income 
shocks while excluding public stocks. It is very similar to the model presented in chapter 3. 
Nevertheless, the main differences lie in the incorporation of income shocks, exclusion of 
public interventions, be they trade or storage oriented, and neglection of fiscal costs and 
extreme events. The model describes a homogeneous agricultural product that can be 
produced, consumed, and stored in both countries as well as traded between them. It is a 
partial equilibrium dynamic programming model with discrete annual time steps. 
4.3.1 Stockholders 
The behavior of the stockholders is based on the competitive storage model. Each country 
i ∈ {A, B} has a single representative stockholder who is risk neutral and acts competitively. 
The stock quantity 𝑆𝑖,𝑡 is purchased at price 𝑃𝑖,𝑡 in country 𝑖 and then carried from period 𝑡 to 
period 𝑡 + 1, where it is sold for price 𝑃𝑖,𝑡+1. Storage losses (1 − 𝛿𝑖) occur and constant 
marginal storing costs 𝑘𝑖 apply. Hence, the stockholders are modelled in the same way as in 
4.3  Theoretical model 
77 
chapter 3 and as described in section 3.3.1. The only difference is that the subsidy 𝑚𝑖 is zero 
for both countries. 
4.3.2 Producers 
Each country has one representative producer who is risk neutral and makes the planting 
decision 𝐻𝑖,𝑡 one period before the harvest in period 𝑡 + 1 where they experience a random 
yield shock 𝑒𝑖,𝑡. Thus, the producers are modelled in the same way as in chapter 3 and 
described in section 3.3.3.  
To limit the number of state variables, the carry-over stocks and the harvest can be combined 
to one state variable per country, availability 𝐴𝑖,𝑡 with 
 𝐴𝑖,𝑡 = (1 − 𝛿𝑖)𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝐻𝑖,𝑡−1𝑒𝑖,𝑡. (4.1) 
This is the availability before trade takes place.  
4.3.3 Trade 
A representative trader uses all spatial arbitrage possibilities and trades competitively between 
both countries 𝐴 and 𝐵. Thus, trade is modelled as in chapter 3 and described in section 3.3.4. 
However, there are no trade quotas in this model such that 𝑋𝑖 = ∞. Furthermore, there are no 
import tariffs, i.e. 𝜙𝑖,𝑡 = 0 ∀ 𝑖, 𝑡 , and trade costs are described by the character Θ. 
4.3.4 Consumption 
In contrast to chapter 3, consumers in this model suffer from income shocks. Each country has 
consumers which consume according to an isoelastic demand function  
 Di(Pi,t, 𝑌𝑖,𝑡) = 𝛾𝑖𝑃𝑖,𝑡
𝛼𝑖𝑌𝑖,𝑡
𝜂
 (4.2) 
with normalization parameter 𝛾𝑖, price elasticity −1 ≠ αi < 0, and income elasticity ηi ≠ 1. 
The income 𝑌𝑖,𝑡 is assumed to be constant in the rest of the world, i.e. country 𝐵, while in 
country 𝐴 it is subject to random, normally distributed shocks with mean 1 and variance 𝜎𝑖
𝑦
. 
For simplicity, the consumers always consume the current income and do not save, hence, 
consumers’ savings can be ignored. Otherwise, these would need to be considered as additional 
state variables and a further maximization problem would need to be solved. As a result, the 
current income in country 𝐴, 𝑌𝐴,𝑡, is the third state variable of the model besides 𝐴𝐴,𝑡 and 𝐴𝐵,𝑡.  
4.3.5 Market equilibrium 
The shocks are considered at the beginning of each period so that equation (4.1) and the 
realization of the income shock in country 𝐴 provide the state variables. The market 
equilibrium condition is 
 𝐴𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑋−𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐷𝑖,𝑡(𝑃𝑖,𝑡, 𝑌𝑖,𝑡) + 𝑆𝑖,𝑡  . (4.3) 
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Therefore, when the model is solved numerically, a recursive equilibrium needs to be found, 
i.e. a set of functions 𝑆𝑖,𝑡(𝐴𝑖,𝑡, 𝐴−𝑖,𝑡, 𝑌𝐴,𝑡), 𝐻𝑖,𝑡(𝐴𝑖,𝑡, 𝐴−𝑖,𝑡, 𝑌𝐴,𝑡), 𝑃𝑖,𝑡(𝐴𝑖,𝑡, 𝐴−𝑖,𝑡, 𝑌𝐴,𝑡), and 
𝑋𝑖,𝑡(𝐴𝑖,𝑡, 𝐴−𝑖,𝑡, 𝑌𝐴,𝑡) which describes the dependency of these response variables on the state 
variables. To obtain this set of equations it is assumed that the stockholders, producers, and 
the trader maximize their profits according to equations (3.1), (3.9) and (3.11), respectively, 
while the market clears according to equation (4.3) and the transition equation (4.1) holds.  
4.4 Calibration 
Calibration parameters including explanations are provided in Table 4.1. The expected value 
of all shock variables is 1. The model is solved on a 9 ⋅ 9 ⋅ 9 grid of the state variables for 
each set of the parameters. This resolution is not particularly high and therefore the precision 
of the results is somewhat limited. However, as the behavior will be shown to be piece-wise 
linear, the resolution is sufficient. The mean error of the stock levels seems to be only around 
3% (compare appendix 8.2). Furthermore, it is necessary to impose this limit on the resolution 
in order to preserve computational requirements which can still be handled. From all the 
parameters, five parameters are varied to test their influence on the response variables. These 
parameters include the interest rate, the relative country size, the standard deviation of supply 
shocks, and the demand as well as supply elasticity. They all refer to country A. The choice of 
these parameters is based on the availability of cross-sectional data for the later application to 
real-world stock data. For each of these parameters, three different values have been used, 
except for the interest rate, for which only two parameters were used. This leads to 2 ⋅ 34 =
162 different sets of parameters. Since for each parameter set the model is solved on a 
9 ⋅ 9 ⋅ 9  grid of the state variables, 2 ⋅ 34 ⋅ 93 = 118098 observations are generated in total. 
The simulations are conducted in MATLAB using the RECS solver (Gouel 2013a) and the 
CompEcon toolbox (Miranda and Fackler 2011). 
4.5 Simulation results 
The aim of this study is to analyze drivers of private grain storage which as a first step 
involves obtaining a qualitative understanding of how private storage generally behaves 
within a broad set of parameters and model assumptions. In a step-by-step procedure, the 
analysis starts with a very simplified model and successively adds more extensions to derive 
the reduced-form equation for the full model. This reduced-form equation is then used as the 
starting point for a response surface fitting procedure in section 4.6. 
4.5.1 One country without income shocks 
First, the case of a single country without income shocks is considered (Figure 4.1). The 
upper panel of Figure 4.1 represents the so-called “storage rule” for different assumptions 
4.5  Simulation results 
79 
about the variability of domestic harvests. The expression “storage rule” just refers to the 
behavior of stocks which is obtained from the numerical simulations under the modelled 
assumptions (such as profit-maximizing, risk-neutral stockholders). It could just be described 
as the behavior of stocks. However, as it is commonly referred to as the storage rule, the same 
convention is adopted here.  
It turns out the storage rule has a kink, so it is zero before a certain threshold and then it 
increases with availability. The kink varies with the standard deviation of supply shocks but 
the slope remains nearly constant. To be precise, the slope is not linear but convex (compare 
e.g. Gouel 2011; Williams and Wright 1991). But once the availability is above the threshold, 
the curve can be approximated to a certain extent by a linear function. Figure 4.2 again 
illustrates the dependence of the closing stocks on the availability but here the storage costs 
and the interest rate in country A are varied as indicated in the graph. In this case, not only is 
the threshold changed when storage takes place, but so is the slope of the storage rule. For 
high storage costs or a high interest rate, the slope of the storage rule decreases (the interest 
rate behaves similarly to the storage costs as it increases the (opportunity) costs of storage). 
This implies that higher availability does not increase the stocks as much as in the baseline 
scenario which is in line with expectations. On the one hand, these results justify the 
approximation of stocks by a piece-wise linear function, as will be discussed in the 
subsequent paragraphs. On the other hand, the influence of individual parameters on the 
results is not yet clear at this stage and will be illustrated and numerically derived afterward. 
Based on the results of these simulations, one can conclude that the storage behavior can be 
approximated by a straight line above a certain threshold. However, the slope of the line and 
the threshold may change, depending on the underlying parameters. This is the result from the 
simulations, but there is no qualitative a priori explanation, why this result is observed. As a 
next step, the influence of all six parameters on the shape of this piece-wise linear storage rule 
is illustrated. Figure 4.3 shows how the intercept, i.e. the position of the kink in the storage 
rule, changes when parameters are varied. To obtain the graph, all parameters are set to their 
standard values and then, consecutively, the different parameters are varied while holding the 
others constant.  
The results (Figure 4.3) indicate that the threshold increases if the interest rate, the storage 
costs, the storage losses, or the supply elasticity increase; meanwhile it decreases if the 
standard deviation of shocks or the demand elasticity increase. Figure 4.3 shows all these 
results by indicating the different parameters which are varied (interest rage, storage costs, …) 
in different colors and with different line styles. As before, the intercept changes nearly 
linearly with these parameters, except for the standard deviation of supply shocks where it is 
closer to a quadratic form. 
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Table 4.1: Calibration Parameters for the simulations 
Parameter Variable Value(s) Comments 
Supply elasticity in ROW 1/𝜇𝐵 0.2 Value from Gouel, Gautam & Martin 
(2014) 
Supply elasticity in A 1/𝜇𝐴 0.2; 0.3; 0.4 Variation of values to cover range in 
FAPRI and USDA databases 
Price elasticity in ROW 𝛼𝐵 -0.27 Typical value 
Price elasticity in A 𝛼𝐴 -0.08; -0.16; 
-0.32 
Variation of values to cover range in 
FAPRI and USDA databases 
Storage costs per unit 𝑘 0.06 Common value for such models 
Interest rate in ROW 𝑟𝐵 0.03 Typical rate  
Interest rate in A 𝑟𝐴 0.07; 0.15 Variation to cover main range in the 
World Bank data 
Trade costs Θ 0.1 Common value for such models 
Income elasticity in ROW 𝜂𝐵 Income is fixed  
Income elasticity in A 𝜂𝐴 0.5 Common value for such models 
Normalization par. in 
ROW 
𝛾𝐵 2 Describes relative scaling to 
parameter in A 
Normalization par. in A 𝛾𝐴 0.02; 0.1; 0.2 Variation in size: 1%, 5% and 10% of 
rest of the world size. 
SD (standard deviation) of 
supply shocks in ROW 
𝜎𝐵 0.065 Estimated for the world wheat 
production from USDA data 
SD of supply shocks in A 𝜎𝐴 0.02; 0.06; 0.12 Variation to cover main range in 
USDA data 
SD of in. shocks in ROW 𝜎𝐵
𝑦
 Income is fixed  
SD of income shocks in A 𝜎𝐴
𝑦
 0.035 Estimated from SD of GDP fluctua-
tions from Hodrick-Prescott-filtered 
trend from World Bank database 
Production normalization 
parameter in ROW 
ℎ𝐵 1/(1+𝑟𝐵)  
Production normalization 
parameter in A 
ℎ𝐴 1/(1+𝑟𝐴)  
Parameters for  solving and simulating 
Number of nodes for each 
shock variable 
 7  
State variables grid for 
which the solutions are 
calculated 
 9 for each state 
variable (from 
0.7 to 1.3) 
This is the grid on which the solutions 
are calculated for each set of 
parameters. (higher for simulations 
with only one country) 
Notes: Own illustration. 
For each of these models, the OLS estimator was used to estimate the slope coefficient of the 
strictly positive part of the storage rule. As a result, it is possible to evaluate how the slope 
coefficient changes when the parameters are varied (Figure 4.4). The slope decreases if the 
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standard deviation of shocks, the interest rate, the storage costs, or the storage losses increase 
or if the supply elasticity or demand elasticity decrease. While the dependency is not fully 
linear, a linearization is still tested. To evaluate fit of the piece-wise linear approximation of 
the storage rule, the R² for each approximation was calculated (Figure 4.5). As the R² is 
always above 0.998, the linear line turns out to be a very good approximation for the strictly 
positive part of the storage rule in all of the tested scenarios. For each of the points from the 
lines in Figure 4.4 and Figure 4.5, an OLS model was estimated. Overall, these are hundreds 
of models that are estimated. Therefore, it is not possible to show the results for all estimated 
models but only the estimated coefficients for the slope are depicted (Figure 4.4) as well as 
the corresponding R²s (Figure 4.5) to evaluate the goodness of fit.  
 
Figure 4.1: Closing stocks (above) and prices (below) in country A 
Notes: Own illustration. Stocks and prices can be interpreted as absolute values or in relative 
terms as a share of the expected harvest (≈ 1)or expect price (≈ 1), respectively. They are 
expressed in dependence of availability in A (total supply = production + opening stocks) for a 
fixed set of parameters. The different curves represent different values of the standard deviation of 
harvest shocks in A to show how this affects the storage rule. 
 
  
Figure 4.2: How storage costs k and interest rate r affect closing stocks 
Notes: Own illustration. The way of illustrating the results is as in Figure 4.1. Implications are 
discussed in the text. 
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Figure 4.3: Dependency of the storage rule’s intercept 
Notes: Own illustration. The SD of production shocks, interest rate, storage costs, and storage 
losses are plotted using the bottom x-axis, the supply elasticity and negative demand elasticity are 
plotted using the top x-axis. 
 
If a piece-wise linear reduced-form approximation is chosen, the response function for stocks 
in A can be written as (with some parameters 𝑎 and 𝑏 for the slope and the intercept) 
 
𝑆𝐴(𝐴𝐴) = {
0                         if 𝐴𝐴 < ?̃?𝐴 = −
𝑏
𝑎
𝑎𝐴𝐴 + 𝑏            if 𝐴𝐴 ≥ ?̃?𝐴 = −
𝑏
𝑎
 
 (4.4) 
or, in a form that can be used for a least-square estimation, as 
 𝑆𝐴 = max(0, 𝑎𝐴𝐴 + 𝑏) (4.5) 
Based on the results depicted in Figure 4.3, Figure 4.4, and Figure 4.5, it was argued that the 
influence of the individual parameters on the intercept and slope of the storage rule is linear. 
This implies that the parameters 𝑎 and 𝑏 can be represented as a linear combination of the 
individual parameters, each of them multiplied by an unknown coefficient which determines 
the linear dependency. Thus, the impact of the model parameters on the intercept 𝑏 and the 
slope 𝑎 of the storage rule can expressed as 𝑎 = 𝑎0 + 𝑎𝑟𝑟𝐴 + 𝑎𝜇1/𝜇𝐴 + 𝑎𝛼𝛼𝐴 + 𝑎𝛾𝛾𝐴 +
𝑎𝜎𝜎𝐴, and 𝑏 = 𝑏0 + 𝑏𝑟𝑟𝐴 + 𝑏𝜇1/𝜇𝐴 + 𝑏𝛼𝛼𝐴 + 𝑏𝛾𝛾𝐴 + 𝑏𝜎𝜎𝐴. This allows applying the storage 
model to various contexts that differ in their parameter constellation (e.g. due to crop or 
country-specific characteristics) by fitting: 
 𝑆𝐴 = max(0, (𝑎0 + 𝑎𝑟𝑟 + ⋯ )𝐴𝐴 + (𝑏0 + 𝑏𝑟𝑟 + ⋯ )) (4.6) 
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Figure 4.4: The dependency of the slope coefficient  
Notes: Own illustration. The slope coefficient was obtained from a linear OLS fit on the positive 
part of the storage rule with the regression being performed for each set of parameters. The SD of 
production shocks, interest rate, storage costs, and storage losses are plotted using the bottom x-
axis, the supply elasticity and negative demand elasticity are plotted using the top x-axis. 
 
 
Figure 4.5: R² of the linear OLS fit for the positive part of the storage rule 
Notes: Own illustration. The very good fit justifies the approximation of the storage rule by a 
piece-wise linear function with a kink with the position of the kink and the slope coefficient 
depending on input parameters. The above graph shows hundreds of fitted models, i.e. for each 
point in the graph, one model was fitted. Thus, it is not possible to show the results for each 
estimated model but only the resulting coefficients for the slope (Figure 4.4) and the 
corresponding R-squares are shown (this Figure).  
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4.5.2 Two countries without income shocks 
Extending the model to two countries makes the response variables dependent on two state 
variables, availability in A and B (Figure 4.6). Again, B represents the rest of the world. 
Clearly, storage only takes place in regions of excess supply which is in line with what was 
expected as trade is costly and both regions are, on average, self-sufficient in this simulation. 
Therefore, excess supplies will be stored in the region where they are produced to either use 
them in the same region later without having any trade costs or to use them in the other region 
later so that trade costs only occur once. If there is little supply in B but excess supply in A, 
there will also be little storage in A but instead exports to B will be high. In case of excess 
supply in both regions, the storage rule for one region is (nearly) independent of the level of 
excess supply in the other region. The slope above the threshold itself seems to be 
independent of the availability in country B which has been verified by comparing the slope 
coefficients for different levels of availability. Overall, these observations lead to the 
following mathematical description of the reduced-form storage rule for the case of two 
countries: 
 
𝑆𝐴(𝐴𝐴, 𝐴𝐵) = {
0                                                      if 𝐴𝐴 < ?̃?(𝐴𝐵)
𝑎𝐴𝐴 + 𝑏(1 + ?̃?(𝐴𝐵) − ?̃?𝐴 )     if 𝐴𝐴 ≥ ?̃?(𝐴𝐵)
 (4.7) 
 
with  ?̃?(𝐴𝐵) = {
?̃?𝐴                                 if 𝐴𝐵 > ?̃?𝐵
?̃?𝐴 − 𝛽(?̃?𝐵 − 𝐴𝐵)     if 𝐴𝐵 ≤ ?̃?𝐵
 (4.8) 
 and ?̃?𝐵 = 𝜃 =  𝜃0 + 𝜃𝑟𝑟𝐴 + ⋯, 𝑎 = 𝑎0 + 𝑎𝑟𝑟𝐴 + ⋯, 𝑏 = 𝑏0 + 𝑏𝑟𝑟𝐴 + ⋯, 
and 𝛽 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑟𝑟𝐴 + ⋯ 
 
Here, ?̃?𝐴 is the point for which 0 = 𝑆𝐴(𝐴𝐴,1, max 𝐴𝐵) = 𝑆𝐴(?̃?𝐴, max 𝐴𝐵) < 𝑆𝐴(𝐴𝐴,2, max 𝐴𝐵) 
for any 𝐴𝐴,1 ≤ ?̃?𝐴 < 𝐴𝐴,2. The 𝑎, 𝑏, 𝛽, and 𝜃 do, as before, consist of six terms: One constant 
term with subscript zero and additionally one term for each parameter, so e.g. 𝑎 = 𝑎0 +
𝑎𝑟𝑟𝐴 + 𝑎𝜇1/𝜇𝐴 + 𝑎𝛼𝛼𝐴 + 𝑎𝛾𝛾𝐴 + 𝑎𝜎𝜎𝐴. Here and in the subsequent sections, this is not 
explicitly written for all parameters, but is always indicated by the open sum which starts with 
the constant and the interest rate.  
In order to fit the model, a single equation is needed again and can in this case be formulated 
as: 
 𝑆𝐴 = max [0, 𝑎𝐴𝐴 + 𝑏 {1 + min (0, −𝛽(?̃?𝐵 − 𝐴𝐵))}] (4.9) 
Note that the intercept of the actual curve in Figure 4.6 changes marginally for high 
availabilities (above 1.1) in country B (e.g. 𝑆𝐴(1.5,1.5) < 𝑆𝐴(1.5,1.1)). Therefore, this 
equation is only an approximation, but sufficient enough for the purpose of this study. 
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Figure 4.6: Storage in A dependent on availability in A and in B 
Notes: Own illustration. Simulation for the two country model without income shocks. Storages 
takes place only in regions of excess supply. Availabilities and storage can be interpreted as share 
of the expected harvest. 
4.5.3 One country with income shocks 
In the case of one country with income shocks but without trade, there are again two state 
variables, namely the availability and the income level which may both influence stocks. 
Figure 4.7 shows how the storage rule changes depending on the availability and income for a 
fixed set of parameters. The graph indicates that income shocks do not influence the slope 
coefficient of the storage rule but only the intercept, i.e. the threshold. An additional analysis 
where the slopes were computed and compared confirmed this assumption. Therefore, the 
results show that the storage rule can be described by the following equation: 
 
𝑆𝐴(𝐴𝐴, 𝑌) = {
0                                             if 𝐴𝐴 < ?̃?𝐴(𝑌)
(𝑎 + 𝜔𝑌)𝐴𝐴 + 𝑏 + 𝜌𝑌      if 𝐴𝐴 ≥ ?̃?𝐴(𝑌)
 (4.10) 
with 𝜔 = 𝜔0 + 𝜔𝑟𝑟 + ⋯, 𝜌 = 𝜌0 + 𝜌𝑟𝑟 + ⋯, and ?̃?𝐴(𝑌) = 𝜌𝑌. 
The single equation which could be used to fit the model can be described as: 
 𝑆𝐴 = max[0, (𝑎 + 𝜔𝑌)𝐴𝐴 + 𝑏 + 𝜌𝑌]  (4.11) 
As mentioned above, income only influences the intercept which implies 𝜔 = 0. 
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Figure 4.7: Storage in A dependent on the availability and the income level in A 
Notes: Own illustration. The income only influences the storage threshold but not the slope. 
4.5.4 Two countries with income shocks in country A 
Finally, the full model for two countries with income shocks in country A is set up. As there are 
three state variables now, the results cannot be plotted as in the other cases. But the previous 
chapters have shown how the different parameters may influence the storage rule. Combing the 
previous results, the reduced-form approximation of the storage rule can be formulated as: 
𝑆𝐴(𝐴𝐴, 𝐴𝐵, 𝑌) = {
0                                                                                             if 𝐴𝐴 < ?̃?(𝐴𝐵, 𝑌)
(𝑎 + 𝜔𝑌)𝐴𝐴  + (𝑏 + 𝜌𝑌 )(1 + ?̃?(𝐴𝐵, 𝑌) − ?̃?𝐴(𝑌))   if 𝐴𝐴 ≥ ?̃?(𝐴𝐵, 𝑌)
 (4.12) 
with   ?̃?(𝐴𝐵, 𝑌) = {
?̃?𝐴(𝑌)                                        if 𝐴𝐵 > ?̃?𝐵(𝑌)
?̃?𝐴(𝑌) − 𝛽(?̃?𝐵(𝑌) − 𝐴𝐵)     if 𝐴𝐵 ≤ ?̃?𝐵(𝑌)
  
 
and ?̃?𝐵(𝑌) = 𝜃 + 𝜏𝑌 = 𝜃0 + 𝜃𝑟𝑟 + ⋯ + (𝜏0 + 𝜏𝑟𝑟 + ⋯ )𝑌. This implies that ?̃?𝐵(𝑌) can be 
expressed as a linear function with an intercept 𝜃 and a slope 𝜏 which both are linearly 
dependent on the model parameters. The parameter 𝜏 determines the change of the threshold 
level for stock-outs under GDP shocks. ?̃?𝐴(𝑌) could be defined but will cancel out anyway. 
In order to estimate the model with non-linear least squares, a single equation is needed. 
Transforming equation (4.12), the following single reduced-form storage rule approximation 
can be derived: 
 𝑆𝐴 = max[0, (𝑎 + 𝜔𝑌)𝐴𝐴 + (𝑏 + 𝜌𝑌){1 + min(0, −𝛽(𝜃 + 𝜏𝑌 − 𝐴𝐵))}] . (4.13) 
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This equation is an important finding of this study which will be used for the subsequent 
analyses to fit the theoretical model and derive the expected signs of the empirical model. As 
before, 𝜔 is equal to zero thereby slightly reducing the complexity of the equation. 
4.6 Testing the reduced-form storage rule approximation 
Equation (4.13) is the reduced-form approximation of the storage rule for the case of two 
countries with one of them suffering from income shocks. The previous sections showed 
mostly qualitatively why this specific form is chosen and why it is expected to describe the 
simulation results as a reduced-form equation. The next step is to quantitatively evaluate how 
good this approximation performs for the CSM. The simulation results from the theoretical 
model will be used to estimate the parameters of the model described by equation (4.13). 
Using a non-linear least squared estimation, the goodness-of-fit based on the R-squared is 
assessed. This is a so-called response surface methodology which relates the response variable 
(stocks) to the explanatory variables (input parameters and state variables). More precisely, 
the pre-defined reduced form is fitted for the response variable (stocks) dependent on the 
endogenous variables which are the input parameters and state variables such that the 
corresponding coefficients can be estimated econometrically. 
A two-step procedure is applied here. In the first step, it is shown that for each set of input 
parameters individually, the model is able to describe the functional form of the storage rule on 
the 9 ⋅ 9 ⋅ 9 state variable space. Then, the input parameters are the same for each individual 
grid point of the state variables on which the model is solved. Thus, only the intercepts are 
included in the regression, i.e. 𝑎0, 𝑏0, 𝜃0, 𝜌0, 𝜏0, 𝛽0. The grid size was chosen to provide a 
compromise between the precision of the results, the number of additional parameters which 
can be included, and the computation time for solving the model. To ensure that income only 
influences the threshold and not the slope of the storage rule, the estimations were also 
conducted with ω included but, as expected, it turned out to be insignificant and close to zero. 
For each of the 162 sets of parameters the model was fitted individually and the R² was 
calculated. The mean of the obtained R² was .99972 with a standard deviation of .00004 and a 
minimum value of .99962, indicating an extremely high fit (Table 4.2; further summary 
statistics are provided). This indicates that the functional form is an excellent approximation 
given a specific set of parameters. Furthermore, for the very different structural parameter sets, 
most of the estimated reduced-form parameters change only slightly as indicated by the 
coefficient of variation (CV) in Table 4.2. The only exceptions are the parameters 𝜌0 and 𝜏0.  
In the second step, the assumption of a linear influence of the different parameters is tested; 
i.e. whether the dependence on the different parameters (interest rate, demand and supply 
elasticities, SD of production shocks, and the relative country size) can be captured by linear 
combinations of structural parameters (i.e. 𝑎 = 𝑎0 + 𝑎𝑟𝑟𝐴 + 𝑎𝜇1/𝜇𝐴 + 𝑎𝛼𝛼𝐴 + 𝑎𝛾𝛾𝐴 + 𝑎𝜎𝜎𝐴) 
in equation (4.13). Therefore, all the simulation results, i.e. the results for all different sets of 
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parameters, are pooled together. Then the regression is conducted again, this time including 
the full specification with linear combinations for 𝑎, 𝑏, 𝛽, 𝜃, 𝜌, and 𝜏 instead of including only 
the intercepts. The results (Table 4.3) have six implications: (1) The very high R² of 0.9997 
indicates that the model is well specified and the equation (4.13) is indeed a very good 
reduced-form approximation of the storage rule which results from the partial equilibrium 
model that lacks any a priori closed form solution. (2) Most of the parameters are highly 
significant, i.e. even significant at the 0.1% level which is partly attributable to the high 
number of observations. (3) The parameters for the interest rate are all insignificant. However, 
this conclusion is preliminary as a higher variation of the interest rate might yield different 
results. (4) The few other insignificant parameters are 𝜌0, 𝜌𝜇, 𝜌𝛼 , 𝜏0, and 𝜏𝑚𝑢. (5) All 
significant parameters are relevant, i.e. (mostly far) above 0.00186 which is not small 
regarding the model calibration. (6) Most insignificant parameters are small, i.e. (mostly 
clearly) below 0.00128. From these results, the expected signs of the regression results in the 
empirical part of the analysis can be deducted. 
Table 4.2: Summary statistics of separate storage estimations (first-step validation). 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. CV Min Max 
R² 0.9997 0.0000 0.0000 0.9996 0.9998 
𝑎 0.7855 0.0105 0.0134 0.7637 0.8054 
𝑏 -1.0145 0.0465 -0.0458 -1.1007 -0.9384 
𝜌 0.0009 0.0065 7.6105 -0.0080 0.0158 
𝛽 -0.7767 0.0273 -0.0351 -0.8194 -0.7344 
𝜃 0.7519 0.0527 0.0701 0.6760 0.8148 
𝜏 0.0567 0.0424 0.7486 0.0064 0.1184 
Notes: Own illustration. Each column shows the summary statistics over the goodness-of-fit (R²) 
and the estimated reduced-model parameters using equation (4.13) for each structural parameter 
set separately. A non-linear least squares fitting procedure is used. 
 
Overall, it is therefore concluded that the piece-wise linear approximation performs very well 
over the broad set of tested parameters. As explained (the first step of the two-step procedure), 
it approximates the storage rule well for each individual set of parameters (i.e. only dependent 
on state variables) which can be seen by the very high mean R² of .99972 with a standard 
deviation of .00004 (Table 4.2). Furthermore, the piece-wise linear approximation is also able 
to describe the influence of the different parameters on the private carry-over stocks as is 
indicated by the very high total R² of 0.9997 (Table 4.3, the second-step of the procedure). 
Thus, the pre-defined specific form of the storage equation, combined with the estimated 
coefficients (Table 4.3) is able to explain almost all the variation in the stock data. Newbery 
and Stiglitz (1982 chapter 30.2) have provided a piece-wise linear approximation for a very 
specific set of parameters for a single country without income shocks, i.e. only considering 
parameters 𝑎 and 𝑏. Their result is however in line with findings in this study, as they provide 
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a range of 0.51 to 0.82 for 𝑎 (depending on the availability) and -0.54 to -0.94 for 𝑏. Here, the 
result for 𝑎 fits very well. The result for 𝑏 is lower but very comparable because the interaction 
variables 𝛽 and 𝜃 are included in the 𝑏 provided by Newbery and Stiglitz (1982 chapter 30.2). 
Table 4.3: Regression results for collective storage estimation (second-step validation)  
 
Coefficient Std. Err. t-value P>|t| 
𝑎0 0.7623 0.0005 1538.21 0.000 
𝑎𝑟 0.0000 0.0023 0.00 0.999 
𝑎𝜇 0.1045 0.0011 94.58 0.000 
𝑎𝛼 0.0253 0.0009 27.93 0.000 
𝑎𝜎 -0.0921 0.0022 -42.04 0.000 
𝑎𝛾 0.0236 0.0012 19.06 0.000 
𝑏0 -5.3433 0.0144 -372.29 0.000 
𝑏𝑟 0.0001 0.0744 0.00 0.999 
𝑏𝜇 -1.9393 0.0379 -51.11 0.000 
𝑏𝛼 0.0641 0.0300 2.13 0.033 
𝑏𝜎 0.9195 0.0727 12.64 0.000 
𝑏𝛾 -1.7322 0.0418 -41.46 0.000 
𝜌0 0.0013 0.0156 0.08 0.935 
𝜌𝑟 -0.0001 0.0710 0.00 0.999 
𝜌𝜇 -0.0212 0.0350 -0.61 0.545 
𝜌𝛼 -0.0470 0.0286 -1.64 0.100 
𝜌𝜎 -0.2953 0.0693 -4.26 0.000 
𝜌𝛾 0.5663 0.0390 14.52 0.000 
𝛽0 -0.1412 0.0000 -2857.43 0.000 
𝛽𝑟 0.0000 0.0003 0.00 1.000 
𝛽𝜇 0.0245 0.0002 116.76 0.000 
𝛽𝛼 -0.0040 0.0001 -32.78 0.000 
𝛽𝜎 0.0019 0.0003 6.41 0.000 
𝛽𝛾 0.0225 0.0002 92.80 0.000 
𝜃0 -4.9728 . . . 
𝜃𝑟 0.0000 0.0206 0.00 1.000 
𝜃𝜇 -1.4286 0.0146 -98.02 0.000 
𝜃𝛼 0.2420 0.0085 28.39 0.000 
𝜃𝜎 -0.3438 0.0204 -16.86 0.000 
𝜃𝛾 -1.4645 0.0152 -96.04 0.000 
𝜏0 0.0003 0.0023 0.12 0.903 
𝜏𝑟 0.0000 0.0104 0.00 0.999 
𝜏𝜇 -0.0062 0.0051 -1.22 0.223 
𝜏𝛼 -0.0159 0.0042 -3.81 0.000 
𝜏𝜎 -0.0392 0.0101 -3.87 0.000 
𝜏𝛾 0.5933 0.0057 103.75 0.000 
 
Notes: Own illustration. N=118098. R²=0.9997. Non-linear least squares are applied. 
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4.7 Empirical estimation 
4.7.1 Data description 
For the empirical validation of the model, the USDA data for stocks, production and demand 
from 1975 to 2013 for corn, rice, wheat, soy, and sorghum is used. The data is further 
complemented with stock data from FAO GIEWS which provides in total 32 countries (after 
cleaning as described in section 4.7.2). GDP per capita is obtained from the World Bank. The 
stock and production data is de-trended using the consumption trend from Hodrick-Prescott 
filtering. Hence, domestic and rest-of-the world (ROW) stocks as well as supply (production 
plus carry-over stocks) are divided by the long-term consumption trend which produces a 
stationary series that is also of similar magnitude among different countries. Likewise, GDP 
per capita in real terms is de-trended using the Hodrick-Prescott filter to obtain a series for 
income-induced demand shocks. The standard deviation of supply shocks 𝜎𝐴 is calculated as 
the standard deviation of the cyclical components of the Hodrick-Prescott filtered production 
data. The scaling parameter for country size 𝛾𝐴 is obtained by dividing the domestic 
consumption trend by the consumption trend of RoW.  
4.7.2 Differentiation between total, public, and private stocks 
The stock data from the USDA and FAO GIEWS does not differentiate between public and 
private stocks. Instead, only their sums, i.e. the total stocks, are reported. Yet, the presented 
method only works well in the absence of (substantial) public interventions. Hence, three 
measures are undertaken to ensure that public stocks do not distort the results. 
First, only those countries were included, which do not have a substantial public stock such 
that the total stocks mostly refer to the private stocks. Hence, the included countries are 
Argentina, Australia, Canada, Chile, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, South Korea, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and the United States. For the post-Soviet countries, 
only data after 1991 was considered. These countries are currently all high-income OECD 
member countries, except for Argentina, Chile, Croatia, Hong Kong, and Singapore, all of 
which are however considered to be high-income economies by the World Bank. This 
selection ensures that there are only small public stocks which are rarely used and therefore 
do not influence the results (much).  
Second, one has to consider how public stocks and policies may impact private stocks. If 
public stocks are kept constant during the considered time period (e.g. as strict emergency 
reserves which remained unused), they do not impact the results. The same holds if public 
stocks follow the same (profit-maximizing) dynamics as private stocks; however, this is 
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unusual. There is very little empirical evidence on the interactions between public and private 
stocks. Indonesia’s public rice stocks have been reported to not have a substantial impact on 
private stocks (Islam and Thomas 1996; Timmer 1996). Similarly, the public stockholding 
program in Ghana has been reported to not significantly influence private stockholder 
activities (Kornher 2015). However, an empirical quantification of the crowding out effect 
does not exist for any country. The first attempt to quantify the crowding out effect is 
presented in chapter 5. There, for the case study of India it is found that every ton of public 
stocks crowds out half a ton of private stocks. Nevertheless, private storage activities 
following a profit-maximization approach are found to persist. In this case, the huge 
involvement of the government would distort the results if it is not explicitly accounted for as 
in chapter 5. Yet, the dynamics of private profit-maximizing stockholders would still be 
found, just with changed coefficients. For example, the response of the stocks to the 
availability would be much lower. In Ethiopia, it has also been reported that private storage 
activities are very low, partly due to weak storage infrastructure (Gabre-Madhin 2001; Getnet 
et al. 2005). However, none of the countries involved in the analysis has any large 
stockholding program or other market interventions which could be compared to India or 
Ethiopia. The interventions are actually even smaller than the ones in Indonesia and Ghana 
where no substantial crowding out was found. Therefore, the extent to which the public stocks 
influence the results is expected to be minimal. Furthermore, in all the countries included in 
the analysis, private stockholders are expected to have access to credit and up-to-date 
information, to be able to use relatively modern warehouses, and to not be substantially 
hindered by governmental regulation. 
Theoretical estimations of the crowding out effect exist for various schemes of public stocks. 
Based on the results from chapter 3, it is possible to make a rough estimation to which extent 
public stocks could impact private stocks. However, this estimation is limited to the specific 
scheme of the reserve from chapter 3. Figure 3.4 illustrates how a public reserve impacts 
private storage depending on the size of the public reserve in the intervention/trigger price. It 
turns out that as long as the interventions are not too frequent, i.e. the trigger price is high 
enough, the impact of public stocks on private stocks are small. For example, a trigger price 
of 40% above the average price would decrease the mean private stocks only by about 4% 
(the stock level is reduced from 1.45% to 1.4% of the average harvest). Similarly, private 
stocks would be reduced by about 8% if the trigger price were chosen to be 30% above the 
average price. In developed countries where consumers are not immediately at risk if food 
prices increase, it is unlikely that governments would intervene if grain prices increased by 
30% above the trend.  
The third measure to evaluate to which extent public stocks can distort the result is a simple 
illustration of how public stocks may follow a similar pattern as private stocks. Therefore, the 
dependency of the stocks on the total availability is plotted for selected countries which 
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allows visually evaluating the overlap with the theoretical results (Figure 4.8 and Figure 4.9). 
India and China are illustrated even though they are not considered in the actual analysis due 
to their large public stockholding programs. In most cases, a nearly linear dependency can be 
observed for all crops. However, there is some noise (i.e. fluctuations) and sometimes stock 
levels on the world level are far too low. The kink, i.e. the threshold, cannot clearly be 
identified in the figures. For the US (Figure 4.9), the slope and the intercept is very crop 
specific and the linearity is more visible for wheat and corn than for rice. In India, strong 
noise renders the stocks much more arbitrary but the general dependency still remains visible. 
This strong noise seems to be a result of the market interventions by the Indian government. 
The huge government stocks in India have been found to be mainly driven by the Indian 
minimum support price and only secondary by the total availability (see chapter 5). In 
contrast, the stocks in China seem to follow to a substantial extent the pattern of private 
profit-maximizing stocks as the dots for all crops in Figure 4.8 form straight lines with little 
noise. This is supported by the observation that substantial amounts were released from 
China’s public stocks during the world food crisis (Yang et al. 2008). Yet, China’s stocks are 
higher than private inventories would be. In contrast, India’s public stock levels increased 
during the crisis (compare with chapter 5). Nonetheless, one has to consider that USDA stock 
estimates for China are vague as the government does not share data on their public stocks. 
Yet, at least in China where most stocks are public, these stocks seem to follow a somewhat 
similar dynamic as private stocks, even though the absolute stock levels are much higher
17
.  
Overall, it can be concluded that the public stocks should not have a significant impact on the 
results of this study. First, only countries with very low public stock levels are included. 
Second, the evidence from Indonesia and Ghana and the theoretical evidence from chapter 3 
indicate that even substantial public stocks do not necessarily have a significant impact on 
private stocks. Third, public stocks sometimes follow a somewhat similar dynamic as private 
stocks as the simple illustration exercise for China indicated. Hence, the results of this study are 
not expected to be distorted by the minor prevailing interventions in the considered countries. 
4.7.3 The non-depletion of empirical stocks 
In theoretical studies, stocks are depleted more or less frequently. However, this is not found 
in empirical data (compare also Figure 4.8 and Figure 4.9). Different explanations have been 
provided for why empirical stock levels usually never fall down to zero. The first was the 
concept of a convenience yield which attributes an intrinsic value to the possession of stocks 
                                                 
17
 In all of the scatter plots, important covariates such as income and global supply shocks are 
omitted which leads to deviations from the piece-wise linear stocking rule over domestic supply. 
Only the econometric estimations can fully capture the influence of all variables and therefore 
provide a comprehensive picture of the extent to which the stocks in a certain country can be 
modelled by the presented method. For China, it also cannot be fully ruled out that the nearly-
linear behavior is a result of the method which the USDA applies to estimate the stocks. 
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(Brennen 1958; Working 1949). This concept was then challenged and complemented with 
the explanations of mismeasurement and aggregation issues (Benirschka and Binkley 1995; 
Brennan et al. 1997). Another explanation has been provided by arguing that stockholders 
follow different motives such as preventing interruptions of production processes or material 
flows (Carter and Giha 2007). However, these views have also been challenged and new 
support for the convenience yield have been found (Franken et al. 2009). Operational stocks, 
which could be a result of different stockholding motives or of a convenience yield, can easily 
be incorporated by an additive term to the entire storage equation. This is conducted in section 
4.7.5. The underlying assumption is that operational stocks, such as the stocks which are 
required to keep production processes running and therefore maintain a certain flow of 
products, can be approximated by a fixed share of grain use.  
 
Figure 4.8: Stocks to use trend for stocks worldwide and in China (Own illustration) 
 
Figure 4.9: Stocks to use trend stocks in the US and in India (Own illustration) 
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4.7.4 Regression on empirical stock data 
To incorporate relevant covariates, a non-linear least square regression on the closing stocks 
is run based on the approximation equation (4.13). In order to account for potential 
unobserved heterogeneity, the country and crop-specific mean stocks 𝑆?̅? over the considered 
time horizon are included: 
𝑆𝑖,𝑡 = max [0, 𝑆?̅? + 𝑎𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + (𝑏 + 𝜌𝑌𝑖,𝑡) {1 + min (0, −𝛽(𝜃 + 𝜏𝑌𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐴−𝑖,𝑡))}] + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (4.14) 
with 𝑎 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛾𝛾 + 𝛼𝜎𝜎 and 𝑏, 𝜌, 𝛽, 𝜃, 𝜏 likewise. This gives a fixed-effects-like non-linear 
panel regression whereas omitting the mean stocks 𝑆?̅? yields a random-effects specification. 
Two different panels are considered: The first uses total grain stocks (“Total Grains” in Table 
4.4) and total grain supply as relevant variables, while the second specification uses a panel 
over countries and additionally over crop types (“Pooled Grains”). The first specification is 
appropriate if grains are perfect substitutes and only total grains matter for the market 
equilibrium. The second specification accounts for heterogeneity among grains but misses the 
substitution effects. The availability of comparable data on some of the structural parameters 
like the demand and supply elasticity as well as the interest rates is scarce. Therefore, and due 
to the insignificance of the interest rate in the theoretical model, only the potential impacts of 
the variation of shocks and the size of the country on the reduced-form parameters are 
controlled for. A benchmark regression on the dataset generated under section 3.4 on only 
those variables that are used in the empirical data is also added (column “Theoretical Model” 
in Table 4.4). 
Regression results are shown in Table 4.4. The magnitude of the estimated coefficients from 
the empirical data and the generated data (“Theoretical Model”) are difficult to compare due 
to scaling issues and therefore these are not of particular interest. Instead, the focus lies on 
qualitative behavior predicted by the theoretical model and whether this is confirmed by the 
empirical analysis. The grey shaded cells indicate where the empirical model matches the 
theoretical results. This is the case if either both coefficients are insignificant or if the sign of 
the coefficients from the empirical model matches the one from the theoretical model in case 
both coefficients are significant. Most importantly, the slope coefficient 𝑎0 is positive and 
significant in all specifications, indicating that high supply leads to higher stock-to-use ratios. 
This effect is stronger for larger countries than for smaller ones, indicated by the positive sign 
of 𝑎𝛾 which holds for all but one specifications and is in line with the results from the 
theoretical model. On the other hand, the intercept 𝑏𝛾 is smaller for large countries, which is 
what the theoretical model predicted. Combining both, it implies that larger countries tend to 
start storing later (i.e. at higher supply levels), but then have a higher slope, i.e. start to build 
up stocks more quickly. The influence of the standard deviation of shocks on the slope and 
primary intercept coefficient 𝑏 is not observable in the empirical data.  
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Table 4.4: Regression results for the empirical estimation of closing stocks 
  FE-like Random Effects 
  Empirical Model 
Theoretical 
Model 
Empirical Model 
Theoretical 
Model   Total Grains 
Pooled 
Grains 
Total Grains 
Pooled 
Grains 
S
lo
p
e 
co
ef
fi
ci
en
t 
𝛂
 
a0 .082** .119*** .790*** .208*** .237*** .789*** 
 (.035) (.022) (.0002) (.051) (.06) (.0002) 
aσ 3.8e-06 6.2e-06 -.096*** 1.7e-05 1.4e-05 -.091*** 
 (6.0e-06) (8.2e-06) (.002) (1.6e-05) (2.0e-05) (.003) 
aγ 3.56*** 1.99*** .0230*** -1.79 1.83** .021*** 
 (1.12) (.362) (.001) (1.98) (.899) (.002) 
P
ri
m
ar
y
 i
n
te
rc
ep
t 
co
ef
fi
ci
en
t 
𝐛
 
b0 .032 .52 -1.21*** .321 .113** -.973*** 
 (.054) (1.03) (.001) (.246) (.049) (.001) 
bσ 1.7e-05 1.9e-03 .197*** -6.2e-05 2.6e-04 .181*** 
 (3.0e-05) (3.6e-03) (.011) (7.8e-05) (1.8e-04) (.017) 
bγ -20.8** -31.4 -.362*** -9.01 -12.1*** -.523*** 
 (9.84) (59.2) (.008) (8.46) (3.2) (.010) 
P
ri
m
ar
y
 i
n
te
rc
ep
t 
sh
if
t 
d
u
e 
to
 G
D
P
  
𝛒
 
ρ0 -.103** -.75 -.008*** -.454 -.076 -.009*** 
 (.049) (1.44) (.001) (.269) (.053) (.001) 
ρσ -9.8e-05 -3.1e-03 -.00265 5.2e-06 -3.8e-04*** .063*** 
 (5.8e-05) (5.7e-03) (.00948) (8.6e-05) (1.4e-04) (.013) 
ργ 23* 31.9 .102*** 16.8* 9.04*** .055*** 
 (11.7) (59.8) (.007) (9.54) (2.39) (.008) 
S
ec
o
n
d
ar
y
 
in
te
rc
ep
t 
sh
if
t 
d
u
e 
to
 t
ra
d
e 
o
r 
G
D
P
 𝛃
 
β0 -.115 -.154 -.645*** 3.4e-03** -.349*** -.805*** 
 (.) (.32) (.0002) (1.6e-03) (.094) (.0003) 
βσ -2.6e-06 3.4e-06 -.020*** -9.2e-07** 2.0e-05** -.082*** 
 (2.8e-06) (8.9e-06) (.002) (4.1e-07) (1.0e-05) (.00563) 
βγ 1.17** -.01 .119*** .066* .417*** .331*** 
 (.549) (.019) (.002) (.032) (.154) (.003) 
S
ec
o
n
d
ar
y
 
in
te
rc
ep
t 
sh
if
t 
co
ef
fi
ci
en
t 
𝛉
 
θ0 -191 -2.17 .832*** 646*** -.152 .833*** 
 (.) (12.3) (.001) (223) (1.9) (.001) 
θσ .014*** -4.3e-04 -.024** 1.48*** 2.0e-03*** -.176*** 
 (5.5e-04) (3.8e-04) (.011) (.371) (6.2e-04) (.016) 
θγ -1.1e+03*** 5.11** -.769*** -9.5e+04 -82.6*** -.674*** 
 (86.2) (2.26) (.008) (.) (26.3) (.009) 
S
ec
o
n
d
ar
y
 
in
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t 
sh
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t 
d
u
e 
to
 G
D
P
 𝛕
 
τ0 322 -.992 -.006*** -178 1.68 -.006*** 
 (.) (.622) (.0008) (121) (1.61) (.001) 
τσ -.016*** 2.2e-05 .002 -1.34*** -1.8e-03*** .054*** 
 (9.1e-04) (4.0e-05) (.009) (.422) (6.0e-04) (.011) 
τγ 907*** -1.64 .605*** 7.6e+04*** 77.4*** .559*** 
 (139) (1.26) (.006) (1.1e+04) (25.5) (.006) 
 R² .84 .765 .9997 .855 .755 .9995 
 Obs 446 1810 118098 446 1810 118098 
Notes: Own illustration. Non-linear least square regression with * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 
0.01. Standard errors clustered by country and crop in parentheses. Grey shaded cells indicate that 
the estimated coefficient has the same sign as expected by the theoretical model for which the 
simulation results were fitted with the same model specification which was used for the empirical 
data.  
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For the other parameters, the coefficients of the empirical model are not significant in many 
cases which may be attributable to partly low data quality or other factors discussed in the 
next section. However, there are very few cases where the coefficient is significant but the 
sign is not in line with the theoretical findings. Depending on the specification, many of the 
GDP-related coefficients are as expected from the theoretical simulations. This indicates that 
stockholders also consider demand changes in their decision making. Similarly, many of the 
trade related coefficients are significant and in line with the theoretical findings. This 
underlines the high degree of market integration in the considered countries and that 
stockholders make use of the supply and demand situation in other countries. The high R²s 
imply that the empirical model is able to reproduce and explain most of the variation in the 
empirical data. 
4.7.5 An alternative minimalistic regression on grain stocks 
The somewhat large number of insignificant coefficients in the empirical regression can have 
several reasons: One explanation can be that real-world storage is distorted by market failures 
(e.g. high transaction costs) or policy interventions that follow a different logic than the 
optimal storage model. The inclusion of storage and trade costs, however, accounts to a 
certain extent for transaction costs. Likewise, the considered countries are chosen to minimize 
the impact of public stocks and policies. The somewhat large amount of insignificant 
coefficients and the unexpected sign for some coefficients can also be attributed to the minor 
changes of slopes and intercepts between countries. Even if they change, these changes may 
not be attributable to the factors that have been controlled for with real-world data.  To 
consider this possibility, a minimalistic reduced-form storage model is run which excludes the 
possibility that underlying structural parameters affect slopes and intercepts of the piece-wise 
linear storage approximation. In contrast, a homogenous response among all countries is 
assumed, i.e. 𝑎 = 𝛼0, 𝑏 = 𝑏0 etc. in equation (4.14). This approach is comparable to the first-
stage model validation in section 4.6 (Table 4.2). Since the parameter 𝜌 is insignificant in the 
individual regressions in section 4.6 as well as in the full model, many coefficients related to 
𝜌 are insignificant (see Table 4.3). Therefore, 𝜌 was omitted in the regression. To further 
account for working or operational stocks that are contained in the data, the term 𝑤 was added 
to the regression. Hence, the resulting regression model reads as 
 𝑆𝑖,𝑡 = max [0, 𝑆?̅? + 𝑎𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑏 {1 + min (0, −𝛽(𝜃 + 𝜏𝑌𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐴−𝑖,𝑡))}] + 𝑤 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (4.15) 
Regression results are shown in Table 4.5. The first surprising result is that for the generated 
(stationary) data, i.e. the theoretical model, the fit remains extremely high. This is indicated 
by the R² of 99.1 %. Thus, the reduced-form storage model performs well even when no 
flexibility of intercepts and slopes is allowed, indicating a very limited influence of these 
parameters on the model’s general form. In contrast to the full regression in Table 4.4, the 
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signs of the coefficients are now fully in line with expectations of the theoretical model. Only 
in case of 𝜃, which determines the change of the constant threshold shift for stock-outs under 
GDP shocks and supply shocks abroad, the regression on real-world stock data yields a 
statistically insignificant coefficient.  
Table 4.5. Regression results for a minimalistic reduced-form closing stocks model 
 
Empirical 
Model 
Theoretical 
Model 
Slope coefficient 𝑎 .354*** .785*** 
 (7.1e-03) (.001) 
Primary intercept coefficient 𝑏  -1.11*** -1.01*** 
 (.071) (.001) 
Secondary intercept shift due to trade or 
GDP 𝛽 
-.0003*** -.774*** 
(8e-05) (.001) 
Secondary intercept shift coefficient 𝜃 -4100 .748*** 
 (.) (.001) 
Secondary intercept shift due to GDP 𝜏 3100*** .058*** 
 (330) (.001) 
Working stocks 𝑤 .197***  
 (.006)  
R² .692 .991 
Observations 1810 118098 
Notes: Own illustration. Non-linear least square regression. Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 
0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The empirical model is applied to pooled grains. All independent 
variables are de-trended as described before.  
 
The statistically significant 𝑎 and 𝛽 in the empirical model indicate a high level of market 
integration: Domestic storage responds strongly to domestic supply as the slope coefficient 𝑎 
is positive, significant, and high. However, it is not as high as expected from the theoretical 
model. Additionally, domestic storage also responds to international supply as the slope 
coefficient for the international supply, 𝛽, is also significant. It is negative due to the way it is 
defined (compare equation (4.15)). Finally, operational or working stocks 𝑤 are estimated to 
be slightly below 19.7 % of domestic consumption which appears to be relatively high but still 
reasonable considering that it contains stocks at all levels of the value chain. These 
operational stocks describe the stocks which are kept every year to keep the flow of products 
and operations running. The parameters 𝛼 and 𝛽 differ significantly from one another 
between the theoretical and empirical model, even though they both have the same sign. As 𝑎 
and 𝑏 are smaller than expected, it seems that real-word stocks do not quite respond to the 
supply situation as expected. Instead, it seems that stocks start to pile up only if the supply is 
substantially above the expectations. Otherwise, stocks remain at a minimal level. 
Furthermore, once this threshold is passed, empirical stocks seem to increase somewhat 
slower than predicted by the theory (as 𝑎 is lower in the empirical model). Overall, this 
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behavior could indicate that stockholders are somewhat risk averse. Instead, it may also be a 
result of policy disturbances, even though the considered counties do not have a large degree 
of government interventions. However, both hypotheses require more evidence and 
alternative explanations may be more appropriate. 
4.8 Conclusion 
Numerical modelling of private speculative storage nowadays usually relies on the 
competitive storage model (CSM), potentially including extensions such as a convenience 
yield or uncertainty about the state of the system. However, prevailing shortcomings include 
(1) the complex numerical implementation which limits the dimensionality of the model, 
usually reducing it to one or two countries and one or two policies; (2) the lack of considering 
actual stock levels in empirical validation exercises; (3) empirical stock determinants can only 
be quantified indirectly through iterative adjustments of model parameters as no analytical 
solution of the model exists. Alternative models directly quantifying impacts lack a solid 
theoretical foundation. The approach presented in this study allows addressing these issues by 
providing a piece-wise linear reduced-form equation which can describe private profit-
maximizing stockholding for a broad set of parameters and model assumptions. It offers an 
alternative empirical validation approach which for the first time considers actual stock levels, 
allows direct empirical testing of individual stock determinants and is applicable to high-
dimensional modelling exercises.  
In contrast to many econometric analyses, this study does not make any a priori assumptions 
about the underlying mathematical relationships between variables. Instead, a theoretically 
founded reduced-form approximation of the numerical storage rule is derived by using the CSM 
in a general setting with trade, GDP shocks and large parameter variations. This approximation 
is extremely flexible and precise when estimated with the stock data generated from the 
theoretical model. It is therefore a useful approximation for storage behavior in future empirical 
and applied research. This way, the need to solve the CSM is overcome and thereby the 
complexity is reduced without reducing its precision as long as the model assumptions hold.  
The qualitative behavior of private grain stockholders which results from the model is in 
accordance with the empirical findings and can be summarized as follows: Ending stocks are 
zero if both domestic and global supplies are below a certain threshold. This threshold is 
shifted downward by positive GDP shocks, i.e. positive income shocks lead more likely to 
stock outs. If production in the rest of the world falls short, both the threshold and the slope 
change and the crop is exported instead of being stored. The threshold and slope are 
influenced by structural model parameters, in particular, storage costs, interest rates, supply 
and demand elasticities as well as the variability of domestic harvest shocks and harvest 
shocks in the rest of the world. If supply within the country and the rest of the world is above 
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the critical threshold, ending stocks depend positively and linearly on domestic and global 
supply. The slope is again influenced by structural model parameters. 
Applying the reduced-form model to observed production, stock and income panel data for 32 
countries and five crops confirmed the appropriateness of the reduced-form approach. Due to 
the piece-wise linear storage rule, a non-linear least squared regression was used. The 
estimated coefficients are largely in line with those expected (i.e. significant and with the 
same sign as in the regression with data generated by the theoretical benchmark model). 
Structural characteristics of countries and crops, however, seem to have only a small impact 
on threshold levels and slopes.  
Three results are of direct policy relevance: First, operational stocks throughout the value 
chain are roughly 19.7% of domestic consumption, implying that stock-to-use ratios have to 
be subtracted by 19.7 percentage points to yield the amount of stocks that are actually 
available for consumption smoothing. This emphasizes the importance of observing stock-to-
use ratios when tracking potential supply shortfalls. Second, domestic stocks respond strongly 
to the international supply situation which suggests a high degree of market integration. This 
underlies the need for multinational agreements and regulations about how to deal with supply 
shocks in individual countries as well as at the global level. Third, GDP shocks are important 
in the theoretical and the empirical model thereby indicating that stockholders do also 
anticipate future demand. This highlights the need to focus also on demand side factors rather 
than only supply side factors in information systems like AMIS (compare chapter 2) such that 
stockholders and other market actors can easily make good estimations about the future 
demand.  
Similarly to chapter 3, the main limitations arise from the model setup and the parametrization. 
Interactions with other sectors of the economy are not captured and certain restrictions on the 
behavior of individual agents are imposed, e.g. assuming private stockholders maximize 
profits. Furthermore, the model assumes complete markets and stationary parameters. The 
quality of stock data is generally low (compare chapter 2) which might further limit the results.  
Future research should explore the impacts of domestic stabilization policies on private storage 
in empirical data. This study has made an important contribution toward this as it provides a 
procedure to directly quantify empirical drivers on the basis of a theoretically well-founded 
model. Chapter 5 provides a first analysis in this direction. In that analysis, the results from this 
study are used to derive an even simpler version of the storage rule which is then applied to 
data from India in order to determine drivers of empirical private storage in India. Further 
research should also focus on the role of policies in leading to higher or lower than optimal 
(private) grain stocks. In addition, future studies should use the presented method and apply it 
to individual countries and crops for a full empirical validation of the model which also 
accounts for public storage, trade distortions, and time-dependent transportation costs.  
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5 What Drives India’s Rice Stocks? Economic Theory and 
Empirical Evidence18 
5.1 Abstract 
India has a long tradition of maintaining public rice and wheat stocks. Storage and trade policies 
helped to stabilize prices in the past. However, stock levels and costs are surging while it 
remains unknown how different factors quantitatively contribute to public stock levels or how 
private stockholders are affected. This study addresses these issues by developing a new method 
to empirically quantify drivers of public carry-over rice stocks at the national level. 
Furthermore, it applies the method developed in chapter 4 and combines it with an instrumental 
variable approach to quantify determinants of private grain stocks. Public storage is found to be 
inert and driven by the minimum support price (MSP), market supply, and export bans. Private 
stocks are driven by private supply (production and private stocks) and export opportunities. 
Each ton of public stocks crowds out half a ton of private stocks but despite huge government 
interventions, speculative storage activities persist. This is beneficial for consumers as the 
public stocks currently offer no crisis-responsive consumer protection – only export restrictions 
do. The 29% increase of the real minimum support price in 2008 contributed 4.9 million tons to 
public stocks, the export ban another 2.9. These factors, combined with the bumper harvests in 
2010 and 2011, led to the recent surges in public stocks. Findings furthermore indicate that 
policy makers were aiming to implement price stabilizing policies in the wake of the world food 
crisis but did not anticipate that these policies would result in massive public stock increases. 
This underlines the need for adjustments in the current system. Different econometric models 
are applied as robustness checks and yield comparable results.  
5.2 Introduction 
Over many years, India’s government has tried to tackle two problems with their storage and 
trade policies: (i) low prices for staple food commodities which may hurt producers, and (ii) 
high prices which may be problematic for consumers. The rational for public interventions to 
stabilize prices is provided by the large share of poor people as well as the sensitivity of the 
population to high prices (compare e.g. Sidhir 2004). The lower boundary for prices is 
effectively represented by the Minimum Support Price (MSP) which is set by the government 
every year before planting of the new crop starts. The MSP is designed to cover the costs of 
production and leave a “reasonable” margin to farmers (Kozicka et al. 2015b). At this price, 
                                                 
18
 The estimation of public stocks (which is the biggest part of this paper) has not been 
published before. An earlier version of the private storage estimation in this work has been 
published as a part of the discussion paper Kozicka, M., Kalkuhl, M, Saini, S., and Brockhaus, J., 
2015. “Modelling Indian Wheat and Rice Sector Policies”. ZEF Discussion Paper 197 as well as 
ICRIER Working Paper 295. An even earlier version was published with the same title and 
authors in the conference proceedings of the 2014 AAEA Annual Meeting, Minneapolis. 
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open-end procurement of rice paddy is guaranteed to farmers. It was claimed, that the MSP 
follows the international prices in the long run, but even then it remains exogenous for the 
Indian market actors. Grains are then stored and given to the poor at subsidized rates. 
However, farmers are free to sell their grains to the open market, i.e. any type of market 
agent, instead. Trade quotas and bans are used as ad-hoc policies to prevent price surges. 
While this stabilized domestic prices (Anderson et al. 2013; World Bank 2010), it also 
amplified world price increases (Anderson et al. 2013; Headey 2010) and led to surging 
public stocks resulting in large fiscal costs for the government (Kozicka et al. 2015b). Hence, 
it is questionable whether India’s price stabilization policies are cost-effective and can be 
sustained in the long run. Given the large share of poor households in India, pro-poor food 
policies are of crucial importance for the country but new policies which achieve the same 
goals at lower fiscal costs and with lower levels of leakages need to be explored (Kozicka et 
al. 2015a). Whether less government involvement and more reliance on the private sector can 
be part of such a strategy is a question of particular importance. 
This study explores the drivers of public and private carry-over rice stocks under the current 
institutional setting. A new method is developed to analyze the drivers of public storage and a 
recently developed theoretical method for the analysis of private stock drivers based on the 
competitive storage model (chapter 4) is used, adjusted, and applied to Indian data and 
policies. This allows endogeneity problems to be overcome, which typically plague empirical 
modeling of supply, demand, and storage. In particular, it is analyzed how the market supply, 
export opportunities, and policy variables such as buffer norms and the MSP influence the 
carry-over rice stocks. Public stocks can be analyzed with a simple OLS regression on the 
levels or first differences while private rice stocks require an instrumental variable approach. 
To deal with the relatively low number of observations, models are kept as simple as possible 
and results for different specifications are provided (including levels and first difference 
specifications). Additionally, different estimators are used in case of the instrumental variable 
approach to estimate private stocks. Finally, both USDA and FAO-AMIS data is used for 
separate private stock regressions as an additional robustness check. The Indian government 
itself does not provide any estimates for private stock data. Overall, this study therefore 
contributes to the string of literature which analyzes India’s market interventions to improve 
food security policies and possible options for reforms of these policies (Baylis et al. 2013; 
e.g. Ganesh-Kumar et al. 2012; Gouel et al. 2014; Gulati and Jain 2013; Gulati and Saini 
2014; Gupta 2013; Jha et al. 2007; Kozicka et al. 2015b; Pursell 2014; Shreedhar et al. 2012; 
Srinivasan and Jha 2001, 1999). 
A particular focus of this study is the interaction between public and private stocks. In 
general, knowledge about how public stocks influence private stocks is mostly derived from 
theoretical models (compare chapter 3 and Miranda and Glauber 1993; Williams and Wright 
1991; Wright and Williams 1982) but quantitative empirical studies on this question are 
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missing. Typically, stock data is not available or is poorly documented  (Abbott 2013). India 
constitutes an exceptional case in the sense that data on both private and public stocks is 
available and the system underwent no major changes for a time period of about 40 years. 
Hence, India provides a rare situation that allows analyzing how public stocks influence 
private stocks. Naturally, results are specific to India. Private stocks are held by farmers, 
traders, millers, and co-operatives. Private-public partnerships have also been built to extend 
and modernize the storage capacity (World Bank 2011).  
Public rice stockpiling policies are well defined in India by setting the MSP which drives the 
procurement. In addition, rice millers are indirectly taxed by having to deliver a state-
dependent share of their milled rice to government agencies (Saini and Kozicka 2014). This 
so-called levy has been used since the mid-1960s (Acharya et al. 2012) but it has been 
announced to be discontinued from October 2015 onward (Dash 2015). The procured grains 
are stored and (supposedly) given to the poor through the public distribution system (PDS) 
which offers predefined quantities of rice and wheat at fixed prices. However, leakages are 
substantial (Drèze and Khera 2015; Gulati and Saini 2015). Up until 1997/98 the distribution 
was non-targeted and specified quotas of subsidized grains were distributed through so called 
fair price shops (Jha et al. 2007). From 1997/98 to 2000/01, a transition to a targeted system 
was made in order to reduce costs and improve targeting the poor (ibid.). Quantities and 
prices then became specified for three groups, the poorest of the poor (AAY), the below 
poverty line (BPL) and above poverty line (APL) (for an analysis of the PDS compare e.g. 
Khera 2011). These quantities and prices are rarely changed. Other Welfare Schemes (OWS) 
exist, through which the government releases additional quantities such as for mid-day meal 
schemes (Saini and Kozicka 2014). In this analysis, these are treated together with the PDS 
offtakes. Additionally, the government can release grains for public exports or through the 
Open Market Sales Scheme (OMSS) if stock levels are above the predefined stock norm. In 
contrast, public imports, which rarely occurred, may be used to ensure stocks do not fall 
below the norm. Figure 5.1 provides an overview about all processes related to the public 
carry-over rice stocks, i.e. the inflows and outflows which happen during the marketing year. 
Regulatory policies for private storage have been in place in the past and have partly been 
reenacted such as upper limits on storage volumes for different types of agents. These 
regulations were introduced by the Essential Commodities Act enacted in 1955. In 2000-
2001, rice and other commodities were no longer regulated (Ahluwalia 2002; Landes and 
Gulati 2004). However, during the world food crisis in 2007-2008, regulations on rice and 
other food staples were put back in place (Thaindian News 2008). These policies are criticized 
but still maintained (Cummings et al. 2006; Landes and Gulati 2004; Pursell 2014; Reardon 
and Minten 2011; Saini and Kozicka 2014). Furthermore, these policies are imposed on the 
state level, very time-dependent and ad-hoc, poorly documented and difficult if not 
impossible to aggregate to the national level. Often these policies are not fully implemented or 
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the implementation suffers from corruption and intransparent and lengthy processes (Mooij 
1994). All these factors make it impossible to control for impacts of such policies and as a 
result they are not considered in the analysis.  
 
Figure 5.1: Overview of drivers of public ending stocks (inflows and outflows)  
Notes: Own illustration. The sizes of the arrows indicate qualitatively the relative importance of 
the process. Public imports are in brackets because they rarely occurred and if so, they were very 
small. 
 
 
Figure 5.2: Timeline of events within one marketing year (Own illustration) 
There are two rice crop seasons in India, the bigger kharif crop is harvested between October 
and December and the smaller rabi crop is harvested from March to June (Figure 5.2). Thus, 
stocks reach their lowest levels at the beginning of October, right before the new harvest is 
starting (Figure 5.3 and Figure 5.5). Hence, this is considered to be the end of the marketing 
year where the carry-over stocks are measured. The highest public stock levels are observed 
between March and April when the second harvest is procured. Overall, some modern silos are 
available but in most areas there is a lack of modern storage facilities and grains are commonly 
stored with the cover and plinth method which results in huge losses (Sharon et al. 2014). 
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The following sections successively describe the data, methodological approach, estimation 
strategies, results, and conclusions. 
5.3 Data 
Data is collected for as many years as possible; however, the data-generating process must not 
change during the time of the analysis. Before 1975, there were two official prices announced 
by the government, the Minimum Support Price (MSP) which was a lower boundary of the 
rice price and the Procurement Price at which the crop was procured by public agencies 
(Ramachandran 2005). Usually, the procurement price was higher than the MSP but lower 
than the market price. In 1975, the system was changed to its current version where there is 
only one price, the MSP, which is announced and guarantees open-end procurement at this 
price by the government (ibid.). For this reason, no data for the years before 1975 is 
considered. As a result, a maximum of forty observations can be obtained with data from 
1975 to 2014. During this time period, no major reforms were carried out which changed the 
overall nature of the data-generating process. The most important reform was the National 
Food Security Act 2013 (NFSA) which extended the existing public distribution system to 
provide subsidized grains to about two thirds of India’s population. So far, this act has been 
rolled out only in some states due to several implementation difficulties, including identifying 
beneficiaries (Das 2015; High Level Committe on Restructuring of the FCI 2015). Therefore, 
the buffer stock norms were adjusted and accompanied by changes in the public distribution 
system (Gulati and Saini 2014). However, procurement procedures did not change. 
Data on the MSP, public stocks, and buffer norms is obtained from the Food Cooperation of 
India (FCI), the Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation, and the Reserve Bank 
of India. Production and demand for India as well as for the rest of the world is obtained from 
the USDA. The MSP is deflated with the World Bank Consumer Price Index. Gulati et al. 
(2013) provide the times when rice exports were banned.  
Empirical data on storage is always scarce and badly documented. The data collection, 
dissemination and transparency has often been criticized (e.g. Abbott 2013). However, the 
FCI publishes monthly stock levels for the main staples from 1995 onward. October rice 
stocks, which are the closing stocks before the new harvest is brought in, are reported from 
1990 onward only.  However, January (end of the fiscal year) and April stock levels are also 
reported in the years before and could be obtained from 1972 onward. Data on private storage 
is usually even harder to obtain. Nevertheless, in India, both the USDA and FAO provide data 
for the total closing rice stocks, i.e. the sum of private and public stocks in October (FAO-
AMIS 2015; Mustard and Singh 2015). It is claimed that no other information is published 
about privately held rice stocks (Mustard and Singh 2015) and that industry sources are 
consulted for the USDA estimations. Apart from using industry sources, stock data is often 
calculated as residual from demand and supply balances (Abbott 2013). The AMIS-website, 
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where the FAO data is obtained, defines the ending stocks as the quantity of the crop held at 
all levels within the food system before the new crop is harvested (FAO-AMIS 2015). 
Furthermore, AMIS states that its forecasts are based on official and non-official sources. 
However, no specific details are provided on how the total stock levels are obtained. FAO 
STAT only reports stock changes but not stock levels, but a comparison shows that their stock 
changes do not correspond to the total FAO-AMIS or public FCI stock changes which 
indicates that other sources or inputs must have been used for the calculation of the total 
stocks. Often, FAO stock data is computed as a residual from the estimation of the other 
demand and supply categories such as production, trade, losses, and total demand (Abbott 
2013).  
Data on surplus of the rest of the world (RoW) is calculated by subtracting the demand trend 
from the actual production which is brought in at the beginning of the marketing year. The 
trend is used because demand is not fully foreseeable during the marketing year. Data on 
production, private stocks, and public stocks is detrended by a Hodrick-Prescott filtered 
domestic consumption trend to obtain a stationary time series. For the surplus in RoW, the 
RoW consumption trend is used. Formal tests for stationarity are not reliable without a large 
number of observations. Nevertheless, most variables are stationary after detrending, 
according to the augmented Dicky Fuller test, but supply and public stocks are not. Therefore, 
and as an additional robustness check, results for first difference estimations are reported 
additionally in the result tables. First differences are stationary for all variables according to 
the augmented Dicky Fuller test. 
5.4 Method to predicting missing observations for public stocks 
As explained in the previous section, closing rice stock data is missing in the years before 
1990 and for 2015, but January and April stock levels are available for all years and can be 
used for predicting the October stock levels. There is a large amount of literature about how to 
deal with missing data (e.g. Afifi and Elashoff 1966; Jones 1980; Little and Rubin 2002; Little 
1992). However, the prevailing situation differs in the sense that data on ending stocks, i.e. 
October stocks, is missing before 1990 and for 2015 but there is data on January and April 
stocks for those years. Therefore, instead of using maximum likelihood, imputation, Bayes or 
non-parametric methods, the knowledge of the January and April stock levels can be used to 
predict the October stocks. It is hence important to notice how stock levels change from April 
to October (Figure 5.3). The smaller rabi harvest takes place in March and April such that 
stocks reach their highest levels during this time. Procurement still takes place between April 
and October, but the decrease from April to October indicates that it plays a minor role during 
this period. Hence, most of the stock changes are a result of releases. This is confirmed by the 
procurement data because only 23% of the yearly procurement is processed in the six months 
from beginning of April to the end of September (yearly average calculated from the 1991 to 
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2009 FCI procurement data). Gulati and Jain (2013) also find that these six months have the 
lowest levels of procurement during the year. Additionally, the value for the procurement 
share has been relatively constant over the years as the standard deviation of the yearly share 
of procurement within these six months is less than 5% despite a slight increase over the 
years. The relatively stable procurement between April and October therefore indicates that 
the storage inflow can be approximated relatively well for the missing years by assuming 
similar patterns as for the years from 1990 onward where data is available. However, stock 
releases also need to be approximated in the same manner. The main way to release stocks is 
through offtakes for the PDS. In comparison, the amount released through OMSS and public 
exports are small. Gulati and Jain (2013) show that there is hardly any seasonality in rice 
offtakes. Figure 5.4 presents the monthly rice offtakes from 1999 to 2001 which also show 
little seasonality and in addition no major differences within these three years. This justifies 
the assumption that stock releases before 1990 can also approximated by stock releases in 
later years. This periodic uptake of large stocks and subsequent releases over the marketing 
year result in large costs for the government and have therefore been criticized (e.g. Shreedhar 
et al. 2012). 
 
Figure 5.3: Monthly public rice stock levels 
Notes: Own illustration. Markers indicate upper limit and lower limits, 25th and 75th percentile and 
the median. Raw data from January 1995 to September 2014, obtained from FCI. 
 
Figure 5.5 shows the changes of the public stocks in relation to their April values. In most 
years, the stocks are reduced by 6 to 10 million tons while there are three years with higher 
and two years with lower releases. For most years with high stock releases between April and 
October, the January stocks were particularly high compared to the April stocks whereas for 
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the years with low stock releases the January stocks often were low compared to the April 
stocks. This provides a rationale to use both the April and the January stock levels for 
regressing the October stock levels because the January stock levels then provide additional 
information about the time trend which is not included in the April stock levels. The April 
stocks are then expected to have a positive and January stocks to have a negative influence 
with the absolute coefficient of the latter being smaller than the one of the former. Hence, the 
regression equation for the October stocks 𝑂𝑡 reads as 
𝑂𝑡 = 𝛾1 + 𝛾2 𝐽𝑡 + 𝛾3 𝐴𝑡  + 𝑒𝑡 (5.1) 
with 𝛾1 being the constant, 𝐽𝑡 being the stocks in January and 𝐴𝑡 being the stocks in April. 
 
Figure 5.4: Monthly rice offtakes from the public stocks 
Note: Own illustration with raw data from FCI. 
 
Three regressions are performed with different dependent variables (Table 5.1), once 
including both 𝐽𝑡 and 𝐴𝑡 as well as one specification including only 𝐽𝑡 and one with 𝐴𝑡 only. 
As earlier years are more important for the estimation and for testing if the coefficients 
change over time, specification (4) was added which uses weighted least squares and gives 
twice the weight to the observations before the year 2000 compared to those afterward. 
However, this construction is somewhat arbitrary. Specification (5) shows the results for a 
first difference estimation. All results fully meet the expectations and the high R²s indicate a 
very good fit of the model. April stock levels are highly significant and positive in all 
specifications. The size of the coefficient changes depending on whether January stocks are 
included. January stocks are always significant and negative unless April stocks are excluded. 
This is a result of the dynamic discussed above, implying that higher January stocks reduce 
the October stocks, possibly because of high stock outs if stock levels are ample over a longer 
time period. If April stocks are not included, higher January stocks just lead to higher October 
stocks with a coefficient which is statistically not different from the April stocks in 
specification (2) where no other variables are included. Then, the effect that high stocks over 
a long time period reduce the ending stocks in October cannot be observed any more. The 
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weighted least squares estimation shows that the coefficients are not statistically different if 
the years before 2000 receive twice the weight of the observations from 2000 onward. 
Overall, the October stocks can be estimated very well this way as indicated by the high R² in 
all specifications. Specification (1) is used to forecast the October stocks for the years before 
1990 where only January and April stock levels are available. This specification has the 
highest R², a high F statistic and low BIC. Furthermore, it makes use of the additional 
information provided by the January stocks which allows for a short-term time trend.  
 
Figure 5.5: Change of public rice stocks relative to each year’s April stocks 
Note: Own illustration with raw data from FCI 
 
Table 5.1: Regression results for the public October rice stocks 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Estimation OLS OLS OLS Weighted 
LS 
FD 
January Stocks -.689
*
  .749
***
 -.569
*
 -.84
*
 
 (.391)  (.081) (.292) (.344) 
April Stocks 1.39
***
 .759
***
  1.25
***
 1.63
***
 
 (.375) (.057)  (.275) (.338) 
Constant -.02 -.023
*
 -.011 -.012 -1.9e-03 
 (.012) (.013) (.015) (.014) (5.2e-03) 
Adj R² .835 .808 .686 .833 .784 
R² .849 .816 .699 .845 .803 
F stat 95 175 85.5 60.8 29.7 
BIC -103 -102 -89.3 -107 -106 
Observations 25 25 25 25 24 
Notes: Own illustration. Robust standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Figure 5.6: Private (grey) and public (black) closing rice stocks 
Notes: Own illustration. Raw data obtained from different sources: public stock data from FCI; 
total stock data from which private stocks are calculated from USDA and FAO (via AMIS). See 
text for a description how closing public stocks before 1990 and for 2015 are predicted. While 
public and private stocks are negatively correlated with a coefficient of -0.36, private stocks can 
better be described when other control variables are accounted for. 
 
Besides looking at the R², it is also possible to compare the estimated public stock levels with 
the actual ones (Figure 5.6). The estimated stock levels clearly follow the observed ones, 
however, for extremely high or low values the estimation does not perform as well. For the 
subsequent analysis, the predicted public stock levels are only used for those years, where 
actual data is missing. Figure 5.6 also shows the private stock levels which are calculated by 
subtracting the public from the USDA or FAO provided total stock levels. Stock levels from 
both sources show a similar dynamic but differ substantially in individual years. While the 
USDA data is available even before 1972/74, the FAO data only starts in 1999/2000. The 
October buffer norm experienced only minor changes over the years. 
5.5 Method to estimate public storage 
In contrast to private storage, public storage is not driven by price expectations of private 
market actors but by the way the government intervenes in the market. This section presents a 
new method for the estimation of public closing stocks and how the regression can be 
performed with exogenous variables only. The processes affecting the public stocks, i.e. the 
inflows and outflows during the marketing year, are depicted in Figure 5.1 and the timing in 
Figure 5.2. 
5.5.1 Overview of determinants 
As explained in the introduction, the government procures rice at the pre-defined and therefore 
exogenous MSP without any limits. Even if the MSP follows international prices in the long-
run it still remains exogenous for India which is sufficient here. The open-ended procurement 
can be described as a mixed complementarity problem (described by the ⊥ symbol), 
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𝑃𝑡 − 𝑀𝑆𝑃𝑡 ⊥ 0 ≤ 𝑀𝑡 ≤ ∞   , (5.2) 
where 𝑃𝑡 is the market price in year t, MSP is the minimum support price and 𝑀𝑡 is the amount 
procured in this year. This complementarity condition sets the MSP as lower limit for the market 
price. Some rice is additionally procured through the levy on rice traders. The government gets a 
fixed state-dependent share (Saini and Kozicka 2014) which can be approximated as 
𝐿𝑡 = 𝛼𝐻𝑡   , (5.3) 
with 𝐿𝑡 being the amount procured, 𝛼 the average share and 𝐻𝑡 the production in year t. The 
main way to release stocks is through the public distribution system. As explained in the 
previous paragraph, these stock releases are relatively stable over time. Stock norms are 
enforced to ensure that stock levels are sufficient to meet the demand of the PDS and other 
welfare schemes. The Open Market Sales Scheme (OMSS) and public exports are used to 
release stocks when their levels are significantly above the norm whereas public imports 
ensure that stocks do not fall below the norms. Decisions about OMSS offtakes, public exports 
or imports are made ad hoc without clear rules. As public imports hardly ever occurred and 
were very low (below 100.000 tons) when they occurred, they can safely be ignored. Public 
exports (𝑃𝐸𝑡) and OMSS releases (𝑂𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑡) also rarely occurred and were mostly very small 
when they occurred, but in a few years, public exports were substantial (Figure 5.7). 
Altogether, the public ending stock levels in year t can then described by the equation 
𝑋𝑡
𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐 = (1 − 𝛿)𝑋𝑡−1
𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐 + 𝑀𝑡 + 𝐿𝑡 − 𝑃𝐸𝑡 − 𝑂𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑡 − 𝑃𝐷𝑆𝑡 + 𝑒𝑡   , (5.4) 
where 𝛿 describes the stock losses due to deterioration (the implicit assumption is that these 
are constant over time and not dependent on the stock levels), 𝑃𝐷𝑆𝑡 the offtakes for the PDS 
and other welfare schemes, and 𝑒𝑡 is the error term which may capture leakages or other not-
considered factors. The procurement is separated into two parts, 𝑀𝑡 which describes the 
procurement via the MSP and 𝐿𝑡 which describes the procurement via the levy. 
 
Figure 5.7: Public exports, OMSS offtakes, opening stocks, and stock norm 
Notes: Own illustration with raw data from FCI. 
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5.5.2 Impact of the minimum support price 
Procurement depends on the market prices but can be expressed in terms of the other 
variables. To illustrate that, it is assumed that there is a producer region where the local 
supply-demand equilibrium price is below the binding MSP while in the so called consumer 
region (e.g. urban areas) production is costly and therefore the local supply-demand 
equilibrium is above the MSP (Figure 5.8). Without trade, the local equilibrium would 
determine the price. With trade, the price in the consumer region is determined by the demand 
curve and the quantity imported from the producer region which itself depends on the MSP. 
In the given example, the producer region consumes a share of the local production, another 
share of it is exported and the last share is procured by the government at the MSP. The trade 
costs determine the price difference between the regions. 
 
Figure 5.8: Illustration of how policy variables and trade affect public stocks 
Notes: Own illustration. The MSP and trade between the producer and consumer region 
influences the regional prices and quantities ex- or imported, consumed, or procured by the 
government. 
 
If the government would raise the MSP by Δ𝑀𝑆𝑃, the share of the quantity consumed within 
both the producer region as well as the consumer region would linearly decline with the MSP 
increase. The linear decrease of the former equals Δ𝐷𝑃 = Δ𝑀𝑆𝑃 ⋅ bp while the latter 
decreases by Δ𝐷𝐶 = Δ𝑀𝑆𝑃 ⋅ bC. In addition, while there would be a linear increase of 
production in the producer region (Δ𝑆𝑃 = Δ𝑀𝑆𝑃 ⋅ dP) and in the consumer region (Δ𝑆𝐶 =
Δ𝑀𝑆𝑃 ⋅ dC), the trade flow would also decrease linearly with the higher MSP by Δ𝑀𝑆𝑃 ⋅
(𝑏𝐶 + 𝑑𝐶). In contrast, the quantity procured would increase with the rising MSP by  
Δ𝑀𝑃 = Δ𝑀𝑆𝑃 ⋅ (𝑑𝐶 + 𝑏𝐶 + 𝑑𝑃 + 𝑏𝑃) . (5.5) 
This equation also describes the effect of lowering the MSP. It is important to note that the 
procurement changes linearly with the change in the MSP as long as the MSP is above the 
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local equilibrium in the producer region and the MSP plus the trade costs are below the local 
equilibrium in the consumer region. If the first condition is not fulfilled, a MSP decrease 
would not change the quantity procured. The change in the procurement if the latter condition 
is not fulfilled is not a priori clear and will be examined in the subsequent sections. For the 
example illustrated in Figure 5.8, the grey dots indicate the equilibrium state of the system. 
Under the assumption that there are more than two regions, the behavior depends on the 
demand and supply curves in all the regions. To illustrate the line of argumentation, it is first 
assumed that there are three regions only, one producer region, one consumer region, and one 
which switches when the MSP increases above a certain threshold (Figure 5.9, parameters of 
the switching region are indicated by the index S). Before the MSP is increased, the 
procurement at the “old MSP” can be calculated as: 
𝑀𝑎𝑙𝑙 = 𝑆𝑃 − 𝐷𝑃 + 𝐷𝑆 − 𝐻𝑆 + 𝐷𝐶 − 𝐻𝐶 
= 𝑐𝑃 − 𝑐𝑆 − 𝑐𝐶 − 𝑎𝑃 + 𝑎𝑆 + 𝑎𝐶 + 𝑃𝑃(𝑑𝑃 + 𝑏𝑃) − 𝑃𝑆(𝑑𝑆 + 𝑏𝑆) − 𝑃𝐶(𝑑𝑐 + 𝑏𝑐) , 
(5.6) 
where the prices in the producer region equals the MSP (𝑃𝑃 = 𝑀𝑆𝑃) and the prices in the 
other region equal the trade costs 𝑇 plus the MSP (𝑃𝑆 = 𝑃𝐶 = 𝑀𝑆𝑃 + 𝑇). Here, it is assumed 
that the trade costs between all regions are the same, i.e. 𝑇 = 𝑇𝑃↔𝑆 = 𝑇𝑃↔𝐶 = 𝑇𝑆↔𝐶. Similarly 
as before in equation (5.5), a very small increase in the MSP, i.e. one which would still leave 
the switching region as an importing region, would increase the procurement by 
Δ𝑀𝑃 = Δ𝑀𝑆𝑃 ⋅ (𝑑𝐶 + 𝑏𝐶 + 𝑑𝑃 + 𝑏𝑃 + 𝑑𝑆 + 𝑏𝑆)  (5.7) 
because all prices would simply be increased by Δ𝑀𝑆𝑃. Hence, there is only an additional 
term added to equation (5.5) which represents the need for exports from the producer region, 
i.e. the region where all the procurement takes place, to the switching region. This implies 
𝛥𝑀𝑆𝑃 ≤ 𝑃𝑆
∗ − 𝑀𝑆𝑃 − 𝑇 and is represented by regime 1 in Figure 5.10. 
If the MSP is increased to such an extent that the switching region becomes a self-sufficient 
region which does not import any more but also does not yet procure anything, i.e. 𝑃𝑆
∗ −
𝑀𝑆𝑃 − 𝑇 < 𝛥𝑀𝑆𝑃 ≤ 𝑃𝑆
∗ − 𝑀𝑆𝑃 (regime 2 in Figure 5.10), then the change in procurement in 
the producer region changes to: 
Δ𝑀𝑃 = Δ𝑀𝑆𝑃(𝑑𝐶 + 𝑏𝐶 + 𝑑𝑃 + 𝑏𝑃) + Δ𝑀𝑆𝑃(𝑑𝑆 + 𝑏𝑆). (5.8) 
Here, Δ𝑀𝑆𝑃 is that part of the MSP increase, which raises the MSP up to the equilibrium 
price (𝑃𝑆
∗) in that region minus the trade costs 𝑇, i.e. Δ𝑀𝑆𝑃 = min(𝛥𝑀𝑆𝑃, 𝑃𝑆
∗ − 𝑀𝑆𝑃 − 𝑇). 
The minimum function ensures that Δ𝑀𝑆𝑃 is equal to the change in the MSP if Δ𝑀𝑆𝑃 ≤
𝑃𝑆
∗ − 𝑀𝑆𝑃 − 𝑇 whereas it is equal to 𝑃𝑆
∗ − 𝑀𝑆𝑃 − 𝑇 if Δ𝑀𝑆𝑃 ≥ 𝑃𝑆
∗ − 𝑀𝑆𝑃 − 𝑇, i.e. if the 
MSP is raised up to the point such that no more imports into the switching region occur. This 
definition ensures that equation (5.7) is included as a special case in equation (5.8). As long as 
the new MSP is not greater than the equilibrium price in the switching region, i.e. 𝑀𝑆𝑃 +
Δ𝑀𝑆𝑃 ≤ 𝑃𝑆
∗, equation (5.8) describes the full procurement because no procurement takes 
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place in the switching region. Thus, the marginal procurement will be reduced, once the 
change in the MSP, Δ𝑀𝑆𝑃, is larger than 𝑃𝑆
∗ − 𝑇 − 𝑀𝑆𝑃 (but still smaller than 𝑃𝑆
∗ − 𝑀𝑆𝑃) 
because no more exports take place from the producer to the switching region.  
If the change of the MSP, Δ𝑀𝑆𝑃, is larger than 𝑃𝑆
∗ − 𝑀𝑆𝑃, such that the new MSP, 𝑀𝑆𝑃 +
Δ𝑀𝑆𝑃, is larger than the equilibrium price in the switching region, procurement will also start 
to take place in this region. As long as Δ𝑀𝑆𝑃 ≤ 𝑃𝑆
∗ − 𝑀𝑆𝑃 + 2𝑇 holds, no exports occur 
from the switching region (regime 3 in Figure 5.10). Then, the additional procurement for 
both the producer and the switching region sums up to: 
Δ𝑀𝑃 + Δ𝑀𝑆 = Δ𝑀𝑆𝑃(𝑑𝐶 + 𝑏𝐶 + 𝑑𝑃 + 𝑏𝑃) + Δ𝑀𝑆𝑃(𝑑𝑆 + 𝑏𝑆) + Δ𝑀𝑆𝑃(𝑑𝑆 + 𝑏𝑆) .  (5.9) 
Here, Δ𝑀𝑆𝑃 represents that part of the change in MSP which is above the equilibrium price 
𝑃𝑆
∗, i.e. Δ𝑀𝑆𝑃 = Δ𝑀𝑆𝑃 − 𝑇 − Δ𝑀𝑆𝑃.  
 
Figure 5.9: Illustration of the impact of MSP changes for switching markets 
Note: Own illustration. 
 
If the MSP is raised even higher, i.e. Δ𝑀𝑆𝑃 > 𝑃𝑆
∗ − 𝑀𝑆𝑃 + 2𝑇 (regime 4 in Figure 5.10), not 
only procurement occurs in the switching region but also exports from the switching to the 
consumer region take place. However, using equation (5.6) and considering that all prices are 
then increased by Δ𝑀𝑆𝑃 = Δ𝑀𝑆𝑃 + 2𝑇 + Δ𝑀𝑆𝑃 shows that the functional relationship does 
not change and equation (5.9) can still fully explain the change in procurement due to a 
change in the MSP within this region.  
If changes within each regime are regarded independently, i.e. price changes with the 
previous price and the price afterward being in the same regime are considered, then it turns 
out that the change in procurement for regime one, three, and four can be described as 
Δ𝑀𝑃 + Δ𝑀𝑆 = Δ𝑀𝑆𝑃(𝑑𝐶 + 𝑏𝐶 + 𝑑𝑃 + 𝑏𝑃 + 𝑑𝑠 + 𝑏𝑠) ,  (5.10) 
whereas in regime two the change in procurement is  
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Δ𝑀𝑃 + Δ𝑀𝑆 = Δ𝑀𝑆𝑃 ⋅ (𝑑𝐶 + 𝑏𝐶 + 𝑑𝑃 + 𝑏𝑃) . (5.11) 
Thus, due to the stop of exports into the switching region for prices within regime two 
combined with the missing procurement in this region for prices below the equilibrium price, 
the marginal change in procurement is reduced in this region. For all other regimes, the 
marginal procurement for all regions combined remains the same because either procurement 
in the producer region is changed due to changing exports to the switching region or 
procurement directly takes place in the switching region.  
If trade costs are negligible, then equation (5.10) describes the change of procurement based 
on the change in the MSP for all regimes. If, however, procurement would not take place in 
the switching region, then the regime three would be the same as regime two for a switching 
market because trade costs would apply for exports to regions with procurement. 
 
Figure 5.10: Four different regimes for price changes in the switching region 
Note: Own illustration. 
 
The previous explanations illustrated how a price change will affect the total procurement if a 
region changes its status regarding its degree of self-sufficiency. The extension to more than 
three regions is now straightforward: All regions can be classified into strict producer, strict 
consumer, and switching regions depending on the level of variability in the MSP which is 
considered. Then, the above principles are applied to the three groups. Instead of having two 
kinks in the marginal procurement, the number of kinks can be up to twice the number of 
switching regions. The location of the kinks as well as the coefficients of how changes of the 
MSP affect procurement depends on the precise structure of all markets, i.e. on all parameters 
of the supply and demand curves. However, these cannot be measured. Nevertheless, various 
assumptions justify applying an approach where a change in the MSP linearly affects the 
change in procurement, thus formally 
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Δ𝑀𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 = Δ𝑀𝑆𝑃 ⋅ 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡 , (5.12) 
where the constant depends on the precise structure of the markets (𝑎𝑖, 𝑏𝑖, 𝑐𝑖, 𝑑𝑖 ∀𝑖). These 
assumptions, of which only a single one needs to be fulfilled, include the following: 
 Trade costs are negligible, for example, because the market are very close to one 
another  
 The number of switching markets is very low compared to the number of producer and 
consumer markets 
 The distribution of switching markets is sufficiently dense and their density 
sufficiently constant over the considered price range 
 
If only a single one of these assumptions holds, equation (5.12) can describe the change in 
procurement which is caused by a change of the MSP. Thus, this linear relationship builds the 
basis for the further analysis. 
5.5.3 Production impact 
Apart from the MSP, production shocks influence the procurement. On the one hand a 
negative production shock reduces the levy which is captured by 𝛼 in equation (5.3). On the 
other hand it reduces the procurement via the MSP. This is illustrated by the dashed lines in 
Figure 5.8. The production curve in Figure 5.8 is interpreted as the planned private supply 
(opening stocks + production) so a shock would lead to a horizontal shift from this curve. A 
production shock, be it negative or positive, leads to a movement of the equilibrium along the 
dashed lines. While a small supply shortfall in the producer region reduces procurement, it 
does not affect trade or the consumer region. In contrast, a large shortfall would reduce 
procurement to zero and then raise prices in both regions. A small shortfall in the producer 
region would affect the quantities traded but not the prices, whereas a big production 
abnormality could either lead to reduced consumption (if procurement is reduced to zero in 
the producer region) or lead to exports from the consumer regions for an unusually high 
supply level (dashed line toward the right).  
5.5.4 Demand impact 
Demand changes may influence procurement through a change in market prices. In India, the 
demand fluctuated with production in the past (Figure 5.11; the correlation coefficient is 
0.94); however, this fluctuation was not fully represented in the real prices as in only a few 
years production shortfalls led to high prices, whereas prices still remained relatively low in 
other years with production shortages. As a result, in many years the production levels 
provide more information about the demand than prices do. Hence, the influence of demand 
on stocks through market prices is captured in the production term. As a result, no prices are 
explicitly included. However, international as well as Indian wholesale prices have been 
tested for both private and public stocks but, as expected, turned out to be insignificant.  
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Figure 5.11: Production, consumption and WPI-deflated wholesale prices 
Notes: Own illustration. The base year is 1981. Production and consumption (left axis) data is 
obtained from the USDA, prices (right axis) from MOSPI.  
5.5.5 Impact of export bans 
Export bans may also influence public stocks as there are fewer or no opportunities for selling 
rice on international markets and therefore government agencies might be one of the few 
choices left for farmers and traders to sell their grains. In Figure 5.8 it can be seen that if 
exports from the producer regions are banned, the quantity which was supposed to be 
exported will be procured instead. Under the assumption that Indian exports cannot influence 
world prices significantly and transportation costs are relatively stable, the additional quantity 
procured can be approximated by a constant. 
Combining these effects of the MSP, supply levels, and export bans on procurement, yields 
𝑀𝑡 + 𝐿𝑡 = 𝜅 𝑀𝑆𝑃𝑡 + 𝜆 𝑆𝑡 + ξ Bt (5.13) 
where  𝑆𝑡 is the private market supply, i.e. production plus opening stocks, and Bt is a dummy 
variable for export bans. As the export ban dummy is stationary, it does not need to be 
detrended as the other variables describing rice quantities or prices will. 
5.5.6 Impact of public exports and OMSS releases 
Public exports and OMSS releases depend on the stock levels but occur in very few years 
only and are mostly low. In general, they are used to enforce that stocks fulfill the buffer 
norms. To approximate the public exports and OMSS releases, it is therefore assumed that 
these represent a certain share of the stock level above the norm (𝑋𝑡
𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐 − 𝑁𝑡). This 
behavior results in the following equations: 
      𝑃𝐸𝑡 = 𝛽 max(0, 𝑋𝑡
𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐 − 𝑁𝑡) = 𝛽 (𝑋𝑡
𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐 − 𝑁𝑡) 𝜃(𝑋𝑡
𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐 − 𝑁𝑡) (5.14) 
𝑂𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑡 = 𝜇 max(0, 𝑋𝑡
𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐 − 𝑁𝑡) = 𝜇 (𝑋𝑡
𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐 − 𝑁𝑡) 𝜃(𝑋𝑡
𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐 − 𝑁𝑡) (5.15) 
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Here, 𝜃(∙) is the Heaviside step function. Decisions on such releases as well as the processing 
of these releases take a lot of time and are made cautiously and delayed (Figure 5.7). Therefore, 
it is more appropriate to replace the current stock levels by last year’s stock levels for the 
release trigger
19
, represented by the Heaviside step function in the corresponding equations 
(5.14) and (5.15). Then, the corresponding part of the stock equation can be expressed as 
𝑋𝑡
𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐 = (𝜇 + 𝛽)(𝑋𝑡
𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐 − 𝑁𝑡) 𝜃(𝑋𝑡−1
𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐 − 𝑁𝑡) + (1 − 𝛿)𝑋𝑡−1
𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐 + ⋯ (5.16) 
For the years with 𝑋𝑡−1
𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐 < 𝑁𝑡 this reduces to 
𝑋𝑡
𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐 = (1 − 𝛿)𝑋𝑡−1
𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐 + ⋯ (5.17) 
and for the other years to 
𝑋𝑡
𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐 = [(𝜇 + 𝛽) + (1 − 𝛿)]𝑋𝑡−1
𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐 + (𝜇 + 𝛽)𝑁𝑡 + ⋯ (5.18) 
Equation (5.16) could be used for the estimation if the stock norms were known for all years. 
But as stock norms are only known from 1989 onward, the sample could be split up into two 
subsamples with  𝑋𝑡−1
𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐 < 𝑁𝑡 and with 𝑋𝑡−1
𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐 > 𝑁𝑡 and then estimated with equations 
(5.17) and (5.18) separately. However, as the number of observations is low, a further 
reduction should be prevented. Hence, the full sample is estimated based on equation (5.18) 
which may lead to a small bias in the parameter (1 − 𝛿) as the missing term is slightly 
correlated to 𝑋𝑡−1
𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐
 via Heaviside’s step function but the other parameters remain unaffected. 
As releases are rare and usually small, the bias is expected to be very low. In addition, the 
estimation is also performed based on equation (5.16) for the years from 1989 onward where 
the norms are known. Yet, OMSS stock releases and public exports are done cautiously and, 
with one exception, substantial releases (>65.000 tons) occurred only when the opening 
stocks were higher than twice the stock norms (Figure 5.7). Hence, the threshold for these 
releases is set to twice the stock norms.  
5.5.7 Public storage regression equation with all determinants 
Under the assumption of relatively staple consumption-detrended PDS offtakes, three policy 
variables can be captured in the estimation: the stock norms, the MSP, and the export bans. 
Using equation (5.13) and (5.16) and the assumptions above, equation (5.3) can be 
transformed into 
𝑋𝑡
𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑋𝑡−1
𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐 + 𝛼2𝑀𝑆𝑃𝑡 + 𝛼3 𝑆𝑡 + α4 Bt + 𝛼5(2 𝑋𝑡−1
𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐 − 𝑁𝑡)𝜃(2 𝑋𝑡−1
𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐 − 𝑁𝑡)
+ 𝑒𝑡 
 (5.19) 
As a result, the public stocks are expressed in terms of exclusively exogenous variables. 
Prices or other exogenous variables are not included, albeit international as well as Indian 
wholesale prices were tested for both private and public stocks but, as expected, turned out to 
                                                 
19
 Of course, only the stock levels for the trigger are lagged, not the stocks from which the 
exports/releases are actually taken. 
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be insignificant. To ensure stationarity of the time series, non-price data was detrended by the 
consumption trend as explained in the previous section and price data was deflated by the 
consumer price index. The general equation describing the public stocks is then given by: 
𝑋𝑡
𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐
𝐷𝑡
𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1
𝑋𝑡−1
𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐
𝐷𝑡
𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑 + 𝛼2𝑀𝑆𝑃𝑡 + 𝛼3
𝑆𝑡
𝐷𝑡
𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑 + 𝛼4𝐵𝑡 + 𝛼5
2 𝑋𝑡−1
𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐 − 𝑁𝑡
𝐷𝑡
𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝜃(2 𝑋𝑡−1
𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐 − 𝑁𝑡)
+ 𝑒𝑡 
(5.20) 
where 𝑋𝑡
𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐 
 is the public closing stocks in the marketing year 𝑡, 𝐷𝑡
𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑 is the consumption 
trend, 𝑀𝑆𝑃𝑡 is the minimum support price, 𝑆𝑡 is the private market supply (i.e. production in 
the beginning of the marketing year plus beginning private stocks), 𝐵𝑡 is an export ban 
dummy, and 𝑁𝑡 is the buffer norm for the public ending stocks. The error term 𝑒𝑡 captures 
leakages and other factors which are not considered. 
As a robustness check, the same regressions are performed on the levels (specification 1 and 2 
in Table 5.2) and on the first differences (specification 3 and 4); in both cases, one model 
including the buffer norm and one without norm is presented as the norm reduces the number 
of observations and, in particular the degrees of freedom. If the norm is included, the 
regression uses only the non-extended USDA series of stocks with the exception of the year 
2015 where the ending stocks are still predicted. 
5.6 Method to estimate private storage 
Estimating private storage requires knowledge about the behavior of private stockholders. 
Theoretically, private stocks should be driven by price expectations of stockholders. Prices and 
price expectations themselves are a result of supply and demand expectations of different 
market agents, including traders, farmers, and consumers. However, unlike current prices, 
private agents’ price expectations or expectations about supply and demand in the future are 
hard to observe. Even if asked, agents may face incentives to misreport if they could benefit 
from private knowledge or are not willing to invest time into reporting. Moreover, risk-averse 
agents such as small-scale farmers may directly use storage for supply and consumption 
stabilization rather than profit maximization. Therefore, price expectations are included only 
indirectly, by using the approach presented in chapter 4. There, a piece-wise linear reduced-
form storage equation is derived which is based on the competitive storage model with traders 
and price responsive producers in a two country setting. Instead of using price expectations, 
which are a result of supply and demand expectations, supply and demand fundamentals are 
directly used to find a piece-wise linear approximation of private carry-over stocks. Hence, 
price expectations are used to describe private stocks but they are not explicitly modelled. This 
study uses that approach with three simplifications. First, it is limited to the case of one country 
where the rest of the world (RoW) is only included by the expected surplus within RoW. 
Second, demand shocks are excluded because demand in India mostly follows production 
(Figure 5.11) and because the number of observations is low and, hence, requires limiting the 
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number of explanatory variables which are used.  Furthermore, GDP shocks, which are used as 
an approximation of demand, were tested but turned out to be insignificant and were therefore 
excluded. Third, the storage rule is assumed to be fully linear without a kink which originally 
occurs when stocks are zero. Assuming full linearity without a kink is justified by the private 
ending stocks always being clearly above zero, even when estimated operational stocks are 
subtracted. Explanations of stocks being always strictly positive range from convenience yield 
approaches postulating an intrinsic possession value (Brennen 1958; Working 1949), 
mismeasurement and aggregation issues (Benirschka and Binkley 1995; Brennan et al. 1997), 
and diverse motives of stockholders (Carter and Giha 2007). However, a Tobit model was 
tested to account for nonlinear storage behavior. This allowed the use of a piece-wise linear 
function by introducing a cutoff point, i.e. a minimum level of stocks which represents the 
operational stocks. Yet, the results of this Tobit model were not statistically different from the 
regular IV regression. In addition, due to the limited number of observations there should be a 
minimal amount of additional parameters and restrictions on the degrees of freedom imposed 
on the model. In conclusion, these reasons provide the rationale to test different specifications 
for robustness but to remain with the simplest applicable version possible. 
Overall, three important variables need to be included based on the discussion above: First, 
public closing stocks to control for crowding out of private closing stocks; second, supply at 
the beginning of the marketing year to account for future price expectations as well as the 
influence on public stocks through the levy; and third, an export ban dummy or the surplus of 
the rest of the world as alternative measures to control for export opportunities and related 
expectations of stockholders. Public storage can be important because procurement takes 
grains from the market and large stocks may also increase the government’s PDS distribution 
quantities, OMSS offtakes, and exports from public stocks. Therefore, public stocks may affect 
price expectations of private stockholders. While the market supply is fixed to a large extent 
(opening stocks + kharif production) at the beginning of the marketing year and fully fixed at 
the time of the rabi harvest (Figure 5.2), procurement takes place during the whole marketing 
year. Restrictions on private market actors activities such as restrictions on stock levels through 
the Essential Commodity Act cannot be considered as they are often badly documented, not 
enforced, and imposed on the state level and hence hard to aggregate on the national level (see 
section 5.2). The general equation describing the private stocks is then given by: 
 𝑋𝑡
𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣
𝐷𝑡
𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1
𝑆𝑡
𝐷𝑡
𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑 + 𝛼2
𝑋𝑡
𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐
𝐷𝑡
𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑  +  𝛼3𝐵𝑡 + 𝛼4
𝐿𝑡
𝐷𝑡
𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑 + 𝑒𝑡 (5.21) 
where 𝑋𝑡
𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣 
and 𝑋𝑡
𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐 
 are the private and public closing stocks in the marketing year 𝑡, 
𝐷𝑡
𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑 is the consumption trend, 𝑆𝑡 is the total market supply, 𝐿𝑡 is the expected surplus in 
RoW calculated as the actual production minus the expected demand (from the demand 
trend), and 𝐵𝑡 is an export ban dummy. This stationary export ban dummy is expected to have 
a linear influence as discussed in section 5.5.5. As closing public sector stocks are considered 
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for the same marketing year as the estimated private closing stocks, endogeneity problems 
may arise. Hence, the regressions are estimated using the instrumental variables technique.  
The public closing stocks are instrumented by the exogenous MSP and the public closing stocks 
of the previous year which are the public opening stocks of the current year. These two 
variables are found to be the main driver in the section on public stocks and the other important 
variables are included as non-excluded instruments in the regression. The public opening stocks 
are used as an instrument because public stocks only change slowly and are not a perfect 
substitute of private market supply as they follow different dynamics. In particular, public stock 
releases react much less flexible than private stock outs. The MSP is used as the second 
instrument because it is the main driver of the change in public stocks (see sections 5.5 and 5.7) 
and it is exogenous because it is fixed before the planting season starts (Figure 5.2). It 
influences production and public stocks but there is no other channel through which it 
influences private stocks. The MSP shapes the demand of the government through the open-end 
procurement which is captured by including (MSP-instrumented) public stocks but apart from 
that it does not influence market prices or price expectations. In addition, the current MSP does 
not matter for future demand or price expectations because private stocks occur at the end of the 
marketing year, i.e. long after the harvest is brought in and the new MSP for the next marketing 
year is announced (Figure 5.2). The production is fixed to a large extent already when the 
bigger kharif season is ending. After the harvest of the rabi season has started, there should be 
only minor changes to the expected production for a specific marketing year. However, the 
ending stocks only occur a few months later and hence the production is exogenous to these. As 
production is controlled for separately, the production effect of the MSP can be neglected and 
the procurement price only influences expected prices via the procurement which is the desired 
effect. In addition, because the market supply is used in the regression, i.e. opening stocks plus 
production, the effect of the MSP on this variable is negligible which also manifests itself in a 
low correlation coefficient of only 0.21. Overall, these reasons lead to the belief that the MSP is 
a good instrument for the public stocks but otherwise does not influence the private stocks. 
Different test statistics are calculated to ensure the validity of the instruments. As robust 
standard errors are applied, the Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic is used to test for 
underidentification of instruments (Kleibergen and Paap 2006). Weak identification is tested 
with the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic, overidentification with the Hansen J statistic 
(Hansen 1982). Contrarily to what is often believed, the latter does not test the validity of 
instruments but rather their coherency, i.e. whether all instruments identify the same vector of 
parameters (Hausman 1983; Parente and Santos Silva 2012).  
A number of different additional tests are performed. Regressions are performed as IV 
regressions on the levels (specification 1-3 in Table 5.3), OLS regressions on the levels 
(specification 4), IV regression on the first differences (specification 5), and OLS regression 
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on the first differences (specification 6). For the IV regressions, the 2SLS, two-step GMM, 
limited information maximum likelihood (LIML; Anderson and Rubin 1950; Anderson 2005), 
and CUE GMM estimators (Hansen et al. 1996) were used and compared. Robust standard 
errors were applied in all cases. The estimated coefficients for all estimators were statistically 
not different from one another. Therefore, only the results for the CUE GMM estimator are 
presented as this estimator, just as the LIML estimator (Flores-Lagunes 2007), is reported to 
have better finite sample properties than the 2SLS (Hansen et al. 1996). At the same time, in 
contrast to the LIML estimator, the CUE GMM estimator is also applicable if heteroscedas-
ticity is present (ibid.). The regressions are performed with the user written command ivreg2 
(Baum et al. 2007) in Stata 13. As a further robustness check, the included endogenous 
variables are changed (specifications 1-3) and the same regressions are repeated on the non-
extended USDA data from 1990 onward and on the FAO data (appendix; Table 8.3).  
5.7 Results for public rice stocks 
Both level and first differences regression results for public stocks are in line with prevailing 
expectations discussed in the previous sections (Table 5.2). As expected, the MSP turns out to 
be an important driver of public stocks. It has a very high coefficient which is highly 
significant in all specifications. As the MSP is deflated (and, as a result, is stationary) the 
coefficient cannot directly be interpreted by using the MSP in Indian Rupee. Instead the 
deflated MSP needs to be multiplied by the consumption trend and the respective coefficient, 
to obtain the total contribution of the MSP to stocks in a specific year. Examples are provided 
in the discussion of Figure 5.12. 
The private supply is another important factor which always has a positive coefficient and 
highly significant impact. The coefficient of 0.299 in the first specification implies that 1 
million tons of additional production leads to a 0.3 million ton increase in ending stocks. The 
lagged public closing stocks (which are the public opening stocks) are significant in all 
specifications. Their coefficient of 0.767 in the first specification means that every ton of 
opening stocks leads to 0.767 tons of closing stocks. This is a result of the slow changes 
which public stocks experience, i.e. a large fraction of the closing stocks is already 
determined by the opening stocks. The stocks above the buffer norm are insignificant in both 
specifications and hence no conclusion about how the buffer norms influence public stocks 
can be drawn. The overall low level of public exports, OMSS releases and in particular public 
imports (Figure 5.7) however support the finding that there is no major impact on public 
stocks. Finally, the export ban is, as expected, positive and significant in all specifications 
implying that export bans lead to higher public stocks. The very high R² indicate a good 
model fit. The similarity of the results between the first differences and the level specification 
support the robustness of the model. 
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Table 5.2: Regression results for the public closing stocks 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Estimation Levels Levels FD FD 
Public Opening 
Stocks 
.767*** 
(.113) 
1.09** 
(.402) 
.423* 
(.209) 
.901** 
(.385) 
MSP .82*** 
(.299) 
1.05** 
(.476) 
1.28*** 
(.26) 
1.26*** 
(.386) 
Private Supply .299*** 
(.05) 
.421*** 
(.147) 
.186** 
(.074) 
.341** 
(.137) 
Export Ban .033** 
(.013) 
.035** 
(.014) 
.041** 
(.019) 
.042** 
(.018) 
Above Buffer 
Norm 
 
 
.811 
(.648) 
 
 
.773 
(.558) 
Constant -.522*** 
(.084) 
-.735*** 
(.196) 
3.8e-04 
(5.3e-03) 
6.2e-04 
(7.9e-03) 
BIC -150 -90.4 -138 -75.1 
R² .772 .823 .458 .531 
Observations 40 25 39 24 
Notes: Own illustration. Robust standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 
0.01. The private supply does include the production and the private opening stocks, but not the 
public opening stocks are they are included separately. 
 
Figure 5.12 illustrates the predicted and actual changes of public stocks as well as the driving 
factors of these changes according to specification 1 for the years from 2002 to 2015. This 
sheds some light on the determinants of some observed stock changes in the past. The biggest 
ever stock decline in India from October 2002 to October 2003 is mostly attributable to the 
low level of supplies, the reduction of public stocks in the previous year and the reduction of 
the MSP in real terms – even though it was constant in nominal terms. When the world food 
crises started in 2007, the government of India introduced an export ban which led to public 
stocks rising by 2.9 million tons in addition to a 1 million ton increase due to high supply 
levels. In total, this yielded a substantial increase in stocks despite exceptionally high prices 
on the world market. In the subsequent year, public stocks soared. The MSP was raised from 
6450 INR in 2007/08 to 9000 INR in 2008/09 which is a 40% increase in nominal terms and a 
29% increase in real values. According to specification 1 of the results, this change in the 
support price resulted in 4.9 million tons higher public stock levels in October 2009 (Figure 
5.12). Other factors such as supply levels and the lagged public stocks had a comparably 
small contribution to the stock increase. In general, the production also responds to the MSP 
(Kozicka et al. 2015b) and this can be observed in 2008/09 where a record harvest of almost 
100 million tons was achieved. This increased public stocks by another 0.5 million tons. It 
seems that the Indian government was not fully aware of the expected increase in public 
stocks due to such a massive increase of the MSP. Clearly, this exceptional raise of the 
support price would have required comprehensive OMSS offtakes. However, these offtakes 
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did not take place and thus public stocks skyrocketed. Had there not been a large negative 
production shock in the marketing year 2009/10, stocks would have soared even further. 
Despite this major shortfall, stocks still increased. In recent years, stock levels were brought 
down by allowing exports, by a low production in 2014/15 and by low procurement prices 
(except in 2012/13). However, stock levels mostly fell relatively to the consumption levels as 
can be seen by the contribution of the constant. In absolute levels, their decrease is still 
relatively limited. 
This study does not attempt to calculate an optimal rule for public stocks as that would require 
defining objective functions and welfare functions and is therefore far beyond the scope of 
this study. It would also involve judgments about how to distribute welfare between 
consumers and producers. However, any reasonable objective function would require large 
stock releases in times of production shortfalls and high prices. As these did not happen and 
stock levels even increased during the world food crisis in 2007/08, it is clear that from the 
ex-post perspective, the stockholding policies from the Indian government were far from 
optimal. Indeed, as discussed above, it seems that the problematic interactions of conflicting 
policies which resulted in stock increases were not anticipated by policy makers. 
 
Figure 5.12: Actual and predicted changes of public closing stocks 
Notes: Own illustration. The changes (lines) and the driving factors behind these (bars) according 
to model specification (1) in Table 5.2. As the closing stocks are the stocks at the beginning of 
October, the “2002-->03” stock change refers to the change from October 2002 to October 2003. 
5.8 Results for private rice stocks 
Private stocks are estimated following equation (5.21) with IV and direct OLS techniques for 
the levels as well as first differences (Table 5.3). The supply now contains the private supply 
and the public opening stocks because these are not included separately as in the public stock 
regression. Overall, the different specifications provide fully consistent results, i.e. 
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coefficients have a similar magnitude and are statistically significant in all cases. Total 
(market) supply is found to be one of the main drivers of private storage, which is in line with 
the theory of competitive storage (Gustafson 1958; Williams and Wright 1991) and the 
expectation from the theoretical approach (chapter 4). More grain is stored in years of excess 
supply and this result is consistent in all specifications. If public stocks did not exist, the 
response of private storage to production could be even greater. Government stocks 
consistently have a negative and significant impact in all specifications and turn out to be the 
most important factor. Hence, public storage seems to crowd out private storage substantially; 
each ton of public stocks reduces private stocks by about half a ton. Again, this finding is in 
line with the expectations as detailed above and with results obtained by other authors (e.g. 
Gouel 2013c). However, public storage is no perfect substitute, i.e. it only partly crowds out 
private storage as its coefficient is statistically smaller than one. A possible explanation is the 
inertia of decisions on public stock releases. While government interventions are substantial, 
they are far from following optimal storage rules. 
Table 5.3: Regression for the private closing rice stocks 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Estimation IV-
Levels 
IV-
Levels 
IV-
Levels 
OLS-
Levels 
IV- 
FD 
OLS- 
FD 
Public Stocks -.557*** 
(.13) 
-.648*** 
(.138) 
-.651*** 
(.152) 
-.447*** 
(.142) 
-.494*** 
(.139) 
-.3*** 
(.097) 
Total supply .323*** 
(.077) 
.349*** 
(.075) 
.337*** 
(.08) 
.261*** 
(.081) 
.256*** 
(.048) 
.255*** 
(.049) 
Export Ban .026*** 
(8.5e-03) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Surplus RoW  
 
.097*** 
(.035) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Constant -.295*** 
(.084) 
-.296*** 
(.076) 
-.279*** 
(.081) 
-.21** 
(.084) 
-1.7e-03 
(3.7e-03) 
-2.2e-03 
(4.0e-03) 
UI: LM / stat 13.3 12.9 11.8  5.38  
UI: LM/ p  1.3e-03 1.5e-03 2.7e-03  .02  
WI: F stat  28 26.9 31.3  25.6  
BIC -168 -165 -161 -174 -173 -177 
R² .447 .405 .274 .362 .447 .471 
OI: Hansen J/ stat 4.24 2.1 .579  0  
OI: Hansen J/ p .04 .147 .447    
First-stage R² .663 .669 .654  .349  
First-stage F 34.9 37.4 50.2  13.8  
Observations 40 40 40 42 39 41 
Notes: Own illustration. Robust standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 
0.01. Statistics used: Underidentification (UI): Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic, Weak 
identification (WI): Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F, Overidentification (OI): Hansen J. The supply 
includes the production, private opening stocks, and public opening stocks. 
5.9  Conclusion 
125 
 
The export ban coefficient is positive and significant as well as the surplus in the rest of the 
world variable, so banned exports or a worldwide surplus both lead to higher stocks. 
Speculative private storage in hope of a future harvest failure may become more attractive 
when current profit margins from trade decrease. The negative constant in the levels 
estimation indicates evidence for the private storage threshold which is expected from theory. 
Private stocks seem to respond more strongly to the market supply than public stocks as the 
coefficients are higher. However, not for all pairs of specifications which one could compare, 
they are statistically different from one another. 
The different test statistics support the validity of the regressions: no evidence is found for 
underidentification, weak identification, or the non-validity of the instruments with exception 
of specification (1) where the overidentification test yields a value just below the threshold of 
0.05. The high R² indicate a very good model fit and the first stage R² support the instrument 
choice. Overall, only closing private stocks are analyzed and no conclusions about intra-
annual effects can be drawn due to lack of data on intra-annual private stocks.  
5.9 Conclusion 
This study develops a novel approach for the estimation of determinants of public stocks for 
the Indian context. Furthermore, it uses the method developed in chapter 4 and combines it 
with an instrumental variable approach to quantify determinants of private rice stocks in 
India. The method for private stocks is based on insights from the competitive storage model 
and numerical approximation techniques and hence has a solid theoretical foundation. The 
approach for estimating the public stocks is derived from the specific policy interventions in 
India and standard supply and demand theory. These methods allow empirically estimating 
the determinants of private and public stock levels, including the role of actual policies. 
Instrumental variables are used to address endogeneity issues that are immanent in the 
analysis of prices, expectations and speculative storage. Levels and first difference 
specifications are used together with different sub-specifications to deal with methodological 
issues such as the low number of observations and a remaining uncertainty about the 
stationarity of some variables. Various test statistics underlined the robustness of the results 
and the validity of the instruments in the private stock regression where public closing stocks 
are instrumented by public opening stocks and the minimum support price.  
Public stocks are found to be slowly changing and driven by the MSP, private market supply, 
and export bans. Together, these factors can explain most of the variation in public stocks. 
Buffer norms are found to be insignificant but that result needs to be interpreted with great 
caution as very little data on buffer norms could be obtained and buffer norms were rarely 
altered leading to little variation in the data. Qualitatively, the non-relevance of buffer norms 
can be explained by the rare use of public imports, exports, or OMSS releases which are 
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designed to prevent deviations from these norms. Hence, norms are set up but rarely enforced. 
Clearly, from the ex-post perspective, the FCI did not even approximately follow an optimal 
strategy in their stockholding policies. Calculating optimal rules goes beyond the scope of this 
study but any reasonable objective function for public stockholders would require stock 
releases in times of production shortfalls and high prices. As these did not happen in 2007/08 
and in other years with supply shortfalls, the FCI seems to be far away from an optimal 
policy. This claim is further supported by the lack of well-defined stock release policies for 
times of crisis. Instead, stocks are only supposed to be released when they are abundant (via 
OMSS releases) but this does not depend on the current supply situation. In contrast, stock 
policies in China seem to be closer to an optimal policies as substantial amounts were released 
during 2007 and 2008 (Yang et al. 2008). 
The biggest changes in public stocks in recent years seem to be driven by the amount of rice 
harvested, the export ban policies and in some years by huge increases in the MSP. During the 
world food crisis in 2007-2008, India’s stocks soared due to the MSP increases and the export 
ban. For example, the mere introduction of the export ban led to a public stock increase of 
around 2.9 million tons while the 29% increase of the real MSP contributed another 4.8 
million tons to the public stocks. It seems, policy makers wanted to protect Indian consumers 
with the help of these polices but they neglected the impacts on public stocks. These led to 
dramatic stock increases and thereby huge management costs as well as unnecessary high 
prices on domestic markets between 2008 and 2012 (even though prices were well below 
global levels).  
Hence, India’s buffer stock policy is prone to fail at least one of its objectives, the protection 
of consumers by preventing high prices. This is a result of the way the stock releases and 
acquisitions are managed. Stock releases for the PDS are pre-defined and not crisis-
responsive. The other channel for stock releases, the OMSS releases, depend on the current 
stock levels, i.e. stock out happen only when stocks are (substantially) above the norm. 
Additionally, OMSS releases currently depend on the ability to cover economic costs for the 
FCI, a policy which urgently needs to be overcome to offer consumer protection. Thus, both 
channels for stock releases do not respond to high prices, supply shortages, and a crisis in 
general. Furthermore, the processes for stockpiling as well as stock releases are too slow to be 
used for quick interventions. Stockpiling reacts to the MSP and the private supply both of 
which are determined long before the end of the marketing year. Stock outs are mainly carried 
out through the stable provision of rice for the PDS. However, in times of need, quick and 
substantial domestic stock releases would be required, in particular, if measures are taken 
which might increase the ending stocks such as MSP increases or banned exports. Such 
factors need to be taken into account for future market interventions. For example, a 
significant raise of the MSP must be accompanied by additional stock releases. Similar stock 
releases are required if export bans, which may help to stabilize prices via decoupling Indian 
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markets from world markets, are introduced. As noted by Gouel, Gautam, and Martin (2014) 
a storage policy without clear stock out rules apart from the PDS results in a buy-and-hold 
strategy. Hence, India’s stockholding policy needs to be adjusted to offer crisis-responsive 
consumer protection, particularly to reach people which are not reached through the PDS. 
Unsurprisingly, private stocks are found to be largely crowded out by public storage. 
However, crowding out is partial as for each ton of public stocks, private stocks are reduced 
by about half a million ton. These findings indicate that despite the high degree of 
government interventions, there are still speculative storage activities ongoing in India. These 
activities contribute to stabilizing prices because the dynamics of the competitive storage 
model imply a price stabilizing behavior of the stockholders and this behavior was found in 
the estimation. As crowding out is only partial, the government can increase the total stock 
levels by holding public stocks. This would allow the Indian government also to use theirs 
stocks more as an emergency reserve and rely more on private stockholders in “normal” times 
when supplies are sufficient. However, such an approach would require a fundamental change 
of the current institutional system. The other main driver of private stocks is the market 
supply as expected from the theory of competitive storage. Furthermore, private storage reacts 
to export opportunities, i.e. banned exports or a large surplus in the rest of the world increase 
the private carry-over stocks.  
In general, combining trade and storage policies to stabilize prices may work but the current 
stockholding system fails to provide the required speed for interventions, the automated 
channel to releases stocks as response to a crisis, and the means to protect consumers in the 
short run. Adjustments need to be quicker and more responsive to the market situation, in 
particular for stock releases. Currently, stock policies cannot protect consumers from fast-
onset crises; instead, this was achieved by implementing export bans in the past. Those bans, 
however, come at huge costs for countries relying in imports. Therefore, storage policies 
should be adjusted to provide short-term consumer protection and keep fiscal costs in check 
such that trade can remain unrestricted. Even if incentives to restrict exports in times of a 
crisis may prevail, better stock release policies would allow more time for evaluating 
alternative measures and negotiating with the international community. Furthermore, 
producers and traders are likely to benefit from the unlimited trade (Shreedhar et al. 2012). 
Limitations of this study arise from the quality of the underlying data and statistical 
limitations. The latter are a result of the limited number of observations and the remaining 
uncertainty about the stationarity of some variables. However, different approaches including 
estimations on levels and first-differences were used to account for these. If policy changes 
are made ad-hoc and not based on the usual rules, such effects also cannot be considered. 
Furthermore, it is assumed that there are no announcement effects. 
5  What Drives India’s Rice Stocks? Economic Theory and Empirical Evidence 
128 
With clear rules and possibly more reliance on the private sector, India can reduce the fiscal 
costs of the policies while maintaining a similar level of price stability or food security 
(compare Basu 2011; Gouel et al. 2014; Saini and Kozicka 2014). Future research should 
explore more flexible public storage policies, the effects of trade liberalization policies 
(Anderson and Martin 2005; “Edward” Yu et al. 2011; Hoda and Gulati 2013; Laborde and 
Martin 2012), and how the private sector could further contribute to stabilize food prices and 
supplies. As an alternative to the public stockholding program, future research also needs to 
explore the potential of cash transfer or food coupon scenarios (as in Basu 2011; Ecker and 
Qaim 2011 (for Malawi, not India); Kozicka et al. 2015a). Finally, interactions between 
domestic and international markets need to be studied, in particular if uncoordinated policy 
responses are implemented in times of crisis (von Braun et al. 2014). Taking the results of 
chapter 3 into consideration, a way needs to be found to align domestic price stabilization 
policies and international efforts to reduce trade restrictions. Increased support from the 
international community may be the only way to provide the right incentives for India to keep 
exports flowing when international supply falls short.  
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6 Using information: When do Prices Matter Most for China’s 
Grain Supply Response?20   
6.1 Abstract 
Agricultural supply needs to respond to prices in order to prevent food shortages and allow an 
efficient allocation of resources. Yet, knowledge on the up-to-dateness of farmers’ price 
information is scarce, even for countries like China. This chapter fills this gap by analyzing 
how the production of indica rice, winter wheat, and corn, China’s most important staples, 
responds to prices at different points in time. At first, a directly estimated single commodity 
supply response model is set up for the agriculturally most important provinces in China. 
Then, by evaluating the impact of prices at different points in time, insights can be obtained 
about how up-to-date farmers’ price information is. The difference GMM estimator is used 
because the number of groups (provinces) is large compared to the time periods and because 
production response is a dynamic process. Evidence of weather impacts on production is 
mixed, but high temperatures consistently reduce production which is worrying in view of 
global warming. All crops are found to strongly respond to prices around and shortly before 
planting time. Elasticities of prices further away from the time of planting are of lower 
magnitude and often insignificant, except for wheat because of its long growing period. Prices 
during last year’s harvest time have little explanatory power, which provides strong evidence 
against naïve or Nerlovian price expectation models. Results could also be used for short-term 
forecasting if timely input data were available. The presented method of analyzing the timing 
of the price response may also be used for as a general test for the robustness of a model. 
6.2 Introduction 
Unexpected high and volatile food prices during the 2007/08 world food crisis and thereafter 
have reemphasized the need of protection against supply shortages. In view of various trade 
restrictions imposed by major exporting countries, governments tend once again to focus 
more on self-sufficiency and food storage. Additionally, in particular emerging economies 
like China aim to increase their yields due to limited possibilities of expanding agricultural 
land combined with a rising population, total grain demand and meat consumption.  
The primary purposes of studying the supply response are threefold in this analysis. The first 
aim is to identify the different factors that can affect production, such as market prices, 
                                                 
20
 Earlier versions of this work have been published in the conference proceedings of the 2015 
AAEA & WAEA Joint Annual Meeting, San Francisco, as Brockhaus, J., Huang, J., Hu, J., 
Kalkuhl, M., von Braun, J., Yang, G., 2015. “Rice, wheat, and corn supply response in China”, as 
well as under the title “When Do Prices Matter Most? Rice, Wheat, and Corn Supply Response in 
China” in the forthcoming book “Food Price Volatility and its Implications for Food Security and 
Policy”, Kalkuhl, M., von Braun, J., Torero, M. (Eds.) Springer. 
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biophysical conditions and infrastructures. The second and main objective is to evaluate how 
the predictive power of prices evolves over time and therefore to understand when farmers 
react most strongly to prices. This reveals how up-to-date farmers’ price information is and 
how their price expectations are formed. Thirdly, differences between the crops are analyzed. 
Hence, a clear understanding of the farmers' planting and production behavior is needed.  
Farmers' decision-making is generally modeled as a two-step process (Colman 1983): First, 
farmers choose the crop type based on past weather conditions and decide their cropping area 
based on the prices they expect to receive several months later. Second, after planting, they 
change their farmland management measures according to market prices and weather 
condition to achieve a high yield. This study focusses on the production response of winter 
wheat, indica rice, and corn as these crops are the main staple foods in China. The country is 
the biggest producer of rice and wheat and one of the biggest producers of corn. The results of 
this research can also be used as the basis for a short-term forecasting tool for monitoring 
Chinese food security or as part of a worldwide food availability monitoring tool. However, 
forecasting would require timely availability of data, which usually is not possible for data 
from the Chinese Agricultural Yearbooks. 
In China, early works in this field have focused on the roles of price and marketing reforms in 
agricultural production (e.g. Lin 1991). Empirical studies have found a positive impact of 
prices on output during the first years of reform (Huang and Rozelle 1996; Lin 1992). Lin 
(1992)  found that 15% of output growth in 1978-1984 came from the rise in relative prices. 
Huang and Rozelle (1996) showed about 10% of rice output growth between 1978 and 1984 
was caused by price effects. The gains have also resulted from increased allocative efficiency 
through market liberalization since the early 1990s. For example, de Brauw et al. (2004) 
found that increasing marketization had a positive effect on crop allocation and productivity. 
The recent works have paid more attention to the impacts of subsidizing agriculture after 
China shifted its agricultural policy from taxing farming households to providing them with 
subsidies in 2004. While these subsidies are given to all producers and are very high, even 
higher than in the US and the EU on a per unit area basis in 2012, they are quite low on a per 
household or per farm basis as farms in China are mostly of small scale (Huang et al. 2013). 
Except for subsidies for machinery, which influenced the purchase of machineries, most other 
subsidies for grain, input, and seed were found not to influence farmers’ area allocation 
decisions (Huang et al. 2011). This finding provides the rationale for not explicitly including 
subsidies in this study. Increased grain outputs in the later years were partly attributed to land 
reallocation to grain production (Yu and Jensen 2010). With the help of a dynamic panel 
approach, acreage and yield responses to output prices were analyzed in a case study for 
Henan (Yu et al. 2011). Both area and yield were found to be price-responsive. However, 
evidence from other provinces is missing, and the effects of high temperatures have not been 
addressed. This analysis focuses on both of these issues. Furthermore, the role of prices at 
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different points in time is at the heart of this study. At the global level, price volatility and 
therefore price risks were found to reduce the supply response (Haile et al. 2016b). However, 
as prices are comparably stable in China, price volatility is not considered as an important 
factor in this study. 
Earlier studies which investigated the price building process of farmers have often focused on 
industrialized countries (e.g. Fisher and Tanner 1978; Holt and McKenzie 2003). Economic 
theory (Moschini and Hennessy 2001) and applied micro-level studies (Haile 2015) have 
underlined the importance of price information on production decisions. However, evidence 
from China, one of the most important countries for agricultural production, is missing and 
the question to prices at which point in time the aggregated supply can still respond has 
largely been neglected.  
In the face of climate change, interest in impacts of global warming on agriculture is 
increasing. The impacts of climate change are expected to be huge and have already been 
partly documented. The general findings include an expected decline of crop yields in China, 
as in other developing countries (Tao et al. 2006). By employing farm-level data and the 
Ricardian method, the average impact of higher temperatures was found to be negative, 
whereas the average impact of more rainfall was found to be positive (Wang et al. 2009). 
Overall, weather conditions, market prices and infrastructures can be seen as the three most 
important conditions for agricultural production. This study makes an important contribution 
to evaluating how such weather-related variables, especially high temperatures, affect the 
production of the considered crops at the province level. Furthermore, to the author’s 
knowledge, this is the first study which addresses the production response to prices at 
different periods in time in order to analyze the aggregated farmers' price expectation 
formation process for China.  
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: Sections 6.3 presents the data and 
explains how data of different frequency and scale was combined. Section 6.4 explains the 
methodology, first for the general supply response model specification and afterwards for 
testing the impacts of prices at different points in time. The results are successively presented 
in section 6.5 before section 6.6 concludes. 
6.3 Data description and usage 
Data on acreage, production, output market prices, procurement prices, fertilizer prices, 
rainfall, consumer price index (CPI), irrigated area, temperatures, sunshine, effective irrigated 
area, and prices of competing crops is obtained from the Chinese agricultural and statistical 
yearbooks from 1996 to 2012. Province-level data is used whenever possible, but whenever 
such data is scarce, national-level data is used instead. Own crop prices are deflated by the 
CPI; other prices are deflated by the own crop price, resulting in relative prices to take into 
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account any possible correlation. Table 6.1 provides an overview of the aggregation level, 
frequency, and transformations of the data. The summary statistics of the variables are 
presented in Table 6.2 for the individual crops. 
A panel data set is created for each crop, whereby the province-wise production of a crop is 
used as the dependent variable to be explained by the other variables
21
. The provincial 
production data, obtained from the National Bureau of Statistics of China, is collected from 
1995 to 2012 and includes information on 20 provinces planting winter wheat, 29 provinces 
planting corn, 13 provinces planting early and late indica rice and 15 provinces planting 
middle indica rice. For indica rice, data from the early, middle, and (double) late seasons are 
pooled together to get more observations and hence ensure that the number of observations 
does not fall below 249. However, this comes at the cost of not being able to detect any 
heterogeneity in the response which could not be captured by the fixed effects. 
The planting season, and complementing and substituting crops may differ slightly among the 
different provinces. For winter wheat, the planting season is from September to October, and 
its harvesting takes place in the late April or May of the following year. The main substitute is 
rapeseed, followed by cotton, while corn is a complementing crop. Corn is mainly planted 
from April to June and harvested between August and October. The main substitutes are 
soybean and cotton, and the main complementing crops are wheat and rapeseed. Based on the 
farmers' production behavior, the focus lies on input and output prices, weather conditions 
and infrastructure. For crop prices, monthly wholesale prices are used. This is because 
wholesale prices are more easily available than farm gate prices and also because of the high 
transmission from wholesale to farm gate prices, as reported in the literature (Liu et al. 2012). 
Two different definitions of substitution crops have been tested. First, only the relative price 
of the main crop which serves as substitute was tested and this is presented in the tables. 
Second, an index of the relative prices of all important crops which serve as substitutes was 
constructed and tested. As this index turned out negligible, the results are not included. 
As land and labor are limited, planting behavior can be affected by the price of competing 
crops. Fertilizer prices are chosen as the main input market price. Wages, obtained from 
Bloomberg, are also included, but their time series is short and as a result so is the number of 
observation. Due to this and the fact that they turn out insignificant, they are not reported in 
this study but are available upon request. The agricultural production system is sensitive to 
weather effects, and there are very few measures available to farmers to compensate for 
weather effects. Therefore, weather conditions, collected from the National Meteorological 
Information Center of China, are a very important independent variable in this analysis. The 
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the two variables are not independent. 
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percentage share of cultivated area under irrigation can also be seen as a measure of 
infrastructure and technology. Missing values for this variable, but not for any other variables, 
are imputed. Irrigation also allows farmers to compensate for insufficient rainfall and partly 
even droughts. As irrigation is typically used in combination with the application of chemical 
fertilizers, it represents a higher standard of agricultural infrastructure. However, irrigation 
relates to the cultivated land area under irrigation and hence is not crop specific. As a result, 
only very limited conclusions can be drawn about how irrigation affects production. This is 
discussed further in the results section and also applies to the non-crop-specific drought area. 
Table 6.1: Overview of the data used for the regression analysis. 
Data 
China … 
yearbook 
Scale Frequency Transformation 
Production rural statistic Province Yearly Logged 
CPI statistical Province Monthly Continuous CPI build from 
yearly changes 
Total farm crop area rural statistic Province Yearly - 
Irrigated area water 
conservancy 
Province Yearly Divided by total farm crop 
area and logged 
Non-Irrigated area - Province Yearly log(1-irrigated area/total farm 
crop area) 
Wholesale prices grain National Monthly Divided by continuous CPI 
and logged (for competing 
crop prices: divided by own 
crop price) 
Fertilizer prices price National Monthly Divided by wholesale price 
and logged 
Rainfall water 
conservancy 
Province Monthly logged 
Hours of sunshine 1 Province Monthly logged 
Lowest temperature 1 Province Monthly - 
Average temperature 1 Province Monthly - 
Highest temperature 1 Province Monthly - 
Area affected by 
drought 
water 
conservancy 
Province Yearly Divided by total farm crop 
area and logged 
Notes: Own illustration. The second column shows the source, i.e., from which of China’s 
yearbooks the data is taken. 1 means that it is not taken from any yearbook but from the National 
Meteorological Information Center of China. 
 
As some of the weather data has a high level of autocorrelation, it is not possible to consider 
every month in the econometric analysis. Therefore, only the most important month is 
included; except for rainfall, where the sum of the most important months is calculated. The 
hypotheses to test in this study are as follows: (1) A positive response to own output prices, 
and a negative response to competing crop prices as well as fertilizer prices, at least if the 
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crop has higher fertilizer requirement than competing crops; (2) own output prices matter 
most in the time period from shortly before to a few month after planting, during which 
farmers make their decisions on areas and yields; (3) droughts and insufficient rainfall have a 
negative effect on production; (4) irrigation has a positive impact and can reduce the negative 
impact of insufficient rainfall or high temperatures.  
Table 6.2: Summary statistics of the data from all provinces 
 Variable Obs Mean SD Min Max 
Corn  
Production (1000 tons) 552 458.7 549.5 0.9 2675.8 
June WSP (CNY/kg) 463 1.4 0.4 0.9 2.3 
Irrigation (1000 ha) 552 1813.9 1385.8 144.2 5205.6 
Rainfall@growing (cm) 534 14.1 6.8 1.5 40.4 
Average Temp@growing (°C) 534 24.9 3.3 13.2 30.7 
Drought area (1000 ha) 495 448.1 544.2 1.0 3133.0 
Fertilizer price (CNY/kg) 492 1916.4 672.6 1186.0 3140.0 
Winter Wheat 
Production (1000 tons) 360 464.3 686.8 0.2 3177.4 
March WSP (CNY/kg) 301 1.5 0.4 1.0 2.2 
April's sunshine hours 360 5.6 1.8 1.7 9.4 
Irrigation (1000 ha) 360 2041.9 1466.8 173.6 5205.6 
Rainfall@growing (cm) 360 6.0 4.8 0.2 22.4 
High Temp@flowering (°C) 360 26.0 4.1 16.6 37.3 
Rainfall@planting (cm) 360 2.9 1.6 0.1 11.7 
Drought area (1000 ha) 321 399.5 482.9 1.0 2573.0 
Fertilizer price (CNY/kg) 320 1897.8 665.3 1184.0 3000.0 
Indica Rice 
Production (1000 tons) 707 406.1 433.0 0.0 2161.1 
WSP@planting (CNY/kg) 594 1.5 0.4 0.9 2.5 
Sunshine hours@planting 707 5.4 1.4 2.1 10.4 
Irrigation (1000 ha) 707 1751.3 985.5 169.9 3929.7 
Rainfall@growing (cm) 707 11.4 4.3 2.6 26.2 
Rainfall@planting (cm) 707 3.8 2.6 0.1 19.5 
High Temp@growing (°C) 707 33.7 2.0 27.2 39.7 
Drought area (1000 ha) 639 292.9 361.0 1.0 2250.0 
Fertilizer price (CNY/kg) 632 1867.1 668.0 1126.0 3340.0 
Notes: Own illustration. Data which is only available on a national basis is copied for all 
provinces and therefore is shown to have more observations than it actually has on the national 
level. Data is only reported if the value for production for that crop, year, and province is 
available. Unless the month is indicated, the @ is used to specify time periods. 
 
This approach has some limitations. The biggest limitation might be the aggregation level of 
data. Some price data were only available at a national level, but as price transmission within 
China is high (Huang and Rozelle 2006), this might not be a concern. For the biophysical 
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variables, even though they were available at the provincial level, this aggregation might be 
more problematic as rainfall, hours of sunshine, and temperatures may vary in different parts 
of the same province. Therefore, the influence of these biophysical variables is likely to be 
underestimated due to this high level of aggregation. Furthermore, important variables may 
not be considered which could be an issue if they fluctuate a lot in the short term. If instead 
they mostly consist of a long-term trend, then they will be captured by the orthogonal 
deviations and lagged production and, as a result, will not cause any problems. Therefore, 
mechanization and modernization of agricultural practices should not be a concern as long as 
they happened sufficiently smoothly. 
6.4 Methodology 
Following Colman (1983), agricultural output supply response analyses can be classified in 
the following two main categories: programming and econometric models. The econometric 
approach can be further subdivided in two-stage procedures, directly estimated supply 
systems, and directly estimated single commodity models (ibid.). The different approaches 
come with different advantages and shortcomings. Programming models are based on the 
behavior of individual, representative farms which are then aggregated. Therefore, 
programming models allow fully accounting for the relationships between different inputs and 
outputs as well as incorporating constraints on resources, crop rotation, and other variables 
(compare e.g. Heckelei 2002). In econometric two-stage procedures, output response 
relationships are calculated by imposing profit maximization marginal conditions on results 
obtained by econometric estimations in the first stage. This approach makes use of the 
principles of duality, i.e. the equivalence between the production and cost, and production and 
profit functions, any of which can be estimated in the first stage (Colman 1983). The third 
approach, directly estimated supply response systems, estimates an aggregate production 
function of different products. Therefore, the fixed inputs are allocated to the production of 
products such that the profits are maximized. However, all of these three methods have the 
major shortcoming that they suppress the dynamics of supply response and instead provide 
static outcomes (ibid.). Therefore, they are useful to investigate interactions between products 
and to evaluate impacts of policies on the agricultural sector. However, they are not useful for 
forecasting purposes and for determining the supply response over time during the marketing 
year (ibid.). Hence, the fourth approach is chosen in this study, i.e. directly estimated single 
commodity supply models. Single commodity supply models are also appropriate for the 
purpose of this study because only three of the various crops grown in China are considered 
and these crops are only partly substitutable as they are often grown on different plots. Rice, 
for example, needs much more water than corn and wheat and is therefore rarely substituted 
by these crops. Finally, the other econometric models reduce the degrees of freedom in the 
estimation due to the imposed restrictions resulting from the substation of inputs and outputs. 
All these factors justify the choice of a direct single commodity supply model. 
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The expected prices at harvesting time constitute a crucial factor for the production decision. 
But these prices depend on the specific expectation building process. Under naïve 
expectations, farmers would assume that the prices at upcoming harvesting time equal those 
during last year’s harvesting time. The Nerlovian price expectation model (Nerlove 1979) 
assumes that farmers have adaptive expectations and prices follow a cobweb logic where 
fluctuations are driven by expectation errors. In this model, prices during the planting time do 
not convey more information than prices during the last harvest but farmers revise their 
expectations based on past errors. Both of these approaches ignore that price expectations by 
different actors can influence future prices (Nickell 1985). Finally, there are rational 
expectations
22
 (Muth 1961) which assume that the farmer makes the best use of all available 
information, i.e. they use all available information to correctly calculate the time-dependent 
probability distributions of all relevant variables. Within this framework, farmers would 
incorporate the latest price information in their decisions because these prices convey more 
information about the current supply and demand situation than earlier prices. With some 
limitations, the framework adopted in this study allows investigating the appropriate price 
expectation model for the aggregated supply response of all farmers by testing the impact of 
prices at different points in time. Hence, it can be derived whether farmers use naïve 
expectations, Nerlovian expectations, or a somewhat more sophisticated expectations model 
such as the rational expectation model. However, because no “optimal” production levels are 
calculated, it cannot be concluded whether farmers actually apply fully rational expectations. 
Strictly speaking, a farmer's decision making process consist of two steps: the area decision 
and the yield decision (Colman 1983). The considered determinants are mostly the same but 
may differ slightly as, for example, competing crop prices are not that important after the area 
decision is made. However, they still may be important because they may affect how farmers 
allocate their inputs such as fertilizers, pesticides, and water, and other variables. On the other 
hand, not all variables which influence yields also matter when allocating the area. 
Unexpected rainfall shocks (or price shocks) cannot be anticipated if they occur after planting 
the crop. Therefore, they cannot affect the area decision. However, these shocks may affect a 
farmer's fertilizer application and therefore yield. Therefore, modeling production implies 
modeling a combination of the area and yield processes. Nevertheless, it is important to see 
the combined effects as the total production volume matters and the aim is to reveal which 
variables have an influence and how they impact the production. Another reason to look at the 
combined effect on production is that statistical issues arise when looking at area and yield 
separately. This is because area and yield influence one another, and therefore this additional 
endogeneity has to be dealt with. For example, area allocation decisions may affect yields in 
two different ways: High prices could cause farmers to favor large planting areas, which 
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should increase the expected yields, whereas planting area expansion may negatively 
influence yields if the additional crop areas are located on less-productive lands. If models 
only model the area decision, their forecasting precision for the production volume is limited. 
If they model both decisions, they have to account for this endogeneity which requires a very 
high number of observations such that appropriate models can be applied. 
The production quantity 𝑦𝑙𝑖𝑡 of crop 𝑙 in province 𝑖 ∈ [1, … , 𝑁] in period 𝑡 ∈ [𝑚 + 2, … , 𝑇] is 
estimated according to  
 
𝑦𝑙𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + ∑ ∑ 𝛽𝑙𝑠𝑒𝑤𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡−𝑒
𝑠
𝑚
𝑒=1
+ ∑ ∑ 𝛽𝑙𝑗𝑘𝑥𝑙𝑗𝑖,𝑡−𝑘
𝑗
𝑛
𝑘=1
+ 𝜆𝑙𝑡 + 𝜂𝑙𝑖 + 𝑢𝑙𝑖𝑡 (6.1) 
where the all 𝛽’s are the coefficients to be estimated, 𝑤𝑠’s are the predetermined covariates 
which are potentially correlated with past errors (lagged production), and 𝑥𝑗’s are the 
independent variables (prices, rainfall, temperatures and other included exogenous variables 
as explained before). The sums over 𝑒 and 𝑘 capture the lagged values of the corresponding 
variables. The lag lengths 𝑚 and 𝑛 are assumed to be sufficient to ensure that 𝑢𝑙𝑖𝑡 is a 
stochastic error (compare Roodman 2009). Time dummies are represented by 𝜆𝑙𝑡, the 
unobserved individual effect by 𝜂𝑙𝑖, and the observation-specific errors by 𝑢𝑙𝑖𝑡.  
The Arellano-Bond difference GMM and system GMM estimators (Arellano and Bond 1991; 
Arellano and Bover 1995; Blundell and Bond 1998; Holtz-Eakin et al. 1988) are applied in 
this study. They are appropriate for a number of reasons. First, the time period is rather short, 
usually around 14 years, while the number of observations per time period is comparatively 
large: 20 for wheat, over 29 for corn, and around 40 for rice. The difference GMM and system 
GMM estimators control for such dynamic panel bias. Second, the production response is a 
dynamic process, i.e., current realizations depend on past ones. Third, fixed effects allow for 
heterogeneity across groups, namely provinces. Last, idiosyncratic disturbances may have 
individual-specific patterns of heteroscedasticity. Thus, equation (6.1) is transformed into 
first-differences for the difference GMM estimator. 
For all three crops, four different specifications are shown in the tables in the results section, 
with the first three presenting different control variables for the difference GMM estimator 
and the fourth illustrating the results for the last specification using the system GMM 
estimator for comparison and robustness checks. While including more variables allows 
controlling for more factors, it also decreases the degrees of freedom, the significance of 
variables which are correlated, and, most importantly, the number of observations (because 
many variables are only available for a limited number of years). Comparing the different 
specifications and comparing the difference and system GMM results provides a further 
consistency check. In general, it seems that the difference GMM estimator is more appropriate 
as it cannot be ruled out that the first differences of the instrument variables are uncorrelated 
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with the group fixed effects. Findings support this hypothesis, as will be shown in the next 
section. The Windmeijer finite-sample correction for standard errors is used (Windmeijer 
2005). The xtabond2 command in Stata is used, which was written by David Roodman, and 
followed the application guidelines in his accompanying paper (Roodman 2009). Instead of 
first differencing, forward orthogonal deviations are used (Arellano and Bover 1995; 
Roodman 2009), i.e., the average of all available future observations was subtracted. This 
procedure removes fixed effects, just like differencing, but because lagged observations are 
not used, these remain orthogonal to the transformed errors. This way, the number of 
observations will not be reduced by gaps in the dataset. As suggested (ibid.), time dummies 
for all years are included in all model specifications. 
For proper usage of the GMM techniques, a number of test need to be run to check the 
consistency of the estimations (ibid.; Efendic et al. 2009). The joint significance of the 
variables is evaluated with an F-Test, the p-value of which is expected to be clearly below 0.1 
(ibid.). While the first lagged residuals are expected to be correlated, the twice lagged 
residuals must not (Arellano and Bond 1991). Considering the null hypotheses, this means the 
p-value of the AR1 test in the result tables is expected to be smaller than 0.1, while the p-
value for the AR2 test should be higher than 0.1 (for significance at the 10%-level). 
Furthermore, the Hansen-J test allows checking if the model specification and all over-
identifying restrictions are correct (Baum 2006). It is suggested that the p-value should be 
above 0.25 but at the same time should not perfectly match 1 for this test (Roodman 2009). 
The difference-in-Hansen test is used to investigate the exogeneity of instruments. The null 
hypothesis is that they are exogenous. Hence the respective p-values have to be above 0.1 in 
order to not reject the null hypothesis. The number of instruments is chosen to provide robust 
test statistics. There are no clear rules about the appropriate number of instruments. However, 
the number of instruments should always clearly be lower than the number of observations, 
which is the case for all specifications. Furthermore, the coefficient of the lagged endogenous 
variable (production in this case) should be less than one to obtain a steady state behavior 
(Roodman 2009), which is the case in all of the presented models. Finally, the validity of the 
estimates can be verified by examining if the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable is 
larger than the one obtained by a fixed effects model and smaller than one obtained by using 
OLS (Bond 2002). This is the case for all specifications and the FE and OLS estimates of the 
lagged dependent variables are reported in the tables. 
All the test statistics are fulfilled in all specifications except for two instances: (1) the first 
specification for winter wheat, which fails to reject the second order autocorrelation at the 
10% level but nevertheless does so at the 5% level; and (2) the first specification for indica 
rice, which fails to reject the Hansen-J test and the difference-in-Hansen test. 
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Apart from evaluating the production response using the price at a predetermined point in 
time, this work aims at analyzing how production responds to prices at different points in 
time. Therefore, the regressions are conducted with prices at different months before and after 
planting, from 20 month before up to 20 month after planting, and how this changes the 
results is graphically illustrated. For this analysis, the second specification is used for all crops 
as this specification provides the maximum number of observations while fulfilling all test 
criteria and while including the most important variables. This procedure allows us to analyze 
how farmers build their price expectations and how up-to-date their price information is. It is 
not possible to fully distinguish between the two with the presented method. If prices during 
the last harvest were the most relevant, it would remain unclear whether farmers do not have 
up-to-date price information or whether they just do not use them because they rely more on 
the harvest time prices. However, as it is found that farmers use the latest prices for they 
production decision, it is clear that they be informed about the latest prices and also take them 
into consideration. Under the assumption of efficient markets, the latest prices incorporate all 
available information about supply and demand and therefore it is economically makes sense 
to use these information rather than old harvest time prices. 
For indica rice, data for the three different seasons are pooled together. Hence, there is no 
fixed planting month, but the appropriate planting month is chosen depending on the season 
instead. All the other variables were similarly chosen relative to the month of planting for that 
season. This means, for example, that the planting time price is April for early indica, May for 
middle indica and July for late indica rice. Similarly, rainfall during the growing season refers 
to April and May for early indica, May and June for middle indica, and July and August for 
late indica rice. 
All variables are logged, and therefore the effects can be interpreted as elasticities. The only 
exceptions are temperatures, which also exhibited negative values and are more intuitive to 
interpret in their non-logged form.  
6.5 Results 
6.5.1 Basic regression results 
The results for the production of corn are shown in Table 6.3, for winter wheat in Table 6.4, 
and for indica rice in Table 6.5. The first row always shows the lagged production. Wholesale 
prices are denoted by WSP followed by the month or relative time period. The latter are 
always denoted by the @ symbol and refer to the planting, growing, flowering, or harvesting 
season of the crop. Average and high temperatures are written as A-temp and H-temp 
respectively. Interaction terms are indicated by an X, while the prices of competing crops are 
presented as substitute. The bottom part of the tables shows which estimator was used; the test 
statistics; and the number of groups, instruments, and observations. 
6  Using information: When do Prices Matter Most for China’s Grain Supply Response? 
140 
The results for corn, illustrated in Table 6.3, show that all specifications seem to be valid 
based on the provided test statistics. A significant amount of variation in production can be 
explained by the previous year’s production (which also takes into account unobserved 
variables). The coefficient ranges from 0.772 to 0.956 and are significant at the 1% level in all 
specifications. The wholesale price in June turns out to be also always highly significant and 
have a major contribution, as evident in its elasticity of around 0.2. This implies that a 1% 
increases in prices will lead to a 0.2% increase in production, which seems reasonable and is 
comparable to the results obtained by similar studies. The fraction of irrigated area is only 
significant in two specifications but has a huge impact in both. However, it is only significant 
for the difference GMM specifications that included the interaction terms, which could 
possibly be attributed to collinearity in these variables (their correlation coefficient is -0.79 
for corn, -0.17 for wheat, and -0.46 for rice). In addition, the total effect of irrigation is the 
elasticity of irrigation plus the interaction term of irrigation with the average temperature. The 
interaction term takes the value of -20.69 at the sample mean for the second specification, 
resulting in a combined marginal effect of -0.59. Despite corn needing rainfall during the 
growing season, the rainfall variable does not seem to have any significant effect on the corn 
production. However, corn needs little water compared to other staples and in particular 
vegetables. As mentioned in section 6.3, the irrigation variable measures the total cultivated 
area under irrigation. This may be a bad proxy for the actual irrigated crop areas; in particular, 
it is not a measure of crop-specific irrigation. Furthermore, the quality of irrigation is not 
reflected in this variable. In addition, considering rainfall variability and water availability, 
the quality of irrigation may change drastically over time. Therefore, the influence of 
irrigation can only be approximated, and thus it is unsurprising that no effect is found in many 
of the specifications (when compared with wheat and rice). 
High average temperatures during the growing season, which is in mid-summer, have a small 
but significant negative impact. When interacted with the non-irrigated area (i.e., the fraction 
of the agricultural area which is not irrigated) it is found that rainfall during the growing 
season becomes significant. As expected, rainfall has a positive influence on production, 
albeit a small one. When interacted with irrigation, high average temperatures are negative 
and significant for the difference GMM specification. This differs from the expectations but 
might be explained by the imprecise approximation of irrigation or by high temperatures 
offsetting the benefits of irrigation. As expected, the drought area has a significant and 
negative influence in all but the system GMM specifications.  
High fertilizer prices at planting time reduce the total production; again, this effect seems to 
be more pronounced in provinces with a high share of irrigated area. This may be attributed to 
the fact that levels of fertilizer application are usually much higher on irrigated areas, which 
may therefore be over-proportionally affected. Prices of competing crops turn out to be 
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insignificant, despite testing various ways of including them in the analysis, such as using the 
province-specific main competing crop only or a weighted average of competing crops. 
Table 6.3: Results for corn production response 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Lagged Production .807*** 
(.166) 
.772*** 
(.143) 
.902*** 
(.139) 
.956*** 
(.034) 
WSP June .296*** 
(.077) 
.291*** 
(.055) 
.226*** 
(.065) 
.177*** 
(.05) 
Irrigated -.115 
(.131) 
20.1** 
(8.12) 
16.8** 
(8.07) 
1.61 
(6.65) 
Rain@growing -.059 
(.063) 
-.013 
(.06) 
-.076 
(.08) 
-7.4e-03 
(.033) 
A-Temp@growing -.029* 
(.015) 
-.095*** 
(.026) 
-.058* 
(.029) 
-.014 
(.024) 
Drought area -.032*** 
(8.6e-03) 
-.033*** 
(9.1e-03) 
-.035*** 
(.01) 
-.014 
(.013) 
Non-Irrigated X 
Rain@growing 
 
 
.077* 
(.045) 
.071* 
(.037) 
.066*** 
(.021) 
Irrigated X A-
Temp@growing 
 
 
-.067** 
(.027) 
-.052* 
(.027) 
-5.3e-04 
(.023) 
Fertilizer@planting  
 
 
 
-.203** 
(.074) 
-.231*** 
(.065) 
Irrigated X 
Fertilizer@planting 
 
 
 
 
-.182** 
(.068) 
-.191*** 
(.058) 
Substitute@planting  
 
 
 
.018 
(.027) 
6.3e-03 
(.017) 
Constant  
 
 
 
 
 
6.29 
(6.9) 
Estimator difference difference difference system 
Groups 29 29 29 29 
Instruments 27 29 28 30 
p:F-Test 1.7e-19 1.3e-23 1.1e-27 4.0e-37 
p:AR1 1.5e-03 1.1e-03 9.9e-04 3.2e-04 
p:AR2 .919 .685 .949 .581 
p:Hansen-J .291 .326 .286 .535 
p:Diff-Hansen .812 .9 .436 1 
OLS .988 .991 .985 .985 
FE .741 .683 .747 .747 
Observations 384 384 296 325 
Notes: Own illustration. Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
WSP=Wholesale price; X indicates interaction terms; H-Temp=high temperature; columns 1-3 are 
specifications using the difference GMM estimator; for comparison and robustness checks, the 
results of the last specification are also shown for the system GMM estimator (4).  
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Table 6.4: Results for winter wheat production response 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Lagged Production .951*** 
(.104) 
.951*** 
(.11) 
.96*** 
(.087) 
.964*** 
(.063) 
WSP March  
 
.338*** 
(.116) 
.292** 
(.132) 
.255* 
(.143) 
H-Temp@flowering -.043*** 
(9.6e-03) 
-.044** 
(.019) 
.061 
(.123) 
-.037 
(.122) 
Sun@flowering .156 
(.092) 
.081 
(.205) 
.124 
(.207) 
.196 
(.293) 
Rain@planting .054** 
(.021) 
.045 
(.026) 
.04 
(.042) 
.047 
(.037) 
Rain@growing 3.5e-04 
(.032) 
-.045 
(.037) 
-.143 
(.099) 
-.133 
(.091) 
Irrigated -.055 
(.483) 
-.344 
(.478) 
-31.9 
(37.2) 
-.093 
(26.4) 
Drought area -.037** 
(.014) 
-.026 
(.016) 
-.034 
(.02) 
-.026* 
(.014) 
Non-Irrigated X 
Rain@growing 
 
 
 
 
-.137 
(.135) 
-.177 
(.165) 
Irrigated X H-
Temp@flowering 
 
 
 
 
.105 
(.125) 
-1.1e-03 
(.089) 
Constant  
 
 
 
 
 
10.3 
(36) 
Estimator difference difference difference system 
Groups 20 20 20 20 
Instruments 26 25 27 29 
p:F-Test 1.4e-13 2.0e-12 2.0e-14 1.8e-22 
p:AR1 8.8e-03 .019 .012 .016 
p:AR2 .053 .185 .173 .241 
p:Hansen-J .595 .463 .805 .744 
p:Diff-Hansen .949 .847 1 1 
OLS 1.01 1.02 1.02 1.02 
FE .865 .855 .863 .863 
Observations 280 249 249 269 
Notes: Own illustration. Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
WSP=Wholesale price; X indicates interaction terms; H-Temp=high temperature; columns 1-3 are 
specifications using the difference GMM estimator; for comparison and robustness checks, the 
results of the last specification are also shown for the system GMM estimator (4).  
 
For winter wheat, the previous year's production is again the most important driver and 
consistently significant at the 1% level (Table 6.4). Wholesale prices in March have a similar 
positive and significant effect, as for corn. The elasticity is around 0.29, even slightly higher 
than for corn. The first specification does not include any prices to ascertain if there are any 
6.5  Results 
143 
changes when more observations are included. This is because the number of observations for 
winter wheat is relatively low compared with corn and rice. The amount of sunshine at 
flowering (around two month before harvesting) is insignificant. From the literature, wheat is 
expected to require much sunshine during this period (FAO 2015) but the aggregation level 
may explain the insignificance. Furthermore, much rain is needed during and shortly after 
planting as well as during flowering and yield formation (ibid.). The positive influence of 
rainfall during and after planting can be observed in the first specification only. Rainfall 
during the growing season and its interaction term with the non-irrigated area are always 
insignificant. This might be a result of data aggregation, as explained above. The irrigated 
area seems to have no effect, but this may be attributed to the poor approximation of 
irrigation, as explained above. The drought area has a significant negative impact in two 
specifications, again albeit with a very small effect. The expected negative effect of overly 
high temperatures during flowering time vanished once the interaction term with irrigation is 
included. Then, both terms become insignificant. Fertilizer prices and prices of competing 
crops have no significant effect but reduce the number of observations substantially. 
Therefore, they are not shown separately but are available upon request. 
Similar to corn and wheat, lagged production is the most important driver of indica rice 
production (Table 6.5). The effect of the wholesale price is similar as in the case of corn, it is 
always significant and has an effect size of around 0.2. Rain during the growing season, a 
large amount of which is required to flood rice paddy fields, is positive but only significant at 
the 10% level in one specification. But as explained before, this might be a result of 
aggregating rainfall data across the provincial level. The results do not change when squared 
rainfall is included. Even when interacted with the non-irrigated area, the rainfall stays 
insignificant. The irrigated area itself is insignificant, which, as detailed before, might be 
attributed to the poor proxy used for irrigation. For sunshine, a 1% increase in the number of 
hours of sunlight increases the production by around 0.16% in all the difference GMM 
specifications. Similarly, the damaging effect of overly high temperatures during the growing 
season can be observed in all difference GMM specifications. The drought area, fertilizer 
prices and the prices of competing crops all turn out insignificant. The underlying reasons 
might be that the costs of switching crops from rice are relatively high and that rice needs a 
comparatively small amount of fertilizer per unit output.  
Overall, the results are mostly comparable to other similar studies. In a non-crop specific 
analysis, Ghatak and Seale (2001) found price elasticities between 0.174 and 0.394, which is 
similar to findings in this study. Looking only at the national level, own price elasticities of 
0.23 for rice, 0.052 for wheat, and 0.164 for corn have been reported (Haile et al. 2016a). The 
results for rice and corn are comparable, whereas a higher price response for wheat is found. 
For Henan, Yu et al. (Yu et al. 2011) found no significant response for wheat but a 
surprisingly high elasticity of 0.737 for corn. However, according to the study, the elasticities 
6  Using information: When do Prices Matter Most for China’s Grain Supply Response? 
144 
of competing crop prices were also high and significant. They also reported that rainfall 
increased winter wheat production when considering the total effect on area and yield. For 
corn, they found that rainfall had no effect, which is consistent with results from this analysis 
if only the non-interacted rainfall is considered – as in the study by Yu et al. 
Table 6.5: Results for indica rice production response 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Lagged Production .913*** 
(.07) 
.914*** 
(.055) 
.778*** 
(.112) 
.911*** 
(.081) 
WSP@planting .196*** 
(.067) 
.181*** 
(.054) 
.163** 
(.061) 
.241** 
(.094) 
Rain@growing .053* 
(.027) 
.152 
(.139) 
.115 
(.178) 
.425 
(.284) 
Sun@growing .174*** 
(.061) 
.167*** 
(.05) 
.142* 
(.074) 
.023 
(.117) 
H-Temp@growing -.024** 
(.01) 
-.026*** 
(8.5e-03) 
-.039*** 
(.013) 
.019 
(.03) 
Irrigated  
 
.356 
(.521) 
.323 
(.674) 
1.06 
(.731) 
Non-Irrigated X 
Rain@growing 
 
 
.294 
(.287) 
.262 
(.346) 
.691 
(.495) 
Drought area  
 
-4.9e-03 
(8.8e-03) 
-1.4e-03 
(8.0e-03) 
4.6e-03 
(.012) 
Fertilizer@planting  
 
 
 
.032 
(.078) 
-.048 
(.058) 
Substitute@planting  
 
 
 
.018 
(.032) 
.04 
(.048) 
Constant  
 
 
 
 
 
-4.51 
(9.08) 
Estimator difference difference difference system 
Groups 41 39 39 39 
Instruments 20 23 22 24 
p:F-Test 2.8e-16 3.2e-20 1.2e-15 1.0e-22 
p:AR1 .073 .098 .118 .096 
p:AR2 .174 .171 .142 .138 
p:Hansen-J .153 .341 .409 .24 
p:Diff-Hansen .088 .102 .227 .569 
OLS .997 .998 .994 .994 
FE .727 .722 .551 .551 
Observations 548 503 394 433 
Notes: Own illustration. Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
WSP=Wholesale price; X indicates interaction terms; H-Temp=high temperature; columns 1-3 are 
specifications using the difference GMM estimator; for comparison and robustness checks, the 
results of the last specification are also shown for the system GMM estimator (4).  
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6.5.2 Impact of prices on production during the marketing year 
As explained in the methodology section, one of the aims of this study is to analyze how 
production reacts to prices at different points in time. Therefore, the regressions with same 
specifications are run for prices at different months before and after the planting time. For all 
other variables, the values used remain the same as before. The results are depicted in Figure 
6.1 for corn, in Figure 6.2 for winter wheat, and in Figure 6.3 for indica rice. The figures 
show the coefficients and the 95% confidence intervals. The statistical significance of the 
response can then be inferred from the figures. The further the distance between the bars and 
the y=0 line, the higher the level of significance. If the y=0 line is included in the bars, the 
coefficient is not statistically significant at the 5% level.  The months before or after planting 
are depicted on the x-axis of the graphs.  
Prices far before or after planting do not have much explanatory power for all crops; hence 
they do not influence production strongly. However, prices around planting time are usually 
highly significant and, at least for corn and rice, also have the highest coefficient. For rice, 
prices are significant in a few months far before planting, which may be attributed to the high 
level of autocorrelation. Nevertheless, both the level of significance and the coefficient 
increase and reach their highest level around planting time. Both rice and corn have a 
relatively short growing time – about 2 to 6 months – compared to wheat. This explains why 
prices during planting period are very important as farmers chose their area and had only little 
time afterwards to influence yields. Particularly for rice, the beginning of the growing season 
is highly important and a lack of water during that time cannot be compensated for at a later 
stage. The finding of a decreased level of significance and a lower coefficients a few months 
after planting is therefore fully consistent with the expectations. For wheat, the graph looks 
different: the level of significance as well as the size of the coefficient increase even after 
planting and reached their highest levels around 6-8 months after planting. This can be 
explained by the different growing patterns, i.e., wheat grows for about 7-9 months after it is 
planted. Furthermore, the most sensitive phase of the crop is the flowering and yield 
formation period, during which the wheat plant is very sensitive to water and temperatures 
(FAO 2015). This period is around 65 to 15 days before the harvest. As a result, it is crucial 
how farmers take care of their crops during this time period, while the establishment, tillering, 
and winter dormancy periods are of minor relevance (ibid.). Considering this, it is expected 
that prices around six months after planting are very important for the yield. For the area 
however, prices at planting time should be the crucial factor. Although without making a 
distinction between area and yield, it is not possible to draw further conclusions about this.  
Comparing the different crops, farmers seem to react earlier to corn prices than the prices of 
winter wheat and indica rice. Rice shows the lowest response to prices, which might be a 
result of relatively high costs of area reallocation. For all crops, prices remained highly 
significant for a while after planting. This indicates that not only the area but also the yield 
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responds to prices, regardless whether it is due to fertilizer or pesticide application, irrigation, 
or other factors. For prices at harvesting time and thereafter, this method suffers from 
endogeneity problems as it is no longer clear if prices drive production or vice versa. 
Therefore, this method is only statistically robust for the time before harvesting, even though 
convincing results are also obtained for the period afterwards. 
A clear result of this analysis is that farmers, at least on average, do not mainly take into 
account previous year's planting or harvesting prices but rather consider current prices around 
planting time to be the more important. This is at odds with naïve and Nerlovian price 
expectation models, which use lagged harvest prices for estimating production decisions. 
Economically, it makes sense to use current prices as they include more information about the 
demand and supply situation than last year’s prices. 
Additional graphs which show the significance (p-values) of the supply response over time for 
all crops and both estimators are shown in the appendix (Figure 8.4 and Figure 8.5). For these 
and the subsequent graphs, model specification two is used for all crops, and only the prices 
are varied over time while all other explanatory variables are kept the same. As expected, 
these graphs show a U-shape curve with more or less distortions depending on the crop and 
estimator. Figure 8.6 and Figure 8.7 show the same results for corn while also illustrating the 
results for other variables: Figure 8.6 for the difference GMM estimator and Figure 8.7 for the 
system GMM estimator. These graphs again support the hypothesis that the difference GMM 
estimator performs better than the system GMM estimator. The fluctuations of the System 
GMM results are much higher, particularly for winter wheat and indica rice as shown in 
Figure 8.5. Furthermore, the fluctuations of the non-price variables are also much higher, as 
indicated in Figure 8.7. In general, the period up to which prices are significant extends 
further after planting for the difference GMM, while in the case of winter wheat the period 
also starts before planting.  
Knowledge about public storage operations in China is scarce. However, when global food 
prices surged in 2007/08, the Chinese government had introduced export restrictions and 
released public stocks (Yang et al. 2008). This allowed limiting domestic price increases to 
4% (Timmer 2010). Therefore, China seems to also follow an anticyclical storage policy 
which further helps to stabilize prices. However, if exports are restricted, the supply cannot 
respond to a potential global scarcity and there is a risk that a crisis might develop. In the 
short run, it may have global impacts but no impacts for China, but in the longer run China 
will also be affected as the stocks will be depleted at some point. Therefore, given the 
responsive supply, it would be preferable to allow a certain degree of price increases such that 
the supply can respond and future demand can be met (argumentation in line with Yang et al. 
2008). 
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Figure 6.1: Explanatory power of prices over time for corn (Own illustration) 
 
Figure 6.2: Explanatory power of prices over time for winter wheat(Own illustration) 
This method of investigating prices at different points in time may also be used for general 
model specification tests. For a robust model, the significance of the tested variables is 
expected to consist of low-frequency components, which implies that there are only slow and 
smooth changes. The occurrence of big fluctuations in a specification, in particular if some 
variables constantly alternate between being insignificant and significant, suggests that the 
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specification is not robust. Figure 8.5 and in particular Figure 8.7 accordingly indicate that the 
system GMM specification is less consistent than the difference GMM specification. 
However, the system GMM fluctuations may still be acceptable; for problematic 
specifications, much higher fluctuations can easily be observed. Interestingly, prices around 
two to five months before planting time seem to have such a high explanatory power in the 
case of the system GMM that all other variables apart from the lagged production become 
insignificant (Figure 8.7). This is an indication that prices before planting might be the most 
important factor influencing final production. Examining the area and yield response 
separately could shed more light on this issue. Overall, the price response and the response to 
other variables are consistent with the expectations, even though many variables turned out 
insignificant. 
 
Figure 6.3: Explanatory power of prices over time for indica rice (Own illustration) 
6.6 Conclusion 
The corn, winter wheat, and indica production response for the main agricultural provinces in 
China are analyzed using a directly estimated single commodity supply response model which 
allows investigating dynamic relationships. The difference GMM estimator and, for 
comparison, the system GMM estimator are applied because the number of provinces is larger 
than the number of years considered. Apart from testing the impact of different variables such 
as temperatures and rainfall on the supply response, understanding at which points in time 
prices matter most for the supply response is a crucial contribution of this chapter. The major 
findings include the following: (1) All crops strongly respond to prices at planting time and 
shortly before. This indicates that farmers behave rationally in the sense that they incorporate 
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the latest price information in their decisions. This result therefore provides strong evidence 
against naïve or Nerlovian price expectation models. (2) The price response of corn and wheat 
are higher than the one of rice. (3) While prices shortly before and after planting period have 
very high explanatory power, prices further away from the planting period have lower 
coefficients and are mostly insignificant. (4) Wheat is an exception in the sense that its prices 
are highly significant long after planting and show large coefficients, which can be attributed 
to wheat’s long growing period and the crop’s sensitivity 1-2 months before harvest. (5) High 
temperatures negatively influence production for all crops, which may become problematic in 
the future due to climate change impacts. (6) Irrigation is measured poorly and therefore may 
have limited the significance of the results; nevertheless the results indicate that irrigation 
may partly help to mitigate a shortfall in rainfall but cannot (fully) compensate for the 
negative effects of high temperatures. (7) High fertilizer prices have a negative impact on corn 
production only.  
In general, the difference GMM estimator seems to perform better than the system GMM 
estimator. The presented method to analyze the importance of prices at different points in time 
may also be used for general model specification tests if data on explanatory variables is 
available at a sufficiently high frequency.  
The mixed evidence regarding the role of weather events and irrigation in affecting 
production can be due to the use of province-level data, which might be too aggregated to 
study spatially differentiated weather impacts. On the other hand, the panel data contains 
observations over time, which is an important advantage over cross-sectional farm-level data, 
in particular when studying the role of determinants with little spatial dispersion (such as 
prices). Studying price impacts on production at different points in time, which is a major 
contribution of this analysis, can only be undertaken with the help of a panel data set over 
multiple years. Findings clearly indicate that (overall) farmers have access to and use up-to-
date price information when making their production decisions. The month-specific price 
elasticities also highlight when the Chinese agricultural sector can best respond to price spikes 
and scarcities. As the price elasticities range from 0,16 (rice) to 0.34 (wheat), increasing 
domestic demand can be met to a substantial extent by supply expansion – provided that 
prices are suitable signals about supply and demand conditions. Given the responsive supply, 
less reliance on public stocks and a reduction of trade restrictions are policy options which 
should be considered by the government. Otherwise, China may be able to protect itself in the 
short run with the help of export restrictions and stock releases. But in the longer run, stocks 
may be exhausted and the supply would not respond to the global scarcity if prices cannot 
transmit. Therefore, the government should at least allow a certain level of price transmission 
by not restricting exports too much (argumentation in line with Yang et al. 2008). 
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The biggest limitation of this study arises from the pooling of provinces which conceals the 
heterogeneity of provinces. Furthermore, the aggregation of data, mostly on the province 
level, weakens the results for some variables, including temperatures and rainfall. Coefficients 
for irrigation and area affected by drought and some other variables were mostly insignificant 
which could be attributed to the fact that the variables were not crop-specific and therefore 
only serve as approximations.  
Future research should analyze how off-farm wages influence production decisions as off-
farm employment options have driven many Chinese people out of agriculture in the past. In 
addition, climate change impacts on crop choices, yields, and nutritional contents constitute 
important areas of future research.  
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7 General Conclusion 
Given the severe impacts of high and volatile food prices, this thesis set out to explore the 
role of public stockholding, private storage, information availability, trade policies, 
international cooperation, and supply response in stabilizing staple food prices. High and 
volatile prices can negatively impact production and consumption decisions, drive people into 
poverty as well as poverty-traps, discourage investments, and lead to social unrest. The risk 
of global supply shortages persists and regional shortages are frequent. Currently, some 
countries face severe food shortages induced by the impacts of the ongoing El Niño. 
Therefore, price and supply stabilization policies are crucial for poor countries and have 
received widespread attention in academia. Yet, several research gaps prevail and many 
policies remain a constant source of controversy, particularly those related to public stocks or 
trade restrictions. Several of these controversies were studied in this thesis using a wide 
variety of methods including econometric techniques and numerical optimization methods.  
Here, the individual chapters are concluded successively. First, the objectives and research 
questions are restated and findings summarized. Then, the theoretical implications are 
outlined, i.e. how findings could influence future understanding and application of knowledge 
of price stabilization. Finally, concrete policy implications are drawn, limitations highlighted, 
and recommendations for future research specified. 
7.1 Chapter 2: how and why global grain supply and demand estimates 
differ 
Objectives, relevance, and findings. Up-to-date information of high quality is important for 
an optimal resource allocation and accordingly for resilient markets which can absorb shocks. 
However, knowledge about the quality of global grain supply and demand estimates is as 
scarce as it is vital. Therefore, the aim of chapter 2 was to reveal the nature and determinants 
of differences between the supply and demand estimates from different sources. To achieve 
this, cointegration analysis, granger causality tests, and three other methods were used. It was 
found that sources have similar information sets at their disposal and differences seem to be 
driven by methodological discrepancies. In contrast to production data, stock and trade data 
seem to suffer from tremendous uncertainty. Weak evidence suggests that the FAO might be 
slower than the IGC and USDA in updating their estimates. Additionally, it has been argued 
that taking the average of the estimates from the three sources may improve the precision and 
robustness of studies based on this data. 
Theoretical implications. Between-source comparisons, as conducted in chapter 2, are 
scarce and have either focused on the U.S. (e.g. Egelkraut et al. 2002; Garcia et al. 1997) or 
are outdated, less comprehensive, and less careful in accounting for methodological discrep-
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ancies (Paulino and Tseng 1980). Methods presented in this thesis allow numerous insights 
while accounting for various methodological differences. However, methods to compare data 
on estimates based on different definitions of marketing years remain yet to be developed. It 
has been shown that taking the mean value from the three sources provides various 
advantages over taking the estimates from any specific source. This approach can reduce the 
impact of mistakes in the data, of estimation errors, and of potentially inappropriate data 
collection or aggregation methodologies. Furthermore, the mean is expected to be closer to 
the real value. Therefore, the robustness and precision of results of future studies which are 
based on global grain supply and demand estimates can be improved by using the average 
value from the three sources rather than data from any specific source. 
Policy implications. Chapter 2 provides various policy implications. First, documentation of 
data, including collection and aggregation methods, needs to be improved to allow a better 
understanding of supply and demand conditions. Second, pressure on governments of some 
emerging economies needs to be augmented in order to increase the amount of information 
that is collected and the extent to which this information is shared (argument in line with 
Gilbert 2011b). Third, data should be harmonized between sources and provided in a more 
disaggregated manner (e.g. public versus private stocks, raw products versus processed 
goods) which would allow additional insights. Fourth, data consistency needs to be improved, 
e.g. by applying more appropriate definitions of marketing years. Fifth, data on stocks and 
trade needs to be improved. Sixth, historical artifacts need to be addressed such as differences 
in stock estimates for the time when the databases were set up which are now partly carried 
forward from year to year. Finally, when estimates are updated, more information on the 
underlying reasons should be provided. Given the responsive supply found in chapter 6, the 
expected gains in price stability from improved information on supply and demand conditions 
are substantial. Researchers would benefit from data which better fits their needs. 
Limitations. Five methods were applied to account for methodological discrepancies but 
there may be some unknown differences which cannot be captured by these methods. 
Furthermore, evidence on some of the results is weak, partly because there are no applicable 
statistical significance tests available.  
Future research. Despite its importance, there is little empirical evidence on how 
uncertainty in agricultural supply and demand information affects price levels, volatility and 
the behavior of market agents. Furthermore, more research is needed on the accumulation of 
information from different sources to improve estimations. As information systems focusing 
on the nationally aggregated supply and demand conditions cannot draw a conclusive picture 
of the food availability within a country, the ability of policy makers to respond to a crisis 
also depends on alternative early warning systems that are in place. These are still scarce in 
indicators, and how different indicators relate to one another is not well understood. 
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7.2 Chapter 3: comparing emergency reserves, private storage, and trade 
policies 
Objectives, relevance, and findings. Knowledge of public stockholding policies in an open 
economy is scarce and previous studies on storage-trade cooperation have ignored private 
stockholding and a responsive supply, two key features when studying price stabilization. To 
address this gap, chapter 3 compared the fiscal costs and effectiveness to stabilize prices of 
maintaining a public emergency reserve, subsidizing private storage, and strategically using 
trade policies. Goals included the evaluation of impacts on price levels, volatility, and 
extreme events, as well as on the activities of market agents. Furthermore, conditions were 
established under which international cooperation can be achieved. A partial equilibrium 
model with rational expectations based on mixed complementarity conditions was used to 
capture the dynamic interactions between agents. Findings reveal the complementarity of an 
emergency reserve and private storage. More precisely, while a reserve is much more cost-
efficient in preventing extreme prices, subsidized private storage is more cost-efficient in 
reducing food price volatility. This research also suggests that, contrary to popular belief, a 
reserve is less market-distorting than subsidizing private storage. Under free trade, benefits of 
price stabilization policies are shared independently of which countries employ them. Hence, 
countries need to either cooperate and share fiscal costs, or impose export restrictions when 
their reserves are touched. Otherwise, a collective action problem arises. If the production 
variability between the countries differs too much, incentives for international storage-trade 
cooperation may vanish. The results also showed that high prices as observed during the 
world food crisis in 2007/08 can be explained by the fact that some countries use public 
stocks in combination with trade restrictions while others do not intervene into markets. In 
this case, prices in the latter group of countries can rise well above those which would be 
observed if all countries would refrain from any type of public intervention. 
Theoretical implications. Chapter 3 contradicts earlier findings that report highly market-
distorting effects of public interventions compared to market based approaches (e.g. World 
Bank 2005; Zant 1997). It therefore provides theory-driven support for authors who argued 
qualitatively for the completion of market-based price stabilization approaches by a well-
designed public storage program (e.g. Abbott 2010; Galtier 2014, 2013; von Braun and 
Torero 2009). Earlier findings on the benefits of risk-sharing with the help of regional grain 
reserves are supported (Kornher and Kalkuhl 2015; Romero-Aguilar and Miranda 2015). In 
line with previous studies, results indicate that a public storage program implemented by a 
single country requires export restrictions to prevent the leakage of benefits into foreign 
markets (Gouel and Jean 2015). Such incentives to restrict trade yield the collective action 
problem which has repeatedly been investigated (Bouët and Laborde Debucquet 2012; Gouel 
2014a; Martin and Anderson 2011) without providing a concrete solution. In contrast, results 
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show that even compensation payments cannot provide the right incentives if the production 
variability between the countries differs too much. An international or inter-governmental 
panel on food and nutrition security (von Braun and Kalkuhl 2015) could potentially increase 
pressure on governments to limit the use of beggar-thy-neighbor policies and lead the way for 
mutual agreements on global short-term and long-term price stabilization policies. 
Policy implications. Results from chapter 3 indicate that the international community should 
acknowledge that surplus countries with public storage programs face clear incentives to 
restrict exports in times of crisis, which is of particular importance for the WTO negotiations. 
It seems that this collective action problem can only be overcome in two ways; first, by 
setting up common international stabilization programs (an extension of the proposal from 
von Braun and Torero 2009) which are unlikely to find a mutual agreement due to diverse 
interests; second, by introducing compensation payments to which most countries will refuse 
to commit. A potential second-best option is regional cooperation between countries with 
similar interests, which, however, limits the potential welfare benefits. Another potential 
second-best option might be to prohibit export bans but permit flexible export tariffs which 
enable countries to prevent the export of grains from public stocks to international markets. 
This is the option that was modelled by the flexible export tariff in chapter 3. An international 
or inter-governmental panel on food and nutrition security as proposed by von Braun and 
Kalkuhl (2015) could pressure governments to limit the use of export restrictions and could 
facilitate agreements which are mutually beneficial. Apart from that, results provide strong 
support that emergency reserves should receive more attention for their cost-effectiveness in 
preventing extreme events. As policy makers care about price volatility as well as high prices, 
a combination of a private storage subsidy and a public reserve may pose an interesting 
possibility to fight both. Either way, reserves should follow clear rules to prevent influence of 
interest groups and allow anticipation by market actors. Without any global progress in sight, 
scaling up WFP activities may provide some protection for the most vulnerable people. 
Limitations. Results depend on the model calibration, although it was chosen in a very 
general way. Therefore, results are not intended to provide specific quantitative guidance on 
how to set up a reserve for a specific country but rather to illustrate the behavioral 
characteristics and interactions that need to be considered in the design of policies. A 
particular but well-designed and promising emergency reserve scheme is used thereby 
restricting possible conclusions to this (and sufficiently similar) schemes. Private storage may 
happen for other objectives besides profit-maximization (see discussion in sections 4.7.1 and 
5.6) and similarly, other market actors may follow different objective functions.  
Future research. Several possible lines for future research emerge from this study. The 
sustainability of a common reserve depending on the characteristics of participating and non-
participating countries is still not well understood. Regional case studies accounting for 
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private storage and a responsive supply, but also acknowledging that trade takes time, should 
be conducted. These are in particular required for regions where the implementation of a 
regional reserve is currently being discussed such as in the ECOWAS region (ECOWAS 
Commission 2012). Further research could investigate pathways which allow overcoming the 
collective action problem that surplus countries may restrict exports in case of a global crisis. 
A valuable first step in this direction would be an analysis on whether and (if so) how 
cooperation on storage can limit the incentives to restrict trade. Impacts of high and volatile 
prices on nutrition and welfare are still not well understood and require further attention. If 
the problems related to high and volatile prices become better understood, this would allow 
the inclusion of more specific objective functions in studies on storage cooperation. 
7.3 Chapter 4: deriving and testing a surrogate model for private storage 
Objectives, relevance, and findings. Given the numerical complexity of the competitive 
storage model, chapter 4 intended to answer the question whether competitive private storage 
can be approximated by a reduced-form equation and whether this equation can provide 
empirical support for the CSM. Starting from the competitive storage model with rational 
expectations, a surface response methodology was used to derive a reduced-form 
approximation of competitive private storage behavior. This can be used for direct empirical 
quantification of stock determinants, high-dimensional modelling exercises, and empirical 
verification of the competitive storage model, the workhorse in private storage simulations. 
Non-linear least squares were used to show that the obtained reduced-form private storage 
equation is highly precise in capturing the effects of individual model parameters. The 
application to stock data from 32 countries provided for the first time empirical support for 
the competitive storage model while accounting for actual stock levels.  
Theoretical implications. Chapter 4 provides empirical support for validity of the 
competitive storage model, but uses actual stock levels instead of price distributions as in 
earlier studies (Cafiero et al. 2011; Deaton and Laroque 1996, 1995, 1992; Miao et al. 2011; 
Peterson and Tomek 2005). The derived reduced-form private storage approximation offers 
ample potential for direct econometric quantifications of empirical determinants of private 
stocks. A first analysis of this type is conducted in chapter 5.  
Policy implications. Results from chapter 4 point out that operational stocks sum up to 
around 19.7% of domestic consumption and therefore need to be subtracted to calculate 
stock-to-use ratios, a common indicator for market tightness. The strong response of private 
stocks to trade underlines the need to find multilateral agreements on price stabilization 
policies. Finally, as stockholders respond to demand expectations, information systems 
should also improve their demand-side estimates and not only focus on the supply-side. 
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Limitations. The same limitations as in chapter 3 apply. Furthermore, the tested parameter 
space is naturally limited and a minor influence of small but prevailing public stocks and 
other policies in the considered countries cannot be fully ruled out. 
Future research. A full empirical validation using the method presented in chapter 4, 
focusing on a specific country-crop combination and accounting for trade distortions and 
time-dependent trade costs would draw an even clearer picture of the validity of the 
competitive storage model and the influence of individual parameters.  
7.4 Chapter 5: drivers of India’s rice stocks 
Objectives, relevance, and findings. India is home to a huge population of undernourished 
people and one of the biggest public stockholding programs. Yet, surging stocks and costs 
call for reforms. Therefore, it is necessary to understand how policies and market conditions 
quantitatively impact India’s public and private rice stocks, which constituted the main 
research question of chapter 5. A new method to estimate public rice stocks was developed 
by deriving the impact of individual policies from economic theory. The private stock 
equation was based on results from chapter 4 which were combined with an instrumental 
variable approach. Findings underline the huge importance of the minimum support price and 
trade restrictions on public stocks. Recent stock surges are found to be caused by the real 
MSP increases, export ban, and bumper harvests in several years. The collapse of the public 
stock system was potentially only prevented by the large production shortfall in 2009/10, the 
reopening of borders for rice traders, and the high inflation combined with a stagnant MSP in 
2010/11 and 2013/14. Each ton of public stocks is found to crowd out half a ton of private 
stocks. 
Theoretical implications. Chapter 5 is a first application of the methodology developed in 
chapter 4 to quantify stock determinants. It thereby contributes to the closure of the large 
research gap on empirical stock drivers and public-private storage interactions. In line with 
earlier studies, a need for reform is highlighted (Cummings et al. 2006; Landes and Gulati 
2004; Reardon and Minten 2011; Saini and Kozicka 2014) and in particular the need for 
better stock-out policies is underlined (Gouel et al. 2014). Indeed, India provides a good 
example about how public stocks should not be managed: The dynamical component of stock 
policies is only producer oriented and provides no crisis-responsive consumer protection. 
PDS distribution is not responsive to a crisis, only export restrictions are. Additionally, 
policies are hard to anticipate for the private sector which also suffers under additional legal 
restrictions. Finally, policy makers themselves seem to be unaware of interactions of their 
policies which have resulted in stock increases during the crisis. However, even under such 
regulation and market interventions, private speculative storage activities persist. This 
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underlines that private storage should not be neglected in the analysis of public stockholding 
policies.  
Policy implications. Findings from chapter 5 point out that India’s policy makers seem to be 
largely unaware of the effect of their policies on both public and private stocks. The surge of 
public stocks and associated explosion of fiscal costs during and after the world food prices 
was largely self-induced by the increases of the real MSP and banning of exports. Stock-out 
policies urgently need to be revised to prevent stock surges as well as to offer price-
responsive protection for consumers in times of crisis. This dynamic consumer protection is 
currently only achieved by implementing export bans but high food prices are not associated 
with stock releases. A fundamental change of the system with a higher consumer-orientation 
and more transparent as well as responsive stocking policies should be considered and 
compared to cash transfers (compare Basu 2011; Gouel et al. 2014; Saini and Kozicka 2014).  
Limitations. Results from chapter 5 are limited by the quality of the underlying data, in 
particular on public and private stocks. Statistical limitations arise from the limited number of 
observations and remaining uncertainty about stationarity, even though different approaches 
have been used to ensure the robustness of the results.  
Future research. Outside of India, empirical impacts of public stocks on private stocks still 
remain a black box. To a large extent, this also applies to the questions on how policies shape 
public stockholding. For India, reform proposals have been made and corresponding studies 
have been conducted, but these are not as comprehensive as required for a major change of 
the system because, for example, the relationship with other sectors of the economy, which is 
particularly important for transfer schemes, has often been neglected. 
7.5 Chapter 6: price information for China’s grain supply response 
Objectives, relevance, and findings. China experiences a huge growth in food demand and 
is still reluctant to rely on imports for its main food crops. Thus, a responsive supply is 
crucial to prevent food shortages. The aim of chapter 6 was therefore to analyze how up-to-
date the price information of China’s rice, wheat, and corn farmers are and what the 
dynamics of the production response to prices are. The second focus was to reveal the 
impacts of weather-related factors thereby shedding light on potential future implications of a 
changing climate. Therefore, a directly estimated single product model was chosen to capture 
the dynamic effects. The difference GMM estimator was applied to avoid dynamic panel bias 
which would otherwise arise as the number of provinces is large compared to the number of 
time periods. Findings indicate that farmers have the latest price information as they react to 
prices shortly before and around planting. Only for wheat, prices after planting are still 
important which can be attributed to its long growing period and the importance of inputs 
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during the last months before the harvest. Furthermore, high temperatures are found to reduce 
production thus raising concerns regarding future self-sufficiency in view of global warming. 
Theoretical implications. Chapter 6 indicates the up-to-dateness of price information of 
Chinese farmers. Using the latest price information is rational as they convey more 
information on supply and demand conditions than earlier prices, including those of the last 
harvest period. Usual seasonal price changes can be anticipated. This finding provides strong 
evidence against naïve or Nerlovian price expectations (Nerlove 1979), models which have 
also been criticized by others (Braulke 1982; Leaver 2004; Roberts and Schlenker 2009; 
Tiffin 2004). Instead, farmers seem to behave rationally in the sense that they consider the 
latest price information in their decision making. 
Policy implications. Results from chapter 6 underline the responsiveness of China’s 
agricultural production which is expected to provide a high resilience against shocks. 
However, high temperatures are found to lower production which highlights the need to find 
mitigation strategies for global warming and international agreements to limit climate change. 
In the short run, China may be able to protect itself from global shortages with the help of 
export restrictions and releases of public stocks as in 2007/08. However, in the longer run, 
this prevents the supply from responding to the global scarcity. Hence allowing a certain 
degree of price transmission through reduced export restrictions may be a more sustainable 
strategy in the long run. 
Limitations. The pooling of the provinces conceals the heterogeneity across provinces but is 
required to obtain sufficient observations. Aggregation on the province-level and the use of a 
few non-crop-specific variables weaken the findings for some variables including 
temperatures, rainfall, and droughts. As a result, some of these variables are insignificant. 
Future research. For China, off-farm wages are expected to influence agricultural 
production due to higher opportunity costs for farmers. Hence, drawing more light on this 
issue would present an interesting extension to the presented analysis. Separating the area and 
the yield decision when testing the influence of prices over time would allow an even better 
understanding of the formation of price expectations and the related resource allocation 
decisions. The impacts of climate change on crop choices, yields, and nutritional contents, 
potentially all the way to nutritional outcomes for humans, constitute additional important 
areas for future research.  
7.6 Final remarks 
This thesis makes important theoretical and applied contributions to the knowledge of price 
stabilization, most importantly for public and private stocks, trade policies, and information 
availability. For this, various numerical optimization and econometric methods were applied. 
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Given the responsive supply that was found in this thesis, expected price stabilizing effects 
from improved information on supply and demand conditions, particularly on stocks, are 
substantial. These would also enhance capabilities of early warning systems for monitoring 
food security. Apart from access to high-quality information, market integration, e.g. through 
good infrastructure, is key to enable farmers, traders, stockholders, and governments to 
quickly respond to changing market conditions and thereby enhance market resilience. 
Another implication of the price-responsive supply is that export restrictions of surplus 
countries in times of crisis can be particularly damaging because they lead to lower domestic 
prices and therefore to lower levels of production. This indirect effect of export restrictions 
can further amplify the increase of global prices. 
Furthermore, in spite of widespread criticism against public interventions, this thesis has 
demonstrated that well-designed emergency reserves can complement speculative private 
storage to stabilize prices. India, however, has been shown to provide an example of how 
public storage programs should not be run: lacking crisis-responsive consumer protection, 
difficult to anticipate for the private sector, and hardly controllable by policy makers due to 
conflicting policies.  
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8.1 Appendix for chapter 2 
Some presumptive mistakes found in the data were corrected. These mistakes have been partly 
confirmed and afterwards corrected by AMIS. They were outliers or the marketing year was 
specified incorrectly. The judgements for detecting outliers were made as described in section 
2.3. Only for the first mistake a figure of the uncorrected data is included but all figures are 
available upon request. The data was corrected as follows: 
1. FAO, Soy, Utilization, 2011 estimate, Market Monitor 3: set to 257 instead of 275 
(outlier). The uncorrected data looks as follows: 
                
    Note: Own illustration. 
 
2. IGC, Rice & Soy, 2012 estimates, Market Monitor 9: Year set to 2011 instead of 2012 
(data matches this year but not 2012 data) 
3. IGC, Rice & Soy, 2013 forecasts, Market Monitor 9: Year set to 2012 instead of 2013 
(data matches this year but not 2013 data) 
4. IGC, Rice, Utilization, 2012 estimate, Market Monitor 10, Set to 468 instead of 458 
(outlier) 
5. IGC, Rice, Trade, 2012 estimate, Market Monitor 10, Set to 37 instead of 39 (outlier) 
6. FAO, Wheat, Supply, 2012 estimate, Market Monitor 17: Set to 841 instead of 818 
(outlier) 
7. USDA, Maize, Production, 2013 estimate, Market Monitor 23: Set to 989 instead of 
999 (outlier) 
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8. USDA, Maize, Supply, 2013 estimate, Market Monitor 23: Set to 1126 instead of 
1136 (outlier) 
9. IGC, Soy, Supply, 2013 estimate, Market Monitor 24: Set to 313 instead of 332 (outlier) 
10. FAO, Wheat, Supply, 2013 estimate, Market Monitor 27: Set to 875 instead of 896 
(outlier) 
11. FAO, Wheat, Utilization, 2013 estimate, Market Monitor 27: Set to 685 instead of 
692 (outlier) 
12. FAO, Wheat, Ending stocks, 2013 estimate, Market Monitor 27: Set to 179 instead of 
193 (outlier) 
13. FAO, Maize, Utilization, 2013 estimate, Market Monitor 27: Set to 946 instead of 956 
(outlier) 
14. FAO, Maize, Ending stocks, 2013 estimate, Market Monitor 27: Set to 176 instead of 
188 (outlier) 
 
Table 8.1: Own global grain supply and demand estimates (mean of FAO, USDA, IGC) 
Report- Corn Rice Soy Wheat 
 Nr. 2011 2012 2013 2014 2011 2012 2013 2014 2011 2012 2013 2014 2011 2012 2013 2014 
E
n
d
in
g
 S
to
ck
s 
2 137 123 
 
122 123 
 
34 33 
 
196 175 
 3 133 119 
 
122 125 
 
35 38 
 
194 171 
 4 133 119 
 
123 125 
 
35 39 
 
193 170 
 5 134 120 
 
124 125 
 
35 39 
 
189 170 
 6 133 120 
 
124 126 
 
35 38 
 
191 172 
 7 133 122 
 
124 128 
 
35 39 
 
192 174 
 8 133 124 
 
125 128 
 
34 38 
 
193 175 
 9 
 
127 159 
 
129 145 
 
24 38 
  
174 180 
 10 
 
126 159 
 
129 133 
 
38 54 
 
174 177 
 11 
 
126 159 
 
129 132 
 
38 45 
 
168 173 
 12 
 
125 157 
 
129 133 
 
38 43 
 
168 173 
 13 
 
126 160 
 
129 132 
 
38 44 
 
168 175 
 14 
 
133 167 
 
130 131 
 
38 44 
 
170 177 
 15 
 
131 164 
 
130 131 
 
39 45 
 
169 183 
 16 
 
131 162 
 
131 131 
 
38 44 
 
169 184 
 17 
 
131 163 
 
132 134 
 
37 43 
 
169 184 
 18 
 
162 163 
 
110 134 
 
37 42 
  
185 184 
19 
 
165 174 
 
134 146 
 
42 
  
185 185 
20 
 
170 188 
 
134 147 
 
37 42 
  
184 188 
21 
 
174 196 
 
133 130 
 
42 57 
 
183 193 
22 
 
175 197 
 
133 129 
 
42 57 
 
183 194 
23 
 
175 198 
 
133 128 
 
42 57 
 
182 193 
24 
 
175 200 
 
132 126 
 
42 57 
 
183 193 
25 
 
174 197 
 
132 126 
 
42 58 
 
183 195 
26 
 
175 198 
 
132 125 
 
42 59 
 
184 198 
27 
 
174 198 
 
132 125 
 
43 60 
 
184 200 
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28 
  
203 
 
108 125 
 
43 62 
  
199 
29 
  
206 
  
126 
  
61 
  
200 
P
ro
d
u
ct
io
n
 
2 879 845 
 
470 471 
 
238 258 
 
697 655 
 3 879 842 
 
470 472 
 
239 266 
 
696 656 
 4 880 841 
 
470 472 
 
239 269 
 
697 655 
 5 882 856 
 
471 472 
 
239 271 
 
697 657 
 6 882 858 
 
471 474 
 
239 269 
 
698 657 
 7 882 859 
 
472 475 
 
239 267 
 
698 657 
 8 881 859 
 
472 474 
 
239 267 
 
698 657 
 9 
 
862 958 
 
477 489 
 
240 267 
  
657 695 
 10 
 
861 964 
 
477 485 
 
267 285 
 
657 694 
 11 
 
865 962 
 
476 483 
 
268 282 
 
656 702 
 12 
 
866 962 
 
476 482 
 
268 281 
 
656 702 
 13 
 
866 966 
 
476 482 
 
268 282 
 
657 704 
 14 
 
867 971 
 
476 479 
 
269 285 
 
657 705 
 15 
 
866 975 
 
476 478 
 
269 288 
 
657 711 
 16 
 
866 977 
 
477 480 
 
269 285 
 
657 712 
 17 
 
866 979 
 
477 482 
 
268 283 
 
657 713 
 18 
 
982 959 
 
471 483 
 
269 282 
  
712 700 
19 
 
985 974 
 
483 492 
 
270 284 
  
713 698 
20 
 
987 982 
 
484 493 
 
269 283 
  
714 703 
21 
 
993 990 
 
483 485 
 
282 307 
 
715 717 
22 
 
994 993 
 
483 483 
 
282 310 
 
715 719 
23 
 
994 995 
 
484 482 
 
284 309 
 
715 721 
24 
 
995 997 
 
483 482 
 
284 310 
 
715 721 
25 
 
996 1000 
 
483 482 
 
284 313 
 
714 721 
26 
 
997 1002 
 
483 482 
 
284 315 
 
715 724 
27 
 
998 1002 
 
483 481 
 
284 314 
 
715 724 
28 
  
1004 
 
477 481 
 
284 316 
  
725 
29 
  
1006 
  
482 
  
318 
  
725 
S
u
p
p
ly
 
2 1006 981 
 
583 593 
 
285 292 
 
891 856 
 3 1006 975 
 
584 595 
 
286 300 
 
892 851 
 4 1007 978 
 
584 595 
 
287 303 
 
889 848 
 5 1009 989 
 
585 596 
 
286 306 
 
888 847 
 6 1009 990 
 
586 597 
 
286 304 
 
888 848 
 7 1009 992 
 
587 599 
 
286 302 
 
889 849 
 8 1009 992 
 
587 599 
 
286 302 
 
891 850 
 9 
 
995 1085 
 
601 629 
 
276 302 
  
850 869 
 10 
 
995 1087 
 
601 614 
 
301 329 
 
850 868 
 11 
 
998 1088 
 
600 612 
 
302 320 
 
848 871 
 12 
 
999 1087 
 
601 612 
 
302 318 
 
848 870 
 13 
 
999 1092 
 
600 611 
 
303 320 
 
848 873 
 14 
 
1000 1104 
 
600 610 
 
304 323 
 
848 875 
 15 
 
999 1106 
 
600 608 
 
304 326 
 
847 880 
 16 
 
999 1108 
 
601 610 
 
303 322 
 
848 881 
 17 
 
999 1109 
 
603 613 
 
304 319 
 
848 882 
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18 
 
1113 1123 
 
579 614 
 
304 320 
  
881 884 
19 
 
1119 1139 
 
615 638 
 
295 321 
  
881 883 
20 
 
1120 1151 
 
616 639 
 
303 321 
  
882 887 
21 
 
1126 1164 
 
615 619 
 
320 342 
 
882 899 
22 
 
1127 1168 
 
615 617 
 
320 352 
 
883 902 
23 
 
1127 1170 
 
615 616 
 
322 352 
 
882 903 
24 
 
1128 1172 
 
615 614 
 
322 352 
 
883 903 
25 
 
1129 1174 
 
615 614 
 
322 356 
 
882 904 
26 
 
1130 1177 
 
616 614 
 
322 357 
 
883 908 
27 
 
1136 1180 
 
616 614 
 
321 356 
 
883 913 
28 
  
1182 
 
588 613 
 
321 359 
  
913 
29 
  
1186 
  
615 
  
360 
  
915 
T
ra
d
e
 
2 98 92 
 
35 36 
 
92 94 
 
148 134 
 3 102 92 
 
37 37 
 
91 97 
 
150 133 
 4 103 93 
 
38 37 
 
92 99 
 
149 134 
 5 104 93 
 
38 37 
 
92 99 
 
150 136 
 6 105 94 
 
38 37 
 
92 99 
 
150 136 
 7 105 94 
 
38 37 
 
93 98 
 
150 138 
 8 105 93 
 
39 37 
 
93 97 
 
150 138 
 9 
 
94 102 
 
38 38 
 
94 97 
  
139 139 
 10 
 
94 102 
 
38 37 
 
96 106 
 
139 139 
 11 
 
97 102 
 
37 38 
 
97 105 
 
139 145 
 12 
 
97 102 
 
38 38 
 
98 106 
 
139 146 
 13 
 
97 103 
 
38 38 
 
98 107 
 
139 146 
 14 
 
96 107 
 
38 38 
 
99 108 
 
140 146 
 15 
 
97 108 
 
38 39 
 
99 109 
 
139 150 
 16 
 
97 110 
 
38 39 
 
99 110 
 
139 150 
 17 
 
97 112 
 
38 40 
 
99 108 
 
139 153 
 18 
 
115 111 
 
39 40 
 
99 110 
  
154 147 
19 
 
118 114 
 
40 40 
 
98 111 
  
155 149 
20 
 
120 114 
 
40 40 
 
100 111 
  
157 148 
21 
 
124 114 
 
40 40 
 
112 115 
 
160 150 
22 
 
124 115 
 
40 41 
 
113 116 
 
159 151 
23 
 
124 114 
 
40 41 
 
113 116 
 
159 152 
24 
 
125 113 
 
41 41 
 
113 116 
 
159 152 
25 
 
125 114 
 
42 42 
 
113 117 
 
159 154 
26 
 
125 115 
 
42 42 
 
113 118 
 
159 154 
27 
 
125 116 
 
42 42 
 
113 117 
 
159 155 
28 
  
117 
 
43 41 
 
113 118 
  
156 
29 
  
119 
  
42 
  
118 
  
157 
U
ti
li
za
ti
o
n
 
2 870 858 
 
461 469 
 
254 258 
 
692 682 
 3 874 857 
 
461 470 
 
254 261 
 
695 681 
 4 876 856 
 
461 470 
 
255 262 
 
694 680 
 5 877 871 
 
461 471 
 
255 265 
 
696 679 
 6 878 872 
 
462 471 
 
255 264 
 
696 678 
 7 878 871 
 
463 472 
 
255 263 
 
695 678 
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8 877 869 
 
462 472 
 
255 263 
 
695 677 
 9 
 
869 926 
 
473 484 
 
255 263 
  
678 690 
 10 
 
871 927 
 
472 480 
 
263 274 
 
678 690 
 11 
 
874 927 
 
472 479 
 
264 274 
 
679 695 
 12 
 
876 927 
 
471 479 
 
264 274 
 
680 696 
 13 
 
874 929 
 
471 479 
 
265 275 
 
680 697 
 14 
 
868 932 
 
470 478 
 
265 278 
 
679 697 
 15 
 
869 938 
 
470 478 
 
264 279 
 
679 696 
 16 
 
869 942 
 
471 479 
 
263 277 
 
679 695 
 17 
 
869 942 
 
471 479 
 
265 276 
 
680 695 
 18 
 
945 960 
 
468 480 
 
264 276 
  
694 700 
19 
 
946 963 
 
480 492 
 
267 277 
  
694 698 
20 
 
944 962 
 
481 492 
 
264 277 
  
693 698 
21 
 
945 965 
 
481 489 
 
275 292 
 
695 705 
22 
 
945 967 
 
482 488 
 
276 294 
 
696 707 
23 
 
946 967 
 
482 488 
 
278 292 
 
697 709 
24 
 
947 969 
 
483 488 
 
279 293 
 
696 710 
25 
 
948 972 
 
483 488 
 
278 295 
 
695 708 
26 
 
948 975 
 
483 489 
 
279 297 
 
695 709 
27 
 
949 979 
 
484 489 
 
278 296 
 
695 711 
28 
  
976 
 
480 489 
 
279 297 
  
712 
29 
  
978 
  
490 
  
298 
  
713 
Notes: Own illustration. This table shows the own supply and demand estimates. Years refer to 
the first year of the marketing season, i.e. 2011 refers to 2011/2012. The calculation is discussed 
in section 2.6. If one or two of the sources had missing values, the result is also reported as 
missing value. The Report-Nr. refers to the number of the AMIS Market Monitor (AMIS 2015). 
8.2 Appendix for chapter 3  
The results depend not only on the model parameters but also on the parameters which are 
chosen to solve and simulate the model (lower half of Table 3.1). In order to test the precision 
of the results, different values were explored. This appendix first presents how the precision 
of the numerical solution depends on the grid size and second how the precision of the 
estimated parameters depends on the number of simulated shock realizations. 
The highest and lowest grid points need to be chosen such that the simulated realizations do 
not exceed these values. In order to find the perfect foresight solution, a time horizon of 5 
periods before convergence to the steady state turned out to be sufficient for all cases. With 
the solution methods detailed in Table 3.1 all models could be solved. In order to evaluate the 
necessary grid points (and therefore grid density), the grid points for each dimension were 
varied from 10 to 120. Figure 8.1 shows the absolute and relative deviation of the response 
variable for the different grid sizes from 10x10 to 80x80 with 120x120 as reference case for 
comparison. While a low grid density leads to less precision, high grid densities require a lot 
of computation time.  
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Figure 8.1: Testing the grid density 
Notes: Own illustration. Relative deviation for the availability, public stocks, private stocks, 
planned production, price and exports in/from country A. The yellow bars show the maximal 
relative deviation, the red bars the mean relative deviation of the respective grid size compared to 
the reference case with a grid size of 120x120. The numbers above the graphs are the mean 
absolute deviation divided by 1000. The range of the respective response variables is indicated in 
the headlines after the variable name. 
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To compute these results, 900,000 realizations of the shock variable were used in order to 
guarantee a minimal bias from the simulations. The yellow bars show the maximal 
deviations, the red bars the mean deviations which are, divided by 1000, also indicated by the 
numbers above the bars. To ensure that the differences are not the result of different shocks, 
the same realizations of the shocks were used for all scenarios. It can be seen that even with 
very low grid sizes, the mean deviation is very small. However, the maximal deviation 
remains significant for some response variables if the grid densities are too low. A grid size 
of 50x50 was chosen which offers a high and sufficient precision while not requiring 
excessive computation times. 
 
Figure 8.2: Dependency of the price moments on simulated realizations 
Notes: Own illustration. The deviation of the mean (dark blue), the standard deviation (dark 
green), the skewness (red) and the kurtosis (light blue) of the price is shown for different amounts 
of simulated realization ranging from 20,000 to 580,000 with the simulation of 600,000 
realizations as reference case. For more than 100,000 realization, the mean and SD are below 
0.0006, the skewness below 0.006, and the kurtosis below 0.04, respectively. 
 
Imprecise results may not only be the outcome of a low grid size but also of using only few 
stochastic realizations of the shocks for estimating the moments, percentiles, and frequencies 
of the response variables. Hence, the deviations of the moments and percentiles depending on 
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the simulated realizations are calculated and illustrated in figures Figure 8.2 and Figure 8.3, 
respectively. The first and second moments can already be estimated with a high precision 
when few realizations are used, whereas skewness and in particular kurtosis still differ 
significantly for many realizations. Percentiles appear to be rather precise if at least 100,000 
realizations are used. Only the 99.9
th
 percentile shows a minor acceptable deviation of less 
than 0.0035. Overall, it is therefore concluded that simulating 120,000 realizations provides a 
sufficient level of precision. This number is split up into 600 cases starting from the steady 
state which are in each case followed by 200 stochastic realizations. 
 
Figure 8.3: Dependency of different price percentiles on simulated shock realizations 
Notes: Own illustration. The deviation of different price percentiles (0.1, 1, 5, 10, 25, 50, 75, 90, 
95, 99, 99.9) is shown for different amounts of simulated realization ranging from 20,000 to 
580,000 with the simulation of 600,000 realizations as reference case. The absolute deviation of 
all percentiles is below ±0.002 for more than 100,000 realizations except for the 99.9 percentile 
(light blue) whose deviation is below ±0.0035. 
8.3 Appendix for chapter 5 
The following two tables show the regression results for the non-extended data, i.e. for the 
years from 1990 to 2014 for which the October stocks are available from the FCI. 
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Table 8.2: Public rice stock regression using only available FCI October stock data 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Estimation Levels Levels FD FD 
L.Public Stocks .666*** 
(.105) 
1.18** 
(.45) 
.447 
(.305) 
.969** 
(.391) 
MSP 1.2*** 
(.414) 
1.03** 
(.485) 
1.33*** 
(.308) 
1.22*** 
(.409) 
Private Supply .241 
(.158) 
.454*** 
(.152) 
.187 
(.163) 
.362** 
(.141) 
Export Ban .039** 
(.017) 
.032** 
(.012) 
.042* 
(.02) 
.04** 
(.018) 
Above Buffer 
Norm 
 
 
.984 
(.73) 
 
 
.979 
(.657) 
Constant -.535** 
(.241) 
-.774*** 
(.195) 
1.6e-03 
(8.1e-03) 
2.1e-03 
(8.4e-03) 
BIC -85.8 -86 -70.9 -71.3 
R2 .802 .828 .456 .533 
Observations 24 24 23 23 
Notes: Own illustration. Robust standard errors in parentheses;* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 
0.01 
 
Table 8.3: Private rice stock regression using only available USDA or FAO data 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Private Stock Data USDA USDA FAO FAO 
Estimation IV-Levels IV-FD IV-Levels IV-FD 
Public Stocks -.472*** 
(.106) 
-.343*** 
(.099) 
-.627*** 
(.197) 
-.145 
(.177) 
Supply .289*** 
(.101) 
.226*** 
(.063) 
.41** 
(.177) 
.31*** 
(.069) 
Export Ban 
  
.038 
(.024) 
 
 
Constant -.244** 
(.113) 
-2.7e-03 
(4.1e-03) 
-.374* 
(.202) 
1.0e-03 
(5.0e-03) 
UI: LM / stat 7.14 3.85 6.23 2.5 
UI: LM/ p  .028 .05 .044 .287 
WI: F stat  39.5 17.7 6.63 6.72 
BIC -102 -107 -56.7 -55.9 
R2 .237 .419 .349 .592 
OI: Hansen J/stat .454 0 .038 2.19 
OI: Hansen J/p .5  .846 .139 
First-stage R2 .698 .32 .655 .288 
First-stage F 56.1 9.34 27.8 7.74 
Observations 24 23 16 15 
Notes: Own illustration. Robust standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 
0.01. Statistics used as in Table 5.3. 
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8.4 Appendix for chapter 6 
The following graphs show the influence of the price over time, i.e. the evolution of the p-
value of the price and other variables. This also indicates the robustness of the estimation. 
 
Figure 8.4: Significance of the wholesale prices over time (difference GMM estimator). 
(Own illustration) 
 
Figure 8.5: Significance of the wholesale prices over time (system GMM estimator). 
(Own illustration) 
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Figure 8.6: Significance of explanatory variables over time (difference GMM estimator) 
Notes: Own illustration. Results are for the second specification for corn. Not all explanatory 
variables are shown to maintain recognizability and the prices are the only variables which were 
varied over time. 
 
 
Figure 8.7: Significance of explanatory variables over time (system GMM estimator)  
Notes: Own illustration. Same notes as for Figure 8.6 apply. 
